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Abstracts 
 
This thesis consists of five interrelated papers: 
Paper 1: Adoption of multiple sustainable agricultural practices in rural Ethiopia 
The adoption and diffusion of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) have become an important issue in the 
development-policy agenda for Sub-Saharan Africa, especially as a way to tackle land degradation, low 
agricultural productivity, and poverty.  However, the adoption rates of SAPs remain below expected levels. This 
paper analyzes the factors that facilitate or impede the probability and level of adoption of interrelated SAPs, 
using recent data from multiple plot-level observations in rural Ethiopia. Multivariate and ordered probit models 
are applied to the modeling of adoption decisions by farm households facing multiple SAPs which can be 
adopted in various combinations.  The results show that there is a significant correlation between SAPs, 
suggesting that adoptions of SAPs are interrelated. The analysis further shows that both the probability and the 
extent of adoption of SAPs are influenced by many factors: a household’s trust in government support, credit 
constraints, spouse education, rainfall and plot-level disturbances, household wealth, social capital and networks, 
labor availability, plot and market access. These results imply that policy makers and development practitioners 
should seek to strengthen local institutions and service providers, maintain or increase household asset bases, and 
establish and strengthen social protection schemes, to improve the adoption of SAPs. 
JEL classification: Q01, Q12, Q16, Q18. 
Key words and phrases:  Multiple adoption; sustainable agriculture practices; multivariate probit; Ethiopia. 
Paper 2: Cropping systems diversification, conservation tillage and modern seed adoption in 
Ethiopia: Impacts on household income, agrochemical use and demand for labor   
The type and combination of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) adopted has a significant effect on 
agricultural productivity and food security. Previous studies on adoption and impact have focused on single 
practices. However, in reality several adoption decisions are made simultaneously. We developed a multinomial 
endogenous switching regression model of farmers’ choice of combination of SAPs and impacts on maize 
income and use of agrochemicals and family labor use in rural Ethiopia and found four primary results. First, 
adoption of SAPs increases maize income and the highest payoff is achieved when SAPs are adopted in 
combination rather than in isolation. Second, nitrogen fertilizer use is lower in the package that contains systems 
diversification and conservation tillage. Third, conservation tillage increased pesticide application and labor 
demand, perhaps to compensate for reduced tillage. However, when it is used jointly with systems diversification 
practices such as legume rotations it does not have a significant impact on pesticide and labor use. Fourth, since 
women contribute much of the farm labor needed for staple crops, adoption of packages increases their 
workload, in most cases, suggesting that agricultural intensification technology interventions may not be gender 
neutral. This implies that policy makers and other stakeholders promoting a combination of technologies can 
enhance household food security through increasing income and reducing production costs, but need to be aware 
of the potential gender related outcomes. 
JEL classification: Q01, Q12, Q57 
Keywords and phrases: Agrochemical use, demand for labor, Ethiopia, income, multinomial switching 
regression, sustainable agricultural practices  
Paper 3: The impact of shadow prices and farmers’ impatience on the allocation of a 
multipurpose renewable resource in Ethiopia 
In a mixed farming system in which farmyard manure (FYM) is considered an important multipurpose 
renewable resource that can be used to enhance soil organic matter, provide additional income, and supply 
household energy, soil fertility depletion could take place within the perspective of the allocation pattern of 
FYM. This paper estimates a system of FYM allocation regressions to examine the role of returns to FYM and 
farmers’ impatience on the propensity to allocate FYM to different uses. We parameterize the model using data 
from a sample of 493 households in Ethiopia. Results indicate a heightened incentive for diverting FYM from 
farming to marketing for burning outside the household when returns to selling FYM and the farmer’s discount 
rate are high. These reveal the need for policies that will help to reduce farmers’ impatience and encourage the 
substitution of alternative energy sources to use FYM as a sustainable land management practice. 
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JEL Classification: Q01, Q12 
Key words and phrases: Impatience, Shadow price, Allocation, Farmyard manure, Ethiopia 
Paper 4: Jointness in agricultural production and livestock technology adoption in Ethiopia 
Even though farmyard manure is considered a promising soil fertilizer in many developing countries, its use in 
soil fertility restoration is constrained by a multitude of factors. Yet the adoption of a crop-livestock technology 
could relax these constraints. This paper examines the impact of a joint crop-livestock technology on farmyard 
manure production and the effect of farmers’ risk preference on livestock technology adoption. An endogenous 
switching regression model is employed to account for self-selection in technology adoption. The model is 
implemented using survey data from 491 households collected in the central highlands of Ethiopia. The results 
show that farmers’ risk preference, distance to the extension service center, and market access to complementary 
inputs significantly influence the adoption of improved livestock technology. Adoption of crossbreeding 
technology creates a positive and significant impact on organic fertilizer production. The positive indirect effect 
of crop technology is significantly higher for those who adopt livestock technology. This implies that a policy 
supporting crop-livestock synergies through joint provision of technologies is important in order to increase 
agricultural productivity through better soil fertility management. 
JEL Classification: Q01, Q12, Q16 
Key words and phrases: mixed farming, organic fertilizer, technology, switching, Ethiopia 
Paper 5: Risk preferences as determinants of soil conservation decisions in Ethiopia 
Soil degradation is one of the most serious environmental problems in the highlands of Ethiopia. The prevalence 
of traditional agricultural land use and the absence of appropriate resource management often result in the 
degradation of natural soil fertility. This has important implications for soil productivity, household food 
security, and poverty. Given the extreme vulnerability of farmers in this area, we hypothesized that farmers’ risk 
preferences might affect the sustainability of resource use. This study presents experimental results on the 
willingness of farmers to take risks and relates the subjective risk preferences to actual soil conservation 
decisions. The study looks at a random sample of 143 households with 597 farming plots. We find that a high 
degree of risk aversion significantly decreases the probability of adopting soil conservation. This implies that 
reducing farmers’ risk exposure could promote soil conservation practices and thus more sustainable natural 
resource management. This might be achieved by improving tenure security, promoting access to extension 
services and education, and developing income-generating off-farm activities. 
JEL Classification:  Q12, Q16, Q24, D81 
Key words and phrases:  Adoption, Ethiopia, risk preference, soil conservation 
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Overview 
In countries where agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, soil fertility depletion in 
smallholder farming is one of the fundamental consequences of environmental problems 
causing low agricultural productivity. In the absence of appropriate resource management 
practices, the traditional farming method inevitably leads to degradation in the resource base 
with important implications for soil productivity, household food insecurity, and rural 
poverty. Concern over the consequences of land degradation for agricultural productivity and 
off-farm externalities has led many government and non-governmental organizations to 
encourage a wide range of sustainable agricultural practices. The design of policy to 
encourage the wider use of sustainable farming practices requires analysis of farmers’ 
decisions and their potential implications (Wu and Babcock, 1998; Kassie et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, this thesis consists of five interrelated papers that study the adoption and 
economics of sustainable agricultural practices from a variety of angles with empirical 
evidence from rural Ethiopia. 
Most previous adoption and impact studies have focused on analysis of a single technology 
while in reality farmers are typically faced with technology alternatives that may be adopted 
sequentially and/or simultaneously as complements, substitutes, or supplements to deal with 
their overlapping constraints (Dorfman, 1996; Khanna, 2001). Farmers adopt combinations of 
different agricultural technologies because of their synergies to improve soil fertility, suppress 
weeds, pests and diseases, and improve crop productivity. This suggests that the adoption of 
one technology may influence the adoption of other technologies. 
The first paper, titled Adoption of multiple sustainable agricultural practices in rural 
Ethiopia, contributes to the growing economic literature on sustainable agriculture by 
applying an estimation method that considers the joint decision to adopt multiple types of 
SAPs such as crop rotation, modern crop varieties, inorganic fertilizer, manure, and 
conservation tillage. The study also extends the focus from the probability of adoption to the 
levels of adoption as measured by the number of SAPs adopted. The results show that there is 
strong complementarity and substitutability between SAPs, indicating the interdependence of 
SAP adoption. Studies that consider the adoption of multiple SAPs in isolation could lose 
important cross-technology correlation effects, and potentially yield biased estimates. The 
cross-technology correlation may have important policy implications in that a policy change 
that can affect one SAP may have spillover effects on other SAPs. Most importantly, the 
results show that the probability and extent of adoption of SAPs are influenced by several 
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factors: social capital in the form of membership of rural institutions, credit constraint, spouse 
education, asset ownership, distance to markets, mode of transportation, rainfall and plot-level 
disturbances, number of relatives and traders that the farmer knows in and outside his village, 
the farmer’s trust in government support in case of crop failure, and confidence in the skills of 
extension agents. 
Using a multinomial endogenous switching framework, the second paper “Cropping systems 
diversification, conservation tillage and modern seed adoption in Ethiopia: Impacts on 
household income, agrochemical use and demand for labor” analyzes adoption of alternative 
combinations of SAPs and examines the implications of adopting various combinations of 
these practices on outcome variables such as maize net income, agrochemical (nitrogen  
fertilizer and pesticide) use, and female and male labour demand for agricultural operations. 
The results show that adoption of SAP combinations significantly increases maize income, 
and that the package that contains all components of SAPs provides the highest income. This 
has promising policy implication: For example, the results can provide a framework for 
decision making for policy makers and other development practitioners to promote an 
alternative combination of SAPs so as to enhance household food security. Adoption of a full 
package has a positive effect on nitrogen and pesticide application as well as on the use of 
women’s and men’s labor on farm. However, it also appears that bio-diversification or 
conservation tillage or both with traditional varieties substituted for the insurance component 
of N use. This enables farmers to reduce N without significantly affecting income. On the 
other hand, comparing the change in pesticide use with the adoption of a package involving 
conservation tillage and bio-diversification with modern and traditional maize varieties 
reveals that pesticide application does not increase significantly when conservation tillage and 
bio-diversification are used with traditional maize varieties. In this regard, SAPs do have 
beneficial environmental effects in terms of reduced external off-farm inputs.   
The third and fourth papers focus on soil nutrient cycling in the form of organic fertilizer 
such as farm yard manure in the mixed crop-livestock system. Crop-livestock systems can 
potentially play a key role in soil fertility management and in ecological balance. Livestock 
plays a crucial role in recycling of waste products and residues from cropping and agro-
industries, and manure from livestock is used for crop production. Farmyard manure (FYM) 
use has often been suggested as a method of improving soil fertility in crop-livestock systems. 
The benefits of using FYM in crop production include improvements in the physical 
properties of soil, increases in soil organic matter content, and provision of N, P, K, and other 
xii 
 
mineral nutrients. Despite these benefits, the use of manure is constrained by limited supply 
due to low performance of indigenous livestock, lack of adoption of improved livestock 
technologies, and improved fodder.  
Under the limited availability of FYM, the household allocation patterns of FYM are also 
interlinked with management of soil resources in such a way that the demand for FYM for 
energy within and outside farm households shifts the resources so that the application of FYM 
for improving soil fertility is limited. Therefore, building on the economic theory of the 
agricultural household model under credit and financial constraints, the thesis extends the 
existing economics literature on soil fertility depletion by examining the effect of the farmer’s 
discount rate (farmer’s impatience) and various returns to FYM on the propensity to allocate 
FYM as an input for agricultural production or for burning it as fuel within and outside farm 
households.  
The empirical analysis is based on a system of equations concerning farmers’ allocation of 
FYM for different purposes. The data indicates that farmers with a high degree of impatience 
tend to decrease the allocation of FYM to the farm, and the higher the selling price of FYM, 
the higher the incentive for farmers to sell FYM for burning outside the farm households. In 
order to encourage adoption of FYM farming as a sustainable land management practice, the 
results suggest that incentive policies may be developed in conjunction with the fuel pricing 
system such as promotion and dissemination of improved stoves not only to the rural areas but 
also to the surrounding towns. The high discount rates in this study, on the other hand, 
indicate that most farm households disregard the use of FYM farming, with effects on the 
sustainable management of soil resources. This implies that the poverty reduction scheme and 
ensuring the functioning of rural credit markets are also an important policy directions 
associated with sustainable land management practices. 
Moreover, the jointness of crops and livestock production in the mixed farming system is 
often considered an opportunity for smallholder farmers to move toward sustainable 
agricultural production because of the associated intensified organic matter and nutrient 
recycling (Marenya and Barrett, 2007). Hence, joint crop-livestock technologies in the mixed 
farming system could be understood in that technologies for crop production are likely to 
improve livestock feed and productivity. These effects, jointly with livestock technologies, 
could improve income and crop-livestock nutrient transfers by increasing the availability of 
FYM.  However, empirical research on the impact of joint crop-livestock technologies in a 
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mixed farming system on the availability of FYM is limited. Additionally, although there is a 
wealth of empirical studies on agricultural technology adoption and its economic and 
environmental impacts, studies on the adoption of livestock technology in developing 
countries are very scarce. The study aims to examine the impact of joint crop-livestock 
technology on farmyard manure production and identify factors constraining livestock 
technology adoption using an endogenous switching regression model to account for self-
selection in technology adoption. 
The results indicate that the likelihood of adopting livestock technology (crossbreeding cattle) 
is positively correlated with complementary livestock production inputs such as an improved 
grazing system, access to extension services, veterinary services, and improved feeds. It is, 
however, negatively correlated with a farmer’s risk aversion. The extent of the FYM 
production gap between adopter and non-adopter of livestock technology suggests that the 
non-adopters might face difficulties in increasing FYM production without using the 
improved livestock technologies. The most salient implication of the above results is 
provision of technologies consistent with joint intensification of the crop and livestock 
system.  
The last paper Risk preferences as determinants of soil conservation decisions in Ethiopia 
starts out by reviewing how the sustainable use of land in the Ethiopian highlands faces 
problems due to continuous cropping and repeated cultivation of sloping lands without proper 
consideration of soil conservation and fertility amendments. Soil erosion – averaging 4.2 
metric tons of soil loss per hectare per year – is a huge contributor to the low productivity of 
Ethiopian soils (Hurni, 1993). As a result, soil erosion is putting some 20,000-30,000 ha of 
croplands out of use annually (Bewket, 2007; FAO, 1986). The traditional explanations for 
soil degradation relate to resource depletion and land mismanagement associated with limited 
soil conservation practices. Some studies on the economics of soil conservation in developing 
countries have suggested incentives for farmers to adopt soil conservation by analyzing their 
household characteristics and the features and attributes of their farm operations (Thao, 2001; 
Gebremedhin and Scott, 2003). Generally, land tenure arrangements, soil characteristics, input 
and output prices, availability of off-farm employment, farm size, household size, discount 
rates, and government policies influence the use of (or refusal to use) soil conservation 
measures by farmers in developing countries. Rarely, however, has the influence of risk 
aversion for adoption of soil conservation practices been addressed. Strong empirical 
evidence to test the impact of risk aversion has been scarce and scattered. In practice, the 
xiv 
 
major benefit that a farmer receives from soil conservation is the soil itself – a potential asset 
for future income.  
In many cases, practical strategies to reduce soil erosion introduce economic risks that reduce 
their potential value. Considering the importance of risk, Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009) 
indicated that, in countries where poverty and environmental degradation are intertwined and 
credit and insurance markets are imperfect or completely absent, the critical factors affecting 
sustainability of resource use are the extent to which people discount the future and their 
willingness to undertake risky activities, such as investment decisions. This study, therefore, 
elicits smallholder farmers’ attitudes toward risk using an experimental method and 
empirically examines the effects of farmers’ risk preferences and other socioeconomic factors 
on soil conservation decisions at the farm level. Results from the experiment indicate that the 
estimated risk aversion is high and the majority of the farmers were found to have 
intermediate, severe, or extreme risk aversion. Empirical results from the multinomial logit 
analysis demonstrate that a high degree of risk aversion has a negative effect on adoption of 
labor-intensive soil conservation practices. Farmers’ risk aversion increases the likelihood of 
non-adoption of stone terraces and soil bund practices. The results imply that, to promote soil 
conservation, policies that reduce farmers’ risk behavior should have priority, especially those 
that address land tenure security and rights, access to better education and extension services, 
and development of income-generating off-farm activities. 
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(Forthcoming in Journal of Agricultural Economics) 
 
Abstract 
The adoption and diffusion of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) have become an 
important issue in the development-policy agenda for Sub-Saharan Africa, especially as a way 
to tackle land degradation, low agricultural productivity, and poverty.  However, the adoption 
rates of SAPs remain below expected levels. This paper analyzes the factors that facilitate or 
impede the probability and level of adoption of interrelated SAPs, using recent data from 
multiple plot-level observations in rural Ethiopia. Multivariate and ordered probit models are 
applied to the modeling of adoption decisions by farm households facing multiple SAPs 
which can be adopted in various combinations.  The results show that there is a significant 
correlation between SAPs, suggesting that adoptions of SAPs are interrelated. The analysis 
further shows that both the probability and the extent of adoption of SAPs are influenced by 
many factors: a household’s trust in government support, credit constraints, spouse education, 
rainfall and plot-level disturbances, household wealth, social capital and networks, labor 
availability, plot and market access. These results imply that policy makers and development 
practitioners should seek to strengthen local institutions and service providers, maintain or 
increase household asset bases, and establish and strengthen social protection schemes, to 
improve the adoption of SAPs.  
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1. Introduction  
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), although significant progress has been made in increasing 
production over the last four decades, productivity has not increased significantly (Pretty et 
al., 2011; IFAD, 2011). The major increase in production comes from expansion of land 
under cultivation and shorter fallow periods (IFAD, 2011). Population growth is continuing, 
however, arable land is shrinking in many areas. Thus, the extensification path and the 
practice of letting the land lie fallow for long periods are rapidly becoming impractical, 
making continuous cropping a common practice in many areas. This leads to land 
degradation, low productivity, and poverty in the region. Increasing productivity through 
expansion of agricultural technologies is a key, if not the only, strategy option to increase 
production. The adoption and diffusion of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs)1 have 
become an important issue in the development-policy agenda for SSA (Scoones and Toulmin, 
1993; Ajayi, 2007; Kassie et al., 2012), especially as a way to tackle land degradation, low 
agricultural productivity, and poverty.  
      Despite the multiple benefits of SAPs and considerable efforts by national and 
international organizations to encourage farmers to invest in them, the adoption rate of SAPs 
is still low in rural areas of developing countries (Somda et al., 2002; Tenge et al., 2004; 
Jansen et al., 2006; Kassie et al., 2009; Wollni et al., 2010). This is true for Ethiopia, where 
despite accelerated erosion and considerable efforts to promote various soil- and water-
conservation technologies, the adoption of many recommended measures is minimal, and soil 
degradation continues to be a major constraint to productivity growth and sustainable 
intensification. A better understanding of constraints that condition farmers’ adoption 
behavior for these practices is therefore important for designing promising pro-poor policies 
that could stimulate their adoption and increase productivity. 
    Adoption analysis of agricultural technologies has long been emphasized for green 
revolution technologies (chemical fertilizer and improved seeds) and physical soil and water 
conservation technologies (e.g., Gebremedhin and Scott, 2003; Bluffstone and Köhlin, 2011; 
Isham, 2002; Kassie et al., 2011). However, scant attention has been paid to the factors that 
impede or facilitate the adoption of conservation tillage, maize–legume intercropping, and 
crop rotations. Past research also focused on the adoption of component technologies in 
                                                          
1 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 1989) argues that sustainable agriculture consists of five major 
attributes: (1) it conserves resources, (2) it is environmentally non-degrading, (3) it is technically appropriate, (4) 
it is economically acceptable, and (5) socially acceptable.  Accordingly, SAPs broadly defined include various 
practices such as conservation tillage, legume intercropping, legume crop rotations, improved crop varieties, the 
use of animal manure, the complementary use of inorganic fertilizers, and soil and stone bunds for soil and water 
conservation (D’Souza et al., 1993; Lee 2005, Kassie et al., 2010; Wollni et al., 2010). 
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isolation, while farmers typically adopt and adapt multiple technologies as complements or 
substitutes that deal with their overlapping constraints. In addition, technology adoption 
decisions are path dependent: the choice of technologies adopted most recently by farmers is 
partly dependent on their earlier technology choices. Analysis of adoption without controlling 
for technology interdependence and simultaneous adoption in complex farming systems may 
underestimate or overestimate the influence of various factors on the technology choices (Wu 
and Babcock, 1998).   
      The present paper contributes to the growing adoption literature on SAPs, including, inter 
alia, Gebermedhin and Scott, 2001; Pender and Gebermedhin, 2007; Lee, 2005; Bluffstone 
and Köhlin, 2011; Kassie et al., 2009, 2010, 2012; Marenya and Barrett 2007, Wollni et al., 
2010. Our contribution is in four major directions: first, our analysis uses a comprehensive 
large plot-level survey conducted recently of maize–legume farming systems of Ethiopia; 
second, we consider methods that recognize the interdependence between different practices 
and jointly analyze the decision to adopt multiple SAPs, including maize–legume rotation, 
conservation tillage, improved maize seed varieties (hereafter improved seed), inorganic 
fertilizer, and manure. Identifying the nature of interrelationships of the set of practices is 
relevant to the long standing debate of whether famers adopt technology in a piecemeal or in a 
package and helps policy makers and development practitioners to define their strategies for 
promoting agricultural technologies. Third, we concentrate on the relative importance of 
social capital and networks, market transaction costs, confidence in the skill of extension 
agents, reliance on government support, (social insurance), household wealth, individual 
rainfall stress and plot-level incidence stresses, in determining the probability and level of 
adoption of SAPs. Fourth, we extend the focus from the probability of an adoption decision to 
the extent of adoption as measured by the number of SAPs adopted. 
    The following section presents the econometric framework and estimation strategies. 
Section 3 presents study areas, sampling, data and description of variables, followed by a 
presentation of results and discussions in section 4. The last section summarizes and 
concludes, highlighting key findings and policy implications. 
 
2. Econometric framework and estimation strategies 
Farmers adopt a mix of technologies to deal with a multitude of agricultural production 
constraints, so the adoption decision is inherently multivariate. Attempting univariate 
modeling would exclude useful economic information about interdependent and simultaneous 
adoption decisions (Dorfman, 1996). Our econometric specification is two parts: first, 
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farmers’ choice of inter-related SAPs is modeled using a multivariate probit model (MVP); 
second, we analyze the determinants of the extent of combinations of SAPs adopted, using 
pooled and random effects ordered probit models, since we have multiple plot observations 
per household. To overcome the possible correlation of plot invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity with observed covariates, we use Mundlak’s (1978) approach where the 
unobserved heterogeneity is parameterized by the mean values of plot varying covariates.2 
For application of this approach using cross-sectional multiple plot observations see Kassie et 
al., (2008) and Di Falco et al., (2012). 
 
2.1 A multivariate probit model 
In a single-equation statistical model, information on a farmer’s adoption of one SAP does not 
alter the likelihood of his adopting another SAP. However, the MVP approach simultaneously 
models the influence of the set of explanatory variables on each of the different practices, 
while allowing for the potential correlation between unobserved disturbances, as well as the 
relationship between the adoption of different practices (Belderbos et al., 2004). One source 
of correlation may be complementarity (positive correlation) or substitutability (negative 
correlation) between different practices (ibid). Failure to capture unobserved factors and 
interrelationships among adoption decisions regarding different practices will lead to bias and 
inefficient estimates (Greene, 2008). 
    The observed outcome of SAP adoption can be modeled following a random utility 
formulation. Consider the thi  farm household ) ., . ,.1( Ni =  facing a decision on whether or not 
to adopt the available SAP on plot )..., ,1(  Ppp = . Let 0U  represent the benefits to the 
farmer from traditional management practices, and let kU  represent the benefit of adopting 
the thk SAP: where k  denotes choice of crop rotation )(R , conservation tillage )(T , improved 
crop variety )(V , inorganic fertilizer )(F , and manure use )(M . The farmer decides to adopt 
the thk SAP on plot p  if 00
** >−= UUY kipk . The net benefit (
*
ipkY ) that the farmer derives from 
the adoption of thk  SAP is a latent variable determined by observed household, plot and 
location characteristics )( ipX and the error term )( ipε : 
ipkipipk XY εβ +′=
*  ),,,,( TMFVRk =   (1) 
Using the indicator function, the unobserved preferences in equation (1) translate into the 
observed binary outcome equation for each choice as follows: 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of a fixed effects model. 
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    In the multivariate model, where the adoption of several SAPs is possible, the error terms 
jointly follow a multivariate normal distribution (MVN) with zero conditional mean and 
variance normalized to unity (for identification of the parameters) where: 
),0(.~),,,,( ΩMVNuuuuu TMFVR and the symmetric covariance matrix Ω is given by: 
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    (3) 
Of particular interest are the off-diagonal elements in the covariance matrix, which represent 
the unobserved correlation between the stochastic components of the different types of SAPs. 
This assumption means that equation (2) generates a MVP model that jointly represents 
decisions to adopt a particular farming practice. This specification with non-zero off-diagonal 
elements allows for correlation across the error terms of several latent equations, which 
represent unobserved characteristics that affect the choice of alternative SAPs.  
    When analyzing the determinants of adoption, we take into account the influence of non-
observable household characteristics on adoption decisions. For instance, there may be a 
correlation between plot invariant characteristics (e.g., managerial ability) and the decision to 
adopt a technology.  A pooled MVP model is consistent only under the assumption that 
unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with observed explanatory variables.  We exploited 
the multiple/repeated plot observations nature of our data and estimated equation (2) with and 
without Mundlak’s (1978) approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity,3 which involves 
including the means of plot varying explanatory variables (e.g., average of plot 
characteristics, plot distance to residence) as additional covariates in the regression model.  
 
2.2 Ordered probit model 
 The MVP model specified above only considers the probability of adoption of SAPs, with no 
distinction made between, for example, those farmers who adopt one practice and those who 
use multiple SAPs in combination. The ordered probit model allows us to analyze the factors 
that influence the adoption of a combination of practices (number of practices) as well as 
                                                          
3 Alternatively, a fixed effects model could have been used. However, with this approach and the nature of our 
data, it would not be feasible to estimate plot invariant covariates as the model relies on data transformation to 
remove unobserved heterogeneity. 
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individual practices and, also the variables that affect the probability of adoption may 
differently affect the intensity of adoption. 
    In the case of multiple SAP adoption, defining a cut-off point between adopters and non-
adopters is the main problem in examining the factors influencing the level of adoption of 
SAPs (Wollni et al., 2010). In our case, many farmers will not adopt the whole package; some 
apply only a mix of some SAPs on their farms but not others. As a result, for SAPs as a 
package, it is difficult to quantify the extent of adoption, for instance by the fraction of area 
under SAPs, as is usually done in adoption literature. To overcome this problem, following 
D’Souza et al. (1993) and Wollni et al. (2010) we use the number of SAPs adopted as our 
dependent variable measuring extent of adoption. Information on the number of SAPs 
adopted could have been treated as a count variable. Count data is usually analyzed using a 
Poisson regression model but the underlying assumption is that all events have the same 
probability of occurrence (Wollni et al., 2010). However, in our application the probability of 
adopting the first SAP could differ from the probability of adopting a second or third practice, 
given that in the latter case the farmer has already gained some experience with adoption of a 
SAP and has been exposed to information about the practice. Hence we treat the number of 
SAPs adopted by farmers as an ordinal variable and use an ordered probit model in the 
estimation, augmented with the pooled and random effect specification and Mundlak’s (1978) 
approach by including the mean of plot varying covariates to capture the correlation between 
observed covariates and unobserved heterogeneity.  
  
3. Study areas, sampling, data and description of variables 
The data used for this study are derived from a farm household survey in Ethiopia conducted 
during the period October–December 2010 by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research 
(EIAR) in collaboration with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center 
(CIMMYT), to identify the key factors influencing the simultaneous adoption of several 
agricultural technologies and practices, and the impact of these on household welfare in the 
maize–legume cropping system zones. The sample covers a total of 898 farm households and 
4,050 farming plots. In this study, we focused on maize plots (1,616) because maize is the 
largest cereal commodity in terms of its share of total cultivated area, total production, and 
role in direct human consumption.  In the study area, maize accounts for over 50% and 76% 
of the total cultivated land and consumption of own production, respectively.              
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     A multistage sampling procedure was employed to select peasant associations (PAs)4 from 
each district, and households from each PA. First, based on their maize–legume production 
potential, nine districts were selected from three regional states of Ethiopia: Amhara, Oromia 
and SNNRP Region. Second, based on proportionate random sampling, 3–6 PAs in each 
district, and 16–24 farm households in each PA were selected.   
Data and descriptive statistics 
A structured questionnaire was prepared, and the sampled respondents were interviewed by 
experienced interviewers under close supervision by researchers from CIMMYT and EIAR. 
The questionnaire consisted of detailed items about household, plot, and village data 
including input and output market access, household composition, education, asset ownership, 
herd size, various sources of income, participation in credit markets, membership of formal 
and informal organizations, trust, stresses, participation and confidence in extension services, 
cropping pattern, crop production, land tenure, adoption of SAPs and a wide range of plot-
specific attributes. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables (SAPs) we consider are: maize–legume rotation; conservation 
tillage; animal manure use; improved seed; inorganic fertilizer use.  
    The maize–legume rotation system (temporal bio-diversification) is one option for 
sustainable intensification that can help farmers to increase crop productivity through N 
fixation and also helps to maintain productivity in a changing climate that could bring new 
pests and diseases due to warmer weather (Delgado et al., 2011). Maize–legume crop rotation 
was practiced on 23.2% of the plots during the cropping season used for this analysis. 
    Conservation tillage is part of a sustainable agricultural system, as soil disturbance is 
minimized and crop residue or stubble is allowed to remain on the ground with the 
accompanying benefits of better soil aeration and improved soil fertility. Minimum soil 
disturbance requires less traction power and less C emissions from the soil (Delgado et al., 
2011). In our case, conservation tillage practices entail reduced tillage (only one pass) and/or 
zero tillage and letting the stubble lie on the plot.  Conservation tillage is used on 36.3% of 
maize plots. 
    Manure use refers to the application of livestock waste to the farming plot. It is a major 
component of a sustainable agricultural system with the potential benefits of long-term 
maintenance of soil fertility, organic matter content and supply of nutrients, especially 
                                                          
4These are the lowest administrative structure in Ethiopia. 
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nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K). The average quantity of manure used in our 
sample was 1.25 t/ha, although, those using manure (27.3% of plots) typically use 5 t/ha. 
    The introduction of modern maize varieties could improve food security and income for the 
rapidly-growing population by improving productivity. The National Maize Research Project 
of Ethiopia has recommended a number of improved maize varieties adapted to the different 
maize agro-ecologies of the country. However, the total area planted with modern maize 
varieties is still about 50% in our sample and only 52.5% of maize plots are planted with 
improved maize varieties.  
    The average inorganic fertilizer used for maize in the study areas was 43 kg N/ha and 13 kg 
P/ha. 67% of the maize plots received fertilizer and farmers who use fertilizer applied 57 kg 
N/ha and 18 kg P/ha. This is very low compared to the official extension recommendation of 
92 kg N/ha and 69 kg P/ha. 67.3% of the maize sample plots were treated with inorganic 
fertilizer. 
Independent variables 
The adoption models include several explanatory variables based on the economic theory and 
empirical literature on the adoption of sustainable land management and integrated natural 
resource management (D’Souza et al., 1993; Neill and Lee, 2001; Isham, 2002; Arellanes and 
Lee, 2003; Gebremedhin and Scott, 2003; Lee, 2005; Marenya and Barrett 2007; Knowler and 
Bradshaw, 2007; Kassie et al., 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012; Wollni et al., 2010). The description 
and summary statistics of the variables are given in Table 1. Detailed descriptions of the 
explanatory variables are as follows. 
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Table 1. Definitions and summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis 
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Household and farm characteristics     
FAMLYSZIE Family size 6.84 2.83 
SEX 1=household head is male 0.92 0.28 
AGE Age of the household head 42 13 
EDUCATHEAD Years of education of the household head 3.42 3.42 
EDUCATSPOUS Years of education of the spouse 1.41 2.85 
PLOTDIST Plot distance from home, minutes 11.3 27.4 
RENTDPLT 1=rented plot 0.15 - 
SHALDEPT 1=shallow depth of soil 0.20 - 
MEDMDEPT 1=medium depth of soil 0.44 - 
GODSOIL 1=good soil quality 0.40 - 
MEDMSOIL 1=medium soil quality 0.51 - 
FLATSLOP 1=flat plot slope 0.62 - 
MEDMSLOP 1=medium slope plot 0.33 - 
Resource constraints   
FARMSIZE Farm size, ha 2.22 2.88 
ASSETVALUE Total value of assets, Birr5 19543 50331 
OTHERINCOM 1=the household earns other income and transfers 0.65 - 
TLU Livestock herd size (tropical livestock units; TLU) 12.38 12.18 
CREDIT 1=credit is a constraint (credit is needed but unable to get) 0.30 - 
Market access     
MEANSTRANS 1=walking to market as means of transportation 0.44 - 
WALKDIST Walking distance to input markets, minutes 59.8 56.6 
Social capital     
RELATIVE Number of close relatives living in and outside the village 10 11 
KNOWTRUST Number of grain traders that farmers know and trust 2.45 4.00 
MEMBER 1=member in input/marketing/labor rural institutions/group 0.24 - 
Extension service    
EXTMAZLEG Frequency of extension contact on maize/legume varieties, days/year 7.3 18.1 
EXTPEST Frequency of extension contact on pest control, days/year 3.0 9.1 
EXTROTAT Frequency of extension contact on crop rotation, days/year 2.9 8.1 
EXTTILAGE Frequency of extension contact on tillage practices, days/year 3.4 12.4 
CONFDNT 1=confident with skills of extension workers 0.82 - 
Stresses 
  RAININDEX Rainfall index (1= best) 0.52 0.30 
PESTSTRES 1=pest and disease stress 0.12 - 
WATRLOGG 1=water logging/drought stress 0.22 - 
FROSTSTRES 1=frost/hailstorm stress 0.06 - 
RELYGOVT 1=rely on government support in case of crop failure 0.39 - 
Location dummies      
WESTSHOA 1=west Shewa zone 0.21 - 
EASTWELEGA 1=east Welega zone 0.07 - 
WESTARSI 1=west Arsi zone 0.13 - 
HADYA 1=Hadiya zone 0.11 - 
GURAGE 1=Gurage zone 0.09 - 
SIDAMA 1=Sidama zone 0.10 - 
EASTSHOA 1=east Shewa zone 0.22 - 
METEKEL 1=Metekel 0.08 - 
Plot observations  1,616  
Household observations  898  
                                                          
5 1 Birr = 0.059 USD at the time of survey. 
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Farm and household characteristics 
We include several plot-specific attributes, including soil fertility6, soil depth7, plot slope8 , plot 
tenure status and spatial distance of the plot from the farmer’s home (walking distance in 
minutes). On average, landowners operate on four plots of 0.5 ha each, and these plots are often 
not spatially adjacent (as far as 5 hours walking time away). Distance of plots to residence is an 
important determinant of the adoption of SAPs because of increased transaction costs on the 
farthest plot, particularly the cost of transporting bulky materials/inputs. For instance, plots 
treated with manure are closer to the residence (about 6 minutes walking time) than plots that are 
not treated with manure (about 13 minutes walking time). Distant plots usually receive less 
attention and less frequent monitoring in terms of, e.g., watching and guarding. This is especially 
true for maize and legume crops, which are edible at green stage and hence farmers are less 
likely to adopt SAPs on such plots.   
We control for socio-demographic characteristics relevant to adoption decision, such as 
family size, age, gender, and education level of the household head and spouse. 92% of the 
sample households have a male head. The number of years of education range from 2 to 4 years 
across the study areas with only 55% of the household heads having at least primary education.  
Farm technology adoption decisions may not only be made by the head of the household, but can 
be part of an overall household strategy (Zepeda and Castillo, 1997). Therefore, we also include 
the education level of the spouse when we examine the role of human capital in the adoption of 
SAPs. The average level of education of the spouses in the study area is 1.3 years; with only 
30% of spouses having at least primary education. 
Input-output market access 
Access to market variables are directly associated with the transaction costs associated with input 
and output marketing activities, and can negatively influence the smallholder’s adoption of 
SAPs, through increasing travel time and transport costs. Transaction costs are barriers to market 
participation by resource-poor smallholders, and are factors responsible for significant market 
failures in developing countries (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). Market access is measured here 
by distance to the input markets (in minutes walking time) and by means of transportation used 
to the output markets, a dummy variable equal to one if farmers are walking to the market, and 
zero if farmers use other transportation systems (such as a public transport , bicycle or 
donkey/horse cart). The average walking distance to input markets is about 1 hour, and only 56% 
                                                          
6 the farmer ranked each plot as “poor”, “medium” or “good”. 
7 the farmer ranked each plot as “deep”, “medium deep” or “shallow”. 
8 the farmer ranked each plot as “flat”, “medium slope” or steep slope”. 
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of households use different transportation means (public transport, bicycle or donkey/horse cart) 
to visit the market.  
Resource constraints 
As a measure of wealth of the household, we include the total value of all non-land assets, 
livestock ownership (in tropical livestock units; TLU) and farm size. We also include a dummy 
variable equal to one if the household receives a remittance in the form of cash and/or 
participates in off-farm work as an indicator for working capital. Farm size is often thought to be 
a prerequisite for obtaining credit. In Ethiopia, farmers must have at least 0.5 ha under maize to 
participate in the credit scheme for maize (Doss, 2006).  
    Credit constraints are frequently mentioned in technology adoption literature. To measure 
whether a farmer has access to credit we follow the Feder et al., (1990) approach of constructing 
a credit-access variable. This measure of credit tries to distinguish between farmers who choose 
not to use available credit, and farmers who do not have access to credit, since many non-
borrowers do not borrow because they actually have sufficient liquidity from their own 
resources, and not because they cannot obtain credit, while some cannot borrow because they are 
not creditworthy, do not have collateral, or fear risk (Feder et al., 1990; Doss, 2006). In this 
study, the respondent is asked to answer two sequential questions: whether credit is needed or 
not, and if yes, whether credit is obtained for farming operations or not. The credit-constrained 
farmers are then defined as those who need credit but are unable to get it (30%). Accordingly, 
the credit-unconstrained farmers are those who do not need credit (40%) and those who need 
credit and are able to get it (30%). 
Stresses 
Smallholder farming in Ethiopia is often subject to environmental disturbances such as drought, 
waterlogging, floods, untimely or uneven distribution of rainfall, incidence of pest and diseases, 
and frost. Understanding the impact of these disturbances on the adoption of SAPs is relatively 
neglected, but these stresses contribute to an erosion of farmers’ confidence in adopting 
technology. We include self-reported rainfall and plot-level crop-production disturbances to 
account for the farm-specific environmental disturbance experience. We follow the Quisumbing 
(2003) approach to construct the rainfall disturbance variable based on respondents’ subjective 
rainfall satisfaction in terms of timeliness, amount and distribution. The individual rainfall index 
relates to rainfall in the preceding three seasons, based on such questions as whether rainfall 
came and stopped on time, whether there was enough rain at the beginning and during the 
growing season, and whether it rained at harvest time. Responses to each of these questions 
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(either yes or no) were coded as favorable or unfavorable rainfall outcomes, and averaged over 
the number of questions asked (five questions) so that the best outcome would be close to one 
and the worst close to zero9. Plot-level disturbance is captured by the three most common 
stresses affecting crop production: attacks by pests and diseases, water logging, and drought, 
frost and hailstorm stress. The effect of these plot-level disturbances on the adoption of SAPs 
depends on the type of SAP. For instance, credit constrained farmers may be less likely to adopt 
SAPs that involve cash expenditure, such as fertilizer and seed varieties, compared to other 
SAPs, such as manure, or crop rotation, that do not require cash outlays. 
Government support 
In Ethiopia it is common for government and international organizations to provide aid/or 
subsides (productive safety nets program) when crop production fails. We include a dummy 
variable equal to one if farmers believe they can rely on government support during crop failure 
and zero otherwise.  Social safety nets/insurance, if properly implemented, can build farmer 
confidence so that he invests despite uncertainty, and can help farm households to smooth 
consumption and maintain productive capacity by reducing the need to liquidate assets that 
might otherwise occur (Barrett 2005). Thus farmers’ confidence on public support can positively 
influence the adoption of SAPs. 
Social network/ capital  
In addition to the conventional household characteristics and endowment variables, the survey 
also collected variables related to social capital and networks that can influence technology 
adoption decisions (Isham, 2002; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Marenya and Barrett, 2007).  Social 
capital literature treats social networks as a means to access information, secure a job, obtain 
credit, protect against unforeseen events, exchange price information, reduce  information 
asymmetries and enforce contracts (Barrett , 2005; Fafchamps and Minten, 2002; Di Falco and 
Bulte, 2011).  
    In this study, detailed questions were asked to identify different social networks. We 
distinguished three social networks and capital: first, a household’s relationship with rural 
institutions in the village, defined as whether the household is a member of a rural institution or 
association, such as input supply and labor sharing; second, a household’s relationship with 
trustworthy traders, measured by the number of trusted traders inside and outside the village that 
the respondent knows; and third, a household’s kinship network, defined as the number of close 
relatives that the farmer can rely on for critical support in times of need. This classification is 
                                                          
9Actual rainfall data is preferable, but getting reliable data in most developing countries, including Ethiopia, is 
difficult. 
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important, as different forms of social capital and networks may affect the adoption of SAPs in 
various ways, such as through information sharing, stable market outlets, labor sharing, the 
relaxing of liquidity constraints, and mitigation of risks. In most developing countries, 
households with a greater number of relatives are more likely to adopt new technologies because 
they are able to experiment with technologies while spreading the risks over more people and 
resources (Di Falco and Bulte , 2011; Kassie et al., 2012). On the other hand, farmers with more 
relatives may have lower opportunity costs for family labour, so farmers may invest less, 
including in new technologies (Di Falco and Bulte, 2011).  
Extension 
Extension is a source of information for many farmers through contact with extension agents. 
Farmers’ access to information through extension is measured by the frequency of extension 
contact related to SAP activities. Given that many of the extension agents are also involved in 
other activities, such as input delivery service, administering credit provision and collection of 
repayment, farmers may question the skill of extension agents to provide reliable and updated 
information. We assess the perception of farmers regarding the skill of extension workers 
through attitudinal questions with a value of 1 if the respondents are confident with the 
qualification of extension agents and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Conditional and unconditional adoption 
The joint and marginal probability distribution of plots for the five SAPs is presented in Table 2. 
Of the 1,616 plots considered in the analysis, about 1,509 plots benefited from one or more SAP 
though all five SAPs were applied in only 10 plots. Inorganic fertilizer was the most common 
SAP used by the sample households. It was used as a single technology on 11% of plots, in 
combination with improved seed on 16% of plots, and in combination with conservation tillage 
and improved seed on 10% of plots. Manure alone was adopted on 4.9% of plots, in combination 
with inorganic fertilizer on 3.5% of plots, and jointly with improved seed and inorganic fertilizer 
on 4.3% of plots. 1.6% of the plots received only the legume–maize rotation practice. Similarly, 
4.3% of the plots benefited from adoption of crop rotation, improved seed, and inorganic 
fertilizer jointly, and 3.5% of plots jointly adopted legume–maize rotation, improved seed, 
inorganic fertilizer and conservation tillage. 
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Table  2. Joint and marginal probabilities of adoption of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) 
Percent adopting in: 
Joint 
probability 
Marginal 
Rotation Variety Fertilizer Manure Tillage 
Rotation only 1.58 1.58 - - - - 
Improved  maize variety only 2.37 - 2.37 - - - 
Inorganic fertilizer only 10.62 - - 10.62 - - 
Manure only 4.92 - - - 4.92 - 
Conservation tillage only 2.31 - - - - 2.31 
Rotation and  improved seed 1.70 1.70 1.70 - - - 
Rotation and fertilizer 2.31 2.31 - 2.31 - - 
Rotation and manure 1.03 1.03 - - 1.03 - 
Rotation and tillage 1.09 1.09 - - - 1.09 
Improved seed and fertilizer 16.02 - 16.02 16.02 - - 
Improved seed and manure 2.00 - 2.00 - 2.00  
Improved seed and tillage 2.18 - 2.18 - - 2.18 
Fertilizer and manure 3.52 - - 3.52 3.52 - 
Fertilizer and tillage 5.58 - - 5.58 - 5.58 
Manure and tillage 3.16 - - - 3.16 3.16 
Rotation, improved seed, fertilizer 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 - - 
Rotation, improved seed, manure 0.61 0.61 0.61 - 0.61 - 
Rotation, improved seed, tillage 0.73 0.73 0.73 - - 0.73 
Rotation, improved seed, manure 0.49 0.49 - 0.49 0.49 - 
Rotation, fertilizer, tillage 2.18 2.18 - 2.18 - 2.18 
Rotation, manure, tillage 0.49 0.49 - - 0.49 0.49 
Improved seed, manure, tillage 1.40 - 1.40 - 1.40 1.40 
Improved seed, fertilizer, manure 4.31 - 4.31 4.31 4.31 - 
Improved seed, fertilizer, tillage 9.65 - 9.65 9.65 - 9.65 
Fertilizer, manure, tillage 0.91 - - 0.91 0.91 0.91 
Rotation, improved seed, manure, tillage 0.55 0.55 0.55 - 0.55 0.55 
Rotation, improved seed, fertilizer, manure 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 - 
Rotation, improved seed, fertilizer, tillage 3.52 3.52 3.52 3.52 - 3.52 
Rotation, fertilizer, manure, tillage 0.67 0.67 - 0.67 0.67 0.67 
Improved seed, fertilizer, manure, tillage 1.27 - 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 
All five 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
None (plot did not receive any of the 
practices) 
6.61 - - - - - 
Total 100.00 23.21 52.57 67.31 27.34 36.30 
    Although the statistics on the joint and marginal probabilities provide interesting results, the 
sample unconditional and conditional probabilities of adoption also provide an indication of the 
existence of possible interdependence across the five SAPs (Table 3). The unconditional 
probability of a plot with inorganic fertilizer is 67.3%. However, this increases to 78.1%, 73.2% 
and 76.4% conditional on adoption of one practice (improved seed), two practices (rotation and 
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improved seed), and three practices (rotation, improved seed and conservation tillage), 
respectively. Interestingly, the conditional probability of adopting inorganic fertilizer on plots is 
significantly lower on plots when farmers adopt only manure (48.2%), jointly manure and 
conservation tillage (38.3%) and three practices (manure, improved seed and conservation 
tillage- 49.2%). The likelihood of inorganic fertilizer use is reduced by more than 19% when 
households applied manure to a plot, suggesting substitutability between manure and inorganic 
fertilizer.  
Table 3. Unconditional and conditional adoption probabilities 
 Rotation Seed Fertilizer Manure Tillage 
P(Yk = 1) 0.23 0.53 0.67 0.27 0.36 
P(Yk = 1|YR = 1) 1 0.58* 0.67 0.25 0.42** 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1) 0.25 1 0.78*** 0.23** 0.38 
P(Yk = 1|YF= 1) 0.23 0.61*** 1 0.19*** 0.36 
P(Yk = 1|YM= 1) 0.21 0.44*** 0.48*** 1 0.33 
P(Yk = 1|YT= 1) 0.27** 0.55 0.67 0.25 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1) 1 1 0.73* 0.24 0.41 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YF= 1) 1 0.63*** 1 0.21** 0.45*** 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YM= 1) 1 0.54 0.54*** 1 0.39 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YT= 1) 1 0.55 0.71 0.24 1 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YF= 1) 0.24 1 1 0.19*** 0.32 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YM= 1) 0.26 1 0.63 1 0.31 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YT= 1) 0.27 1 0.76*** 0.19*** 1 
P(Yk = 1|YF= 1, YM= 1) 0.24 0.58 1 1 0.26*** 
P(Yk = 1|YF= 1, YT= 1) 0.29** 0.62*** 1 0.14*** 1 
P(Yk = 1|YM= 1, YT= 1) 0.26 0.42*** 0.38*** 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1, YF= 1) 1 1 1 0.21** 0.42 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1, YT= 1) 1 1 0.76* 0.21 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1, YM= 1) 1 1 0.64 1 0.37 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YF= 1, YM= 1) 1 0.64 1 1 0.40 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YF= 1, YT= 1) 1 0.59 1 0.18** 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YM= 1, YT= 1) 1 0.50 0.55 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YF= 1, YM= 1) 0.26 1 1 1 0.25*** 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YF= 1, YT= 1) 0.27 1 1 0.13*** 1 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YM= 1, YT= 1) 0.30 1 0.49*** 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YF= 1, YM= 1, YT= 1) 0.37** 0.54 1 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YV= 1, YF= 1, YM= 1, YT= 1) 0.32 1 1 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YF= 1, YM= 1, YT= 1) 1 0.48 1 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1, YM= 1, YT= 1) 1 1 0.53 1 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1, YF= 1, YT= 1) 1 1 1 0.15** 1 
P(Yk = 1|YR= 1, YV= 1, YF= 1, YM= 1) 1 1 1 1 0.30 
Note: Yk is a binary variable representing the adoption status with respect to practice k (k = rotation (R), improved 
seed (V), fertilizer (F), manure (M), conservation tillage (T)); *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1%, respectively. The comparison is between unconditional probability and conditional probability in 
each practice. 
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    While a more in-depth multivariate analysis is required, a non-parametric maize net-income10 
distribution analysis shows that SAPs affect the net value of maize production. The cumulative 
distribution of the net value of maize production on plots with legume rotation, chemical 
fertilizer, improved seed, manure use, and conservation tillage dominates the maize net-income 
cumulative distribution on plots without these SAPs. This is shown by the cumulative density 
function (CDF; Figures 1–5) of maize net income of plots with SAPs being constantly below or 
equal to that of plots without these practices. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics test for CDFs 
or the test for vertical distance between the two CDFs also confirms this result.11  This is an 
important economic incentive for farmers to adopt SAPs.  
Figures 1-5: Impacts of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) on net maize income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Net of fertilizer, seed, and pesticides costs. 
11 Test result not shown in the interest of brevity. 
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4.2 Regression results 
4.2.1 Adoption decisions: MVP model results 
The MVP model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method on plot-level 
observations. 12  The model fits the data reasonably well – the Wald test [χ2(296) = 6937.74, p = 
0.000)] of the hypothesis that all regression coefficients in each equation are jointly equal to zero 
is rejected. As expected, the likelihood ratio test [χ2(10) = 111.096, p = 0.000)] of the null 
hypothesis that the covariance of the error terms across equations are not correlated is also 
rejected (See  Appendix Table 1b). This is supported by the correlation between error terms of 
the adoption equations reported in Table 1b. The estimated correlation coefficients are 
statistically significant in six of the ten pair cases, where three coefficients have negative and the 
remaining three have positive signs.  
    In addition to supporting the use of the MVP, this also shows the interdependence of practices 
where the probability of adopting a practice is conditional on whether a practice in the subset has 
been adopted or not. These results agree with the conditional and unconditional adoption 
probabilities reported in Table 3. Improved seed is complementary with crop-rotation, inorganic 
fertilizer, and manure. The correlation between improved seed and inorganic fertilizer adoption 
is the highest (42%). On the other hand, manure is a substitute for inorganic fertilizer, crop 
rotation and conservation tillage.  The substitution between manure and inorganic fertilizer 
contradicts the finding of Marenya and Barrett (2007) who found the two to be complementary 
for smallholder farmers in western Kenya in 2007.  
    As is evident in Table 4, the MVP model estimates differ substantially across the equations, 
indicating the appropriateness of differentiating between practices. To formally test this, we 
estimated a constrained specification with all slope coefficients forced to be equal. The 
                                                          
12 The results without Mundlak’s approach are presented in the appendix Table 1a. 
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likelihood ratio test statistic of the null hypothesis of equal-slope coefficients is rejected (χ2(224) 
= 4487.86, p = 0.000), reflecting the heterogeneity in adoption of SAPs and, consequently, 
supporting a separate analysis of each rather than aggregating them into a single SAP variable. 
Table 4. Coefficient estimates of the multivariate probit model with Mundlak’s approach  
Variables 
Rotation Improved seed Fertilizer Manure Tillage 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Household and farm characteristics 
SEX 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.23 -0.26* 0.16 -0.13 0.18 
AGE (10-2) -0.70* 0.40 -0.01 0.40 0.20 0.60 0.10 0.40 0.20 0.50 
EDUCATSPOUS 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06** 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.04* 0.02 
DIST -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.002 0.01 
RENTD -0.01 0.54 -0.07 0.53 0.64 0.48 -1.77*** 0.58 0.41* 0.25 
SHALWDEPT -0.19 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.78** 0.33 -0.31 0.34 0.15 0.22 
MEDUMDEPT -0.26 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.69*** 0.24 0.02 0.28 -0.04 0.16 
GOODSOL 0.31 0.34 -0.16 0.27 -1.06*** 0.41 0.63* 0.33 0.17 0.20 
FLATSLOP 0.02 0.27 -0.44** 0.21 -1.33*** 0.34 0.74** 0.31 -0.01 0.21 
MEDMSLOP 0.09 0.26 -0.58*** 0.21 -0.77** 0.30 0.52* 0.29 0.10 0.201 
GODSOL X  DIST 0.01 0.02 -0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
MEDMSOL X DIST 0.01 0.02 -0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
RENTD X GODSOL 0.14 0.57 0.32 0.56 -0.15 0.52 0.73 0.63 -0.56* 0.29 
RENTDX  MEDSOL -0.14 0.56 -0.06 0.54 -0.78 0.55 1.22** 0.61 -0.68** 0.29 
FLATSLP X  DIST -0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01* 0.01 
MEDMSLP X  DIST 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01** 0.01 
Market access and resource constraints 
MEANSTRANS -0.04 0.09 -0.15* 0.09 -0.23* 0.13 -0.02 0.09 -0.32*** 0.11 
WALKDIST (10-2) -0.01 0.10 -0.10* 0.10 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.20* 0.10 
ASSETVALUE 0.003 0.82 1.77** 0.83 8.47*** 2.07 -1.31 0.84 4.12*** 1.53 
OTHERINCOM 0.21** 0.09 -0.07 0.08 -0.135 0.13 0.09 0.09 -0.09 0.11 
TLU (10-1) -0.01 0.06 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.17*** 0.06 0.01 0.07 
CREDIT -0.04 0.11 -0.17* 0.09 -0.36** 0.17 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.12 
Social network/capital and extensions 
RELATIVE  (10-2) 0.70* 0.40 0.01 0.40 -0.30 0.70 -0.60 0.40 1.10** 0.50 
KNOWTRUST 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.01 
INPUTMEMBER 0.29*** 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.16 -0.15 0.10 0.36*** 0.12 
CONFDNT -0.01 0.54 -0.07 0.53 0.64 0.48 -1.77*** 0.58 0.31 0.25 
Stresses 
RAININDEX 0.29* 0.17 -0.22 0.16 0.42* 0.24 0.18 0.15 -0.30 0.19 
WATRLOGG -0.27** 0.13 -0.08 0.11 0.03 0.18 -0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.13 
FROSTSTRES 0.01 0.22 -0.46** 0.19 -0.21 0.30 -0.32* 0.18 -0.13 0.23 
RELYGOVT -0.06 0.09 0.27*** 0.08 7.07*** 0.18 -0.46*** 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
CONSTANT -0.55 0.41 0.14 0.39 -0.82 0.59 -0.29 0.41 -0.06 0.48 
Joint significance of 
location variables:  χ2 (7)     32.24 61.69 92.72 18.92 38.06 
Prob.  > χ2 (7) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Sample size = 1616 Wald χ2 (296)    = 6937.74;             Prob.  > χ2  = 0.00 
Joint significance of mean  of plot varying covariates: χ2 (70)    = 155.88;             Prob.  > χ2  = 0.00 
Note: *,** and *** indicate statistical difference at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; SE is the standard error adjusted for clustering on-farm  
households to allow for correlation within group;  Non-significant control variables include: FAMLYSIZE, EDUCATHEAD, MEDMSOL, 
FARMSIZE, PESTSTRES, EXTMAZLEG, EXTPEST, EXTROTAT EXTTILAGE. 
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    The MVP model results reveal that the spouse’s (woman’s) education level has a positive 
impact on the adoption of inorganic fertilizers and conservation tillage. The result underscores 
the important role women play in agriculture and technology adoption decisions in developing 
countries. One implication is that technology adoption decisions should not be viewed as an 
isolated decision but as part of an overall household strategy, modeled as a joint household 
decision.    
    The mode of transportation to output market influences the likelihood of adoption of improved 
seed and conservation tillage. Households which use a public transport, bicycle, or donkey/horse 
cart are more likely to adopt improved seed and conservation tillage. This suggests that 
improving the road infrastructure and access to a public transportation system is important in 
facilitating adoption, through facilitating product transport, reducing the cost of the farmer’s time 
and enabling more timely market information. Transaction costs related to distance to input 
market from residence have a differentiated effect. Distance to the input market has a negative 
and significant effect on the adoption of improved seed, reflecting transaction and access costs. 
Distance to the input market, on the other hand, has a positive and significant effect on the 
adoption of conservation tillage practices, possibly because increased input costs increases the 
attraction of alternative input use, such as conservation tillage.    Wealth, as measured by the 
value of major household and farm equipment, positively influences the adoption of improved 
seed, inorganic fertilizer and conservation tillage, reflecting the capacity to purchase external 
inputs and to cope with greater risk. Similarly, livestock ownership positively influences the 
adoption of manure farming because livestock waste is the single most important source of 
manure for small farms in most parts of Ethiopia (c.f. Marenya and Barrett, 2007). Credit 
constraints negatively influence investment in improved seed and inorganic fertilizers, 
suggesting that liquidity-constrained households (those who need credit but are unable to find it) 
are less likely to adopt SAPs that require cash outlays.13  
    Our results further underscore the importance of rainfall and plot-level stresses (waterlogging 
and frost) in explaining adoption of SAPs. The probability of adoption of inorganic fertilizer and 
crop-rotation is high in areas/years where rainfall is reliable in terms of timing, amount and 
distribution. Kassie et al., (2010) and Pender and Gebremedhin (2007) found that inorganic 
fertilizers provide a higher crop return per hectare in wetter areas than in drier areas and suggest 
the need for careful agro-ecological targeting in the development, promotion and scaling up of 
                                                          
13 The variable credit access is potentially endogenous. Following Wooldridge (2002) we implemented a two stage 
residual inclusion test for the endogeneity of the variable. We use walking distance to credit office as the 
instrumental variable. The instrument significantly explains the access to credit variable.  The results suggest that 
endogeneity is not a problem. Results are available upon request. We thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing 
this out.    
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SAPs. Similarly, adoption of crop rotation and improved seed are negatively and significantly 
influenced by waterlogging and frost stress.   
    The hypothesis that social capital positively affects the probability of adoption of SAPs is 
confirmed. The probability of adopting crop-rotation and conservation tillage practices is 
affected by a households’ participation in a rural institution or group, and by the number of 
relatives inside and outside the village that farmers can rely on for support in times of need.  
Likewise, adoption of crop rotation and improved seed increase with the number of traders that 
farmers know inside and outside the village. With scarce or inadequate information sources and 
imperfect markets, social networks such as traders and farmers’ associations or groups facilitate 
the exchange of information, and enable farmers to access inputs on schedule and overcome 
credit constraints. This finding suggests that in order to enhance the adoption of maize 
technology, local rural institutions and service providers need to be supported because they can 
effectively assist farmers in providing credit, inputs, information, and stable market outlets.   
    Households that believe that the government will provide support when crops fail are more 
likely to adopt improved seed and inorganic fertilizer, probably because the benefits of new 
technologies are uncertain, and farmers want to have insurance if they have to adopt new 
technologies. On the other hand, those who have less trust in government support are more likely 
to adopt practices that depend on local resources, such as manure. The results also reveal that 
households who have confidence in the skill of extension agents are more likely to adopt 
conservation tillage practices because this practice is relatively knowledge-intensive and requires 
considerable management. However, the frequency of extension contact has no impact on 
adoption of this practice. This may indicate that it is not the frequency of extension contact per 
se which affects adoption, but the quality of the extension services.  
    Consistent with earlier work on technology adoption (e.g., Kassie et al., 2010; Jansen et al., 
2006), land tenure influences the adoption of the use of animal manure and conservation tillage, 
which are more common on owned plots than on rented plots, possibly reflecting tenure 
insecurity and Marshallian inefficiency, suggesting that secure land tenure will encourage 
adoption decisions.  
    With respect to plot characteristics, the analysis shows that the use of inorganic fertilizers is 
less likely on plots with good soil quality, while the use of manure is more likely. The propensity 
to adopt inorganic fertilizers and improved seed is more likely on plots with a steep slope, while 
the practice of manure farming is less likely. However, the probability of inorganic fertilizer 
adoption increases on distant flat and medium slope plots (see interaction term), suggesting a 
tradeoff for using inorganic fertilizers on nearby steep plots and distant flat plots. Although the 
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use of fertilizers on distant flat plots can prevent nutrient erosion, it can incur additional 
transaction and application costs. Similarly adoption of improved seed and conservation tillage 
practices are more likely on distant flat and medium slope plots.  
 
4.2.2 Number of SAPs adopted: Ordered probit results 
Table 5 shows the results from pooled- and random effects ordered probit models. 14 The 
estimates of both models are numerically similar despite the significance of the random effects.  
The discussion of results is based on the pooled ordered probit model using Mundlak’s 
approach15, which distinguishes the marginal impact of each covariate on an individual outcome 
variable. 
    The chi-squared statistic for the ordered probit model is 305.9 and is statistically significant, 
indicating that the joint test of all slope coefficients equal to zero is rejected. Results show that 
the number of SAPs adopted increases with family size and decreases with the age of the head of 
the household.  As in the adoption decision, the spouse’s education level has a significant and 
positive effect on the level of SAP use. Each additional year of education of the spouse increases 
the probability of adopting more than two SAPs by 12%. Means of transportation to output 
market has a significant and negative impact on the number of SAPs adopted. Farmers who do 
not have their own means of transportation or access to public transport are 9% less likely to 
adopt more than two SAPs.  
    Social capital variables (household’s membership of a rural institution, a kinship network, and 
trust in traders) have significant and positive effects on the number of SAPs used, with varying 
marginal probabilities. If a household is a member of a rural institution or group, the probability 
of adopting more than two SAPs increases by 10%. Households with more relatives and who 
know more traders are 0.2% and 0.5% more likely to adopt two or more SAPs, respectively. 
Extension contact on the practice of crop rotation has a statistically significant but small positive 
marginal probability effect (0.6%) for adopting more than two SAPs.  
                                                          
14 The joint significance of the mean of plot varying explanatory variables is significantly different from zero 
suggesting that there is a correlation between observed and unobserved heterogeneity and justifying the use of 
Mundlak’s approach. Our analysis also shows that the likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis that the correlation 
between two successive error terms of plots (rho) belonging to the same household is significantly different from 
zero, justifying the application of the random effects ordered probit model (Table 5). 
15 The results without Mundlak’s approaches are presented on the appendix Table 1c. 
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Household assets positively influence the adoption of more than two SAPs, where (Table 2) 
improved seed and inorganic fertilizer predominate in the mixes of more than two SAPs. This 
result is consistent with the positive effect of wealth on the likelihood of adoption of SAPs. 
Households that experience plot-level stresses such as incidence of frost and hailstorms are 10% 
less likely to apply more than one SAP on their farming plot than households who have not 
experienced these. Consistent with the probability of adoption of SAPs, a farmer’s perception of 
government support in case of crop failure plays an important role in the number of SAPs 
adopted. In the study area, farmers who rely on government support during adverse conditions 
are 20% more likely to adopt more than two SAPs. The effect of this variable seems to be more 
important on the adoption of externally purchased SAPs (such as improved seed and inorganic 
fertilizers).  
    Plot-related variables, such as plot access as measured by plot distance to residence, have a 
negative impact on the number of SAPs adopted. An increase of 10 minutes in the walking time 
to the plot decreases adoption of more than two SAPs by 1%. Farmers are more likely to apply a 
greater number of SAPs on plots they own, as above.  
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
Increasing and sustaining agricultural productivity through investment in sustainable agricultural 
practices is important for the reduction of hunger and poverty in Ethiopia. In this study, we 
analyzed the probability and level of adoption of multiple SAPs by smallholder farmers using 
plot-level observations. We used multivariate probit and ordered probit models to jointly analyze 
the adoption of multiple SAPs and the number of SAPs adopted on the plot while recognizing 
the inter-relationship among them. Our approach extends the existing empirical studies by 
allowing for correlations across SAPs and including a number of policy-relevant variables that 
affect adoption decisions. 
    The results reveal that there are strong complementarities and substitutabilities between SAPs, 
reflecting the interdependence of SAP adoption. Studies that consider the adoption of SAPs in 
isolation ignore important cross-technology correlation effects, and potentially generate biased 
estimates. The cross-technology correlation information can have important policy implications 
since policy changes which affect one SAP can have spillover effects to other SAPs. In addition, 
such information helps policy makers and development practitioners to define their strategies of 
promoting agricultural technologies.  
    Most importantly, the results show that the probability and extent of adoption of SAPs are 
influenced by several factors: social capital in the form of membership of rural institutions, credit 
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constraint, spouse education, asset ownership, distance to markets, mode of transportation, 
rainfall and plot-level disturbances, the number of relatives and traders known by the farmer 
inside and outside his village, farmer’s belief in government support during crop failure, and 
confidence in the skill of extension agents. In particular, social safety nets (government support 
during crop failure), social capital, market access and tenure security are important policy 
variables that have a high impact on adoption of multiple SAPs. 
    The significant role of social capital on adoption suggests the need for establishing and 
strengthening local institutions and service providers to accelerate and sustain technology 
adoption. In a country where there is information asymmetry and where both input and output 
markets are missing or incomplete, local institutions can play a critical role in providing farmers 
with timely information, inputs (e.g., labor, credit, insurance) and technical assistance.   
    The importance of the value of assets and the availability of credit in influencing the purchase 
of inputs (improved seed and fertilizer) calls for improving credit delivery systems. Livestock 
ownership clearly influences the use of manure. Although increasing the number of livestock 
might not be a feasible option, introducing high-yield breeds and improved forage legumes can 
increase livestock products, including manure. 
    The effects of rainfall disturbance on inorganic fertilizer and maize–legume rotation adoption 
are also important for targeting technologies, and for better rainfall forecasts, not only in terms of 
amount but also of timing and distribution. Furthermore, the use of SAPs is associated positively 
with the farmer’s reliance on government support during crop failure. This suggests that 
investment in public safety-net programs (public insurance) and risk-protection mechanisms can 
be expected to have a positive impact on the adoption of SAPs. Investment in rural public 
education with a special focus on women will also facilitate the adoption of technologies and 
practices according to our results.   
    Finally, while there is ample evidence from on-station and on-farm experiments on the impact 
of SAPs on productivity (Nzabi et al., 2000; Bloam et al., 2009; Rockstrom et al., 2009; Ghosh et 
al., 2010), little is known about the associated effects under smallholder farmers’ conditions. 
Although the results of this study help, further research that examines the productivity, risk, 
environmental, and welfare implications of the adoption of individual SAPs and combinations of 
SAPs, is important to bridge the knowledge gap and influence farm policies. 
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Appendix 
Table 1a.  Coefficient estimates of the multivariate probit model without Mundlak’s approach  
Variables 
Rotation Improved seed Fertilizer Manure Tillage 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Household and farm characteristics 
EDUCATSPOUS 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07*** 0.03 -0.001 0.01 0.04** 0.02 
RENTD 0.07 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.44 0.32 -0.90* 0.52 -0.06 0.35 
SHALWDEPT 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.29* 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.19 0.13 
MEDUMDEPT 0.18* 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.12 
GOODSOL -0.03 0.18 -0.17 0.15 -0.51*** 0.21 0.36** 0.17 -0.32* 0.17 
FLATSLOP 0.23 0.20 -0.13 0.18 -0.79** 0.28 0.32 0.22 0.33* 0.19 
MEDMSLOP 0.10 0.21 -0.24 0.18 -0.63** 0.28 0.17 0.23 0.46*** 0.19 
GODSOL X  DIST 0.02* 0.01 -0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.001 0.01 
MEDMSOL X DIST 0.02 0.01 -0.01* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.001 0.01 
RENTD X GODSOL 0.14 0.40 -0.15 0.39 0.07 0.38 0.18 0.56 0.06 0.39 
RENTDX  MEDSOL -0.19 0.39 -0.23 0.37 -0.02 0.38 0.59 0.55 -0.17 0.39 
FLATSLP X  DIST -0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.004 0.01 
MEDMSLP X  DIST 0.002 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03* 0.02 -0.002 0.01 
Market access and resource constraints 
MEANSTRANS -0.06 0.09 -0.16** 0.08 -0.12 0.10 0.03 0.08 -0.29*** 0.10 
WALKDIST  (10-2) -0.10 0.10 -0.10* 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.20* 0.10 
ASSETVALUE 0.17 0.86 1.56** 0.81 7.93*** 1.96 -1.25 0.91 3.49*** 1.49 
OTHERINCOM 0.19** 0.09 -0.07 0.08 -0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 -0.07 0.11 
TLU  (10-2) 0.20 0.50 -0.40 0.30 0.20 0.80 1.20*** 0.50 -0.20 0.60 
CREDIT -0.08 0.10 -0.17** 0.09 -0.32** 0.17 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.12 
Social capital and extensions 
RELATIVE  (10-2) 0.50* 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.30 0.40 -0.40 0.30 1.30*** 0.40 
KNOWTRUST 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.01 
INPUTMEMBER 0.28*** 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.14 -0.16 0.10 0.36*** 0.12 
CONFDNT 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.09 0.13 -0.05 0.09 0.23* 0.13 
Stresses 
RAININDEX 0.28* 0.17 -0.23 0.15 0.43** 0.23 0.19 0.15 -0.29 0.19 
PESTSTRES 0.08 0.12 0.04 0.13 -0.09 0.18 -0.03 0.12 0.23* 0.14 
WATRLOGG -0.29*** 0.12 -0.08 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.10 -0.02 0.12 
FROSTSTRES -0.12 0.19 -0.43*** 0.16 -0.09 0.26 -0.09 0.15 0.02 0.18 
RELYGOVT -0.06 0.09 0.25*** 0.08 6.97*** 0.38 -0.46*** 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
CONSTANT -0.43 0.37 0.34 0.33 -0.55*** 0.50 -0.63* 0.36 -0.06 0.40 
Joint significance of 
location variables:  χ2 (7)     37.06 63.90 96.74 19.13 46.05 
Prob.  > χ2 (7) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Sample size = 1616 Wald χ2 (221)    = 2302.48;             Prob.  > χ2  = 0.00 
*,** and *** indicate statistical difference at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; SE = standard errors adjusted for clustering on-farm households to 
allow for correlation within group;  other non-significant control variables include: FAMLYSIZE, SEX, AGE, EDUCATHEAD, DIST, 
FARMSIZE, MEDMSOL, EXTMAZLEG, EXTPEST, EXTROTAT EXTTILAGE. 
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Table 1b. Estimated covariance matrix of the multivariate probit model (MVP) regression 
between sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs)  
 
Rρ  
 
Vρ  
 
Fρ  
 
Mρ  
 
Vρ  0.12 (0.04)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fρ  0.09 (0.06) 0.42 (0.06)*** 
 
 
 
 
Mρ  -0.09 (0.05)** -0.11 (0.05)*** -0.38 (0.05)*** 
 
 
Tρ  0.03 (0.05) -0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.06) -0.09 (0.05)* 
Likelihood ratio test of: RVρ = RFρ = RMρ = RTρ = VFρ = VMρ = VTρ = FMρ = FTρ = 0 
)10(2χ = 111.09 
Prob> 0.00 
*,** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively; numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. 
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Abstract 
The type and combination of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) adopted has a significant effect on 
agricultural productivity and food security. Previous studies on adoption and impact have focused on 
single practices. However, in reality several adoption decisions are made simultaneously. We developed a 
multinomial endogenous switching regression model of farmers’ choice of combination of SAPs and 
impacts on maize income and use of agrochemicals and family labor use in rural Ethiopia and found four 
primary results. First, adoption of SAPs increases maize income and the highest payoff is achieved when 
SAPs are adopted in combination rather than in isolation. Second, nitrogen fertilizer use is lower in the 
package that contains systems diversification and conservation tillage. Third, conservation tillage 
increased pesticide application and labor demand, perhaps to compensate for reduced tillage. However, 
when it is used jointly with systems diversification, it does not have a significant impact on pesticide and 
labor use. Fourth, since women contribute much of the farm labor needed for staple crops, adoption of 
packages increases their workload, in most cases, suggesting that agricultural intensification technology 
interventions may not be gender neutral. This implies that policy makers and other stakeholders promoting 
a combination of technologies can enhance household food security through increasing income and 
reducing production costs, but need to be aware of the potential gender related outcomes.  
JEL classification: Q01, Q12, Q57 
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1. Introduction 
The major challenge facing sub-Saharan African (SSA) governments today is how to achieve 
food security and reduce poverty, while simultaneously mitigating degradation of essential 
ecosystem services. Most attention has been given to the low and stagnant returns from African 
agriculture (World Bank, 2007; Bluffstone and Köhlin, 2011). However, many ecosystem 
services, including nutrient cycling, nitrogen fixation, soil regeneration, and biological control of 
pests and weeds, are under threat in key African food production systems that are vital for 
sustainable food security. Declining fallow periods and a strong trajectory away from 
diversification in favor of mono-cropping, in otherwise traditionally complex farming systems, 
and inadequate investment in sustainable intensification are among the causes of environmental 
degradation in SSA (Pretty, 1999; Lee, 2005; Woodfine, 2009; Snapp et al. 2010; Jhamtani, 
2011). These trends have contributed to the low agricultural productivity and food insecurity in 
SSA and will continue to do so at an accelerating rate under anticipated climate change. 
 Unfortunately, there is thus a risk of a trade-off between the attempts to increase the 
productivity in African agriculture through “modernization packages” that combine improved 
seed varieties with agrochemicals and the resulting stress that these have on ecosystem services.  
The loss of ecosystem services can in turn have implications on the use of agrochemicals (such as 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides) and on the demand for on-farm labor. Regulation of the 
occurrence of pests and diseases under increasingly simplified mono-cropping systems requires 
increased use of external inputs. For example, weed and pest populations previously controlled 
by natural ecosystem services now require the use of pesticides (Fuglie, 1999; Knowler and 
Bradshaw, 2007) and/or there is an increased labor demand for their control. If not properly used, 
agrochemicals can cause significant harm to the environment and human health.  
 It is in this context that Sustainable Agricultural Practices (SAPs)1 are considered as 
strategies that can increase productivity but in a way that is sustainable by addressing the 
degradation of ecosystem services, and increasing resilience and adaptation of smallholder 
                                                          
1 We define SAPs for agricultural intensification and productivity growth in farming systems more broadly to 
include conservation tillage (zero or reduced tillage), cropping bio-diversification (legume intercropping and crop 
rotations), improved crop varieties, use of animal manure, complementary use of organic fertilizers, and investment 
in soil and water conservation (Lee, 2005; Kassie et al. 2010; Wollni et al. 2010; Pretty et al. 2011; FAO, 1989).  
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farmers to climate variability and change (Antle and Diagana, 2003; Lee, 2005; Woodfine, 2009; 
Pretty et al. 2011).   
 This paper will analyze the application of various combinations of three SAPs. The first 
one is bio-diversification (maize–legume rotation) that performs and provides many ecosystem 
services including N fixation and C sequestration, breaking the life cycle of pests, smoothing out 
impacts of price fluctuations, and improving weed suppression (Liebman and Dyck, 1993; 
Altieri, 1999; Tilman et al. 2002; Woodfine, 2009; Snapp et al. 2010; Jhamtani, 2011). This can 
save farmers the cost of buying fertilizer and pesticides, which contributes to the mitigation of 
climate change. Bio-diversification enables farmers to grow products that can be harvested at 
different times and spaces and that have different weather or environmental stress-response 
characteristics. These varied outputs and degrees of resilience are a hedge against the risk of 
drought, extreme or unseasonal temperatures, rainfall variations and price fluctuations that affect 
the productivity and income of smallholder systems.  
The second SAP is adoption of conservation tillage that can lead to substantial ecosystem 
services benefits by reducing soil erosion and nutrient depletion and conserving soil moisture 
(Fuglie, 1999; Tilman et al. 2002; Woodfine, 2009).  
The third SAP considered is the introduction of modern crop varieties (Lee, 2005). In our 
case, the improved maize varieties used are primarily intended to increase yields, mostly 
augmented with fertilizer and pesticides, thus addressing food security and income needs (Bellon 
and Taylor, 1993; Fernandez, 1996). Important as it may be, in the future adoption of improved 
crop varieties is likely to be an important strategy to also adapt to climate change.  
 In this paper, we jointly analyze adoption of a combination of these SAPs and their 
impacts on income and agrochemical use. Specifically, the paper focuses on the following 
objectives: a) Analyze the factors motivating the adoption of a combination of SAPs (i.e., bio-
diversification, conservation tillage and modern maize seed) in the maize–legume farming system 
of Ethiopia; and b) Examine the implications of adopting various combinations of these practices 
on selected outcome variables; more specifically maize net income2, use of agrochemicals such 
as N fertilizer and pesticides (insecticides and herbicides) and demand for agricultural female and 
                                                          
2 It is the net of fertilizer, seed, and pesticide costs. Labor is another important factor cost but since very little labor is 
traded in our sample households we chose to address the implications on male and female labor use as a separate 
evaluation criterion. 
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male labor by controlling for selection bias using multinomial endogenous switching treatment 
effects approach. 
 Despite the multiple benefits of SAPs and considerable efforts by national and 
international organizations to encourage farmers to invest in them, there is lack of evidence on 
farmers’ incentives and conditioning factors that hinder or accelerate adoption of inter-related 
SAPs. An improved understanding of farmers’ adoption behavior and the potential economic and 
agrochemical use implications associated with adoption of these practices is therefore important 
for sustainable intensification in the region.  
The paper adds value to existing literature on adoption analysis and impacts of a 
technology in the following ways. First, we investigate –for the first time to our knowledge– 
whether adoption of SAPs in combination will provide more economic benefits and regulate 
agrochemical use than adopting them individually. This knowledge is relevant to the debate on 
whether farmers adopt technologies piecemeal or in a package and it is also valuable for 
designing effective extension policy by identifying a combination of technologies that deliver the 
highest pay off. Most previous adoption studies (e.g., Gebremedhin and Scott, 2003; Kassie et al. 
2010; 2011) have focused on analysis of a single SAP using single equation models (e.g., probit, 
logit), although farmers are faced with technology alternatives that may be adopted 
simultaneously as complements, substitutes or supplements to deal with their overlapping 
constraints such as weeds, pest and disease infestations, and low soil fertility and crop 
productivity (Dorfman, 1996; Khanna, 2001, Moyo and Veeman, 2004). They also ignore the 
possibility of a path or state of dependence: the choice of technologies adopted more recently by 
farmers may be partly dependent on earlier technology choices (Wu and Babock, 1998; Khanna, 
2001). Adoption and impact analysis of technologies while ignoring their inter-relationships may 
underestimate or overestimate the influence of various factors on adoption and impacts of 
adoption (Wu and Babcock, 1998). Modeling technology adoption and impact analysis in a 
multiple technology choice framework is therefore important to capture useful economic 
information contained in interdependent and simultaneous adoption decisions (Dorfman, 1996).  
Second, our analysis uses comprehensive household and plot-level survey data covering 
major maize growing regions in Ethiopia. This has allowed us to include several policy relevant 
variables (e.g., governance indicators, kinship, rainfall and pest and disease shocks, and farmers’ 
expectations on social safety nets or social insurance during crop failure) that determine SAP 
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adoption and outcome variables that were not considered in previous studies. Third, we 
contribute to the scant empirical evidence on the impacts of SAP adoption on agrochemical and 
labor use.  
2. Conceptual and Econometric framework 
In a multiple adoption setting, farmers’ adoption of bio-diversification, conservation tillage and 
an improved maize variety jointly leads to eight (23) possible SAP combinations that a farmer 
could choose. The actual choice is expected to be based on his expected utility of adoption, given 
his/her constraints. We model framers’ choice of SAP packages (i.e., alternative combinations of 
bio-diversification, conservation tillage and modern maize seed) and outcome variables (maize 
net income per hectare, agrochemical use and female and male labor demand) in a setting of 
multinomial endogenous switching regression framework.  
 Farmers endogenously self-select themselves into adoption/non-adoption decisions, so 
decisions are likely influenced by unobservable characteristics (for example expectation of yield 
gain from adoption, managerial skills, motivation) that may be correlated with the outcomes of 
interest. This requires a selection correction estimation method. We apply a multinomial 
endogenous switching regression (ESR) treatment effects approach following Dubin and 
McFadden (1984) (hereafter, DM model) and Bourguignon et al. (2007) to correct selection bias. 
This framework has the advantage in that it evaluates alternative combinations of practices as 
well as individual practices. It also captures both self-selection bias and the interactions between 
choices of alternative practices (Mansur et al. 2008; Wu and Babcock, 1998). 
 In the first stage, farmers’ choice of combinations/packages3 of SAPs is modeled using a 
multinomial logit selection model4, while recognizing the inter-relationship among them. In the 
second stage of the estimation, the impacts of each combination of SAPs on outcome variables 
are evaluated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with selectivity correction. 
2.1.  Multinomial adoption selection model  
                                                          
3 Combination and package are used interchangeably. 
4 Bourguignon et al. (2007) using Monte-Carlo experiments show that selection bias correction based on the 
multinomial logit model can provide good correction for the outcome equation, even when the IIA (Independent and 
Irrelevant Alternative) hypothesis is violated. 
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We assume that farmers aim to maximize their utility iU by comparing the utility provided by m 
alternative packages. The requirement for farmer i  to choose any package j , over any alternative 
package m , is that jmUU imij ≠>  , or equivalently . 0 jmUUU imijim ≠>−=∆ The expected 
utility ( *ijU ) that the farmer derives from the adoption of package j  is a latent variable 
determined by observed household, plot and location characteristics )( iX  and unobserved 
characteristics )( ijε : 
 ,          (1) 
where is observed exogenous variables (household, plot and location characteristics) and  is 
unobserved characteristics. The farmer’s utility from choosing an alternative package is not 
observable but the package adoption decision is. Let  be an index that denotes the farmer’s 
choice of package, such that: 
    for all                                                     (2) 
where (Bourguignon et al. 2007). Equation (2) implies that the thi farmer 
will adopt package to maximize his expected utility if package provides greater expected 
utility than any other package that is if . 
 Assuming that  are identically and independently Gumbel distributed, the probability 
that farmer  with characteristics  will choose package  can be specified by a multinomial 
logit model (McFadden, 1973): 
       (3) 
The parameters of the latent variable model can be estimated by maximum likelihood.    
 In the second stage of multinomial ESR, the relationship between the outcome variables 
and a set of exogenous variables Z (plot, household and location characteristics) is estimated for 
the chosen package. In our SAPs specification (Table 1), the base category, non-adoption of SAP 
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(i.e., R0V0T0) is denoted as j=1 and at least one SAP is used in the remaining packages (j=2, . . 
.,8). The outcome equation for each possible regime is given as:  
  
where  are the outcome variables of the thi  farmer in regime and the error terms  are 
distributed with  and .  is observed if, and only if, package
is used, which occurs when . If the  and are not independent, OLS 
estimates in (4) will be biased. A consistent estimation of  requires inclusion of the selection 
correction terms of the alternative choices in (4). The DM model assumes the following linearity 
assumption:  
  
With (by construction the correlation between and sum to zero). Using this 
assumption the equation of the multinomial endogenous switching regression in (4) is specified 
as: 
  
Where is the covariance between ’s and ’s, is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the 
estimated probabilities in (3) as follow: 
 ; is the correlation coefficient of ’s and ’s and  are error 
terms with an expected value of zero. In the multinomial choice setting, there are J-1 selection 
correction terms, one for each alternative package. The standard errors in (5) are bootstrapped to 
account for the heteroskedasticity arising from the generated regressor ( ).  
2.2.  Estimation of average treatment effects  
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The above framework can be used to examine the average treatment effect (ATT) by comparing 
the expected outcomes of adopters with and without adoption. The challenge in impact evaluation 
using observational data is to estimate the counterfactual outcome, the outcome the adopters 
could have earned had they not adopted the packages. The expected outcome for adopters had 
they not adopted the packages, is a counterfactual outcome. Following Carter and Milon (2005) 
and Di Falco and Veronesi (2011), we compute the ATT in the actual and counterfactual 
scenarios as follow; 5 
Adopters with adoption (actual adoption observed in the sample):  
                                                                
Adopters, had they decided not to adopt (counterfactual):  
                         
These expected values are used to derive unbiased estimates of the ATT. The ATT is defined as 
the difference between (6a) and (7a) or (6b) and (7b). For instance, the difference between (6a) 
and (7a) is given as:  
                                                                  
The first term on the right hand side of equation (8) represents the expected change in adopters’ 
mean outcome, if adopters’ characteristics had the same return as non-adopters, i.e., if adopters 
had the same characteristics as non-adopters. The second term  is the selection term that 
captures all potential effects of difference in unobserved variables. 
3. Data description and empirical specification 
The data set used for this study is based on a farm household survey in Ethiopia conducted during 
October–December 2010 by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) in 
collaboration with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT). The 
                                                          
5 The effect of treatment on untreated (ATU) can also be computed using this framework; however, we did not report 
this to save space. 
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sample contains 900 farm households and about 1,644 farming plots. A multistage sampling 
procedure was employed to select peasant associations (PAs)6 from each district and households 
from each of the PAs. First, based on their maize–legume production potential, nine districts from 
the three (Amhara, Oromia and SNNRP) regional states of Ethiopia were selected. Second, based 
on proportionate random sampling, 3–6 PAs in each district, and 16–24 farm households in each 
PA were selected. 
The SAPs considered in this study include bio-diversification (maize-legume rotation), 
conservation tillage and improved maize seeds. Adoption of these practices provides eight 
possible combinations of SAPs. Table 1 presents the proportions of maize area cultivated under 
SAPs packages. Of the 1,644 maize plots, about 25% did not receive any of the SAPs (R0V0T0); 
while all three practices were jointly adopted on 5.4% of the plots (R1V1T1).  
Table 1. Sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) packages used on maize plots 
Choice 
(j) 
Binary triplet 
(Package) 
Bio- diversification 
 (R) 
Improved variety 
(V) 
Conservation tillage 
(T) Frequency 
(%) R1 R0 V1 V0 T1 T0 
1 R0V0T0  
√ 
 
√ 
 
√ 25.40 
2 R1V0T0 √   
√ 
 
√ 5.43 
3 R0V1T0  
√ √ 
  
√ 24.79 
4 R0V0T1  
√ 
 
√ √ 
 
12.03 
5 R1V1T0 √  
√ 
  
√ 8.00 
6 R1V0T1 √   
√ √ 
 
4.46 
7 R0V1T1  
√ √ 
 
√ 
 
14.47 
8 R1V1T1 √  √  √  5.43 
Note: The binary triplet represents the possible SAPs combinations (package). Each element in the triplet is a binary variable for a 
SAP/rotation/bio-diversification (R), improved variety (V), conservation tillage (T)/, where the subscript refers 1 = adopted and 0 
= otherwise. 
 Table 2 shows the interdependence of SAPs packages. Maize–legume rotation is practiced 
on about 23% of the plots. Maize is often rotated with legumes such as haricot bean and 
soybeans. Sampled farmers used conservation tillage on about 36.3% of plots. Conservation 
tillage in our study refers to either reduced tillage (only one pass) or zero tillage together with 
letting the residue remain on the plot. Improved maize variety is adopted on 53% of the maize 
plots. The sample unconditional and conditional probabilities presented in Table 2 highlight the 
existence of interdependence across the three SAPs. For instance, the conditional probability of 
household adopting conservation tillage and modern maize seeds is increased from 36% to 50% 
                                                          
6 PA is the lowest administrative structure in Ethiopia. 
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and from 53% to 58%, respectively, when farmers adopt bio-diversification. The result indicates 
complementarity between the adoption of bio-diversification, conservation tillage, and modern 
maize varieties. 
Table 2. The unconditional and conditional probabilities of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) adoption (%) 
 Bio-diversification (R) Conservation tillage (T) Modern maize seeds (V) 
P(Yk = 1) 23.3 36.4 52.5 
P(Yk = 1|YR = 1) 100.0 49.5** 57.6** 
P(Yk = 1|YT = 1) 27.1** 100.0 54.8 
P(Yk = 1|YV = 1) 25.5* 38.0 100.0 
P(Yk = 1|YR = 1, YT = 1) 100.0 100.0 54.9 
P(Yk = 1|YR = 1, YV = 1) 100.0 40.5 100.0 
P(Yk = 1|YT = 1, YV = 1) 27.1** 100.0 100.0 
Note: Yk is a binary variable representing the adoption status with respect to choice k (k = bio-diversification (R), 
conservation tillage (T) and modern maize seeds (V)); *, ** and *** indicate a statistically significant 
difference at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. The comparison is between unconditional probability and conditional 
probabilities in each SAP. 
 A description and summary statistics of explanatory variables for the eight sub-groups of 
observation are presented in Table 3. The specification of our empirical model is based on a 
review of theoretical work and previous similar empirical adoption and impact studies (D’Souza 
et al. 1993; Fuglie, 1999; Neill and Lee, 2001; Lee, 2005; Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Knowler 
and Bradshaw, 2007; Kassie et al. 2010, 2011; Wollni et al. 2010; Kasem and Thapa, 2011). 
According to this literature, factors affecting adoption and our outcome variables include farm 
characteristics (soil depth, slope, fertility, plot distance to dwelling), social capital, governance 
and information (membership in farmers’ association, number of traders farmers know in their 
vicinity, number of blood relatives in and outside the village, extension contact, household 
confidence in skill of extension workers), shocks and social insurance (self-reported rainfall 
shocks, plot level crop production disturbances and farmers’ reliance on government support 
during crop failure), resource constraints and market access (farm size/livestock, farm equipment 
ownership, distance to main market and input dealers, and access to credit), household 
characteristics (family size, household head education, spouse education, gender, and age), and 
geographic location (district dummies). 
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 We focus on describing those variables that are not common in the adoption and impact 
literature. A detailed description and hypothesis of these variables is available in Kassie et al. 
(2012) and Teklewold et al. (forthcoming). 
 The rainfall disturbance variable is based on respondents’ subjective rainfall7 satisfaction 
in terms of timeliness, amount and distribution. The individual rainfall index was constructed to 
measure the farm-specific experience related to rainfall in the preceding three seasons, based on 
such questions as whether rainfall came and stopped on time, whether there was enough rain at 
the beginning and during the growing season, and whether it rained at harvest time. Responses to 
each of these questions (either yes or no) were coded as favorable or unfavorable rainfall 
outcomes, and averaged over the number of questions asked (five questions) so that the best 
outcome would be equal to one and the worst equal to zero. Plot-level disturbance is captured by 
the following most common stresses affecting crop production: attacks by pests and diseases, 
water logging and drought, and frost and hailstorm stress.  
  In this study, credit-constrained farmers are defined as those who need credit but are 
unable to get it (30%). Accordingly, credit-unconstrained farmers are those who do not need 
credit (40%) as well as those who need it and are able to get it (30%). 
 We also control for the possible role of farmers’ perception of government assistance, by 
including a dummy variable taking the value of one if the farmer think that they can rely on 
government support during crop failure. We distinguish three social networks and capital: a 
household’s relationship with rural institutions in the village; a household’s relationship with 
trustworthy traders; and a household’s kinship network. Such classification is important as 
different forms of social capital and networks may affect the adoption of SAPs in various ways 
such as through information sharing, stable market outlets, labor sharing, the relaxing of liquidity 
constraints, and mitigation of risks.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Factors explaining adoption of package of SAPs 
The results from the multinomial logit model are presented in Table 4. 8 The base category is 
non-adoption (R0V0T0) where results are compared.  
                                                          
7Actual rainfall data are preferable but reliable in season village-specific data in most developing countries, including 
Ethiopia, are scarce. 
8 The model is estimated using the stata selmlog routine (Bourguignon et al. 2007). 
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The model fits the data reasonably well and the Wald test that all regression coefficients 
are jointly equal to zero is rejected [χ2(266) = 956.44; p = 0.000]. The results show that the 
estimated coefficients differ substantially across the alternative packages.  
 The spouse’s (women’s) education level has a positive impact on the adoption of the 
improved variety–conservation tillage package (R0V1T1). There is a strong correlation between 
the adoption of package R1V1T1 and family size and age of the household head; increasing for 
family size but decreasing for household age.  
 Farm size has inconclusive results on the packages containing conservation tillage. It is 
positively related to SAPs packages containing only conservation tillage (R0V0T1), perhaps 
because of demand for labor-saving technologies. A similar result was found by Fuglie (1999) in 
the US. However, adoption of package R1V1T1 is more likely to be used by small farmers 
probably because smaller farmers tend to achieve food security by sustainably intensifying 
production.  
 All social network and capital variables have positive impacts on adoption of most 
packages of SAPs. With scarce or inadequate information sources and imperfect markets, 
including insurance market and transactions costs, social networks could facilitate the exchange 
of information, enable farmers to access inputs on schedule, and overcome credit constraints. 
This finding suggests that in order to enhance the adoption of SAPs, local rural institutions and 
service providers need to be supported because they can effectively assist farmers by providing 
credit, inputs, information, and stable market outlets. 
 Adoption of R0V1T0 (only improved seeds combination) is more common by farmers who 
trust in government support when crops fail, probably because the benefit of new technologies 
(i.e., modern seeds) is uncertain and farmers may need insurance to adopt new technologies. The 
results also reveal that more highly-skilled extension agents enhance the likelihood of adopting 
packages R0V1T0, R0V0T1, R0V1T1, and R1V1T1, perhaps because a package containing modern 
seeds and the conservation tillage practice is relatively knowledge-intensive and require 
considerable management input. This underscores the importance of upgrading the skill of 
extension workers to speed up adoption of SAPs. The results further indicate the importance of 
rainfall and plot level shocks in determining the adoption of packages of SAPs. The probability 
of adoption of R1V0T0 is high in areas/years where rainfall is reliable in terms of timing, amount 
and distribution. Similarly, adoption of R1V1T1, R1V1T0, and R1V0T0 is negatively and 
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significantly influenced by waterlogging stress. The incidence of pests and diseases positively 
influences the adoption of packages R0V0T1, R1V1T0, R1V0T1, and R0V1T1. Finally, plot 
characteristics also conditioned the adoption of different packages, suggesting the importance of 
considering these characteristics in promoting packages of SAPs.  
4.2. Average treatment effect on the treated  
The second stage regression estimates are shown in Appendices Table A1–A5. Because our 
major objective is to determine the average adoption effects of various combinations of SAPs 
under the actual and counterfactual scenarios, the regression results are not discussed here. 
However, it is worth noting that many of the coefficients on the selection correction terms are 
significant suggesting that adoption of packages of SAPs will not have the same effects on non-
adopters should they choose to adopt, as it would on adopters.  
 Table 5 presents the unconditional and conditional average effects of adoption of a 
combination of SAPs. The unconditional average effects indicate that adopters of packages of 
any SAPs earn more maize income, on average, than non-adopters. The same is true for other 
outcome variables except that non-adopters use more N fertilizer under package R0V0T1. 
However, this simple comparison is misleading because it does not account for both observed and 
unobserved factors that may have influence on outcome variables. 
 To estimate the true average adoption effects for households that did adopt, the outcome 
variables of farm households who adopted packages of SAPs are compared with what they would 
have been if the farm households had not adopted, by applying equation (8). We found that in 
almost all cases adoption of a combination of SAPs provides more maize income compared to 
adopting them in isolation. Farmers obtained higher income when bio-diversification and 
conservation tillage practices were combined with improved seeds, either together or 
individually. The largest income effect (5.58 thousand birr/hectare) is from adoption of package 
R1V1T1. 
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Table 5. The average effect of adoption of package of sustainable agricultural practices (SAPs) using multinomial 
endogenous switching regression 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 With regards to input use, we found that for farmers who adopted package R1V1T0, the 
average labor demand both for females and males is significantly higher than it would have been 
if the adopters had adopted R0V0T0. However, the average N and pesticide use are not 
significantly affected, probably because bio-diversification saves farmers from using N and 
pesticides through N fixation by the legume crops and controlling for pest, disease and weed 
infestations. On the other hand, adoption of R0V0T1 and R0V1T1 significantly increased pesticide 
application and labor demands while significantly reducing the average N application. The 
decrease in N application is greater when farmers use traditional maize varieties (R0V0T1) and 
even further under package R1V0T1 (bio-diversification combined with conservation tillage) 
without significantly affecting the average maize income, pesticides use, and households’ labor 
demand. Similarly, adoption of bio-diversification with traditional varieties (R1V0T0) does not 
significantly affect the average N and pesticide use and female labor but reduces the male 
 
Adoption 
effects 
 
Package 
Outcome 
Maize 
income  
(Birr/ha) 
N 
application 
(Kg/ha) 
Pesticide 
application 
(l/ha) 
Labor (labor days/ha) 
Women Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unconditional 
average effects 
R1V0T0 5924.00*** 
( 721.76) 
101.66*** 
(13.96) 
2.19*** 
(0.37) 
0.411 
(0.53) 
4.01*** 
(0.99) 
R0V1T0 2751.24*** 
(135.84) 
3.77*** 
(1.14) 
0.89*** 
(0.03) 
3.18*** 
(0.37) 
2.62***  
(0.36) 
R0V0T1 3929.43*** 
(207.32) 
-12.18*** 
(1.06) 
2.49*** 
(0.10) 
9.26*** 
(0.42) 
6.85***  
(0.55) 
R1V1T0 5858.69*** 
(325.28) 
31.80*** 
(3.21) 
0.16*** 
(0.04) 
2.52*** 
(0.42) 
0.03 
(0.46) 
R1V0T1 7324.07*** 
(584.67) 
54.89*** 
(7.51) 
21.60*** 
(3.77) 
12.50*** 
(1.52) 
24.87*** 
(3.07) 
R0V1T1 2795.68*** 
(187.57) 
-1.19 
(1.16) 
1.25*** 
(0.04) 
3.83*** 
(0.41) 
1.81***  
(0.48) 
R1V1T1 6822.82*** 
(253.74) 
332.82*** 
(50.20) 
2.83*** 
(0.19) 
13.69*** 
(0.49) 
2.23*** 
 (0.50) 
 
 
 
 
 Average 
treatment 
effects on 
treated (ATT) 
R1V0T0 1892.43*** 
(819.78) 
9.45 
(9.31) 
0.59 
(0.58) 
-0.63 
 (1.74) 
-3.32** 
(1.94) 
R0V1T0 2823.06*** 
(269.44) 
3.78** 
(2.29) 
1.04*** 
(0.06) 
3.13***  
(0.62) 
1.71*** 
(0.61) 
R0V0T1 2349.90*** 
(376.70) 
-13.92*** 
(2.89) 
2.95*** 
(0.49) 
2.97*** 
 (1.06) 
3.11*** 
(1.26) 
R1V1T0 4506.65*** 
(752.39) 
7.81 
(6.72) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
6.08***  
(1.33) 
2.36**  
(1.33) 
R1V0T1 497.54 
(903.52) 
-19.95*** 
(5.69) 
3.42 
(3.21) 
1.57 
(2.54) 
3.61 
(3.44) 
R0V1T1 2840.85*** 
(405.59) 
-5.60** 
(3.57) 
0.84*** 
(0.09) 
1.60** 
 (1.05) 
0.59  
(0.99) 
R1V1T1 5579.47*** 
(745.39) 
15.27* 
(10.65) 
1.49*** 
(0.30) 
10.12*** 
(1.73) 
4.99*** 
(1.99) 
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workload. On the other hand, the average N and pesticide use and labor demand significantly 
increases with adoption of R1V1T1 and R0V1T0. This is likely due to the complementarity 
between improved maize variety adoption and fertilizer and pesticides through the increase in 
agrochemical use because of adoption of package R0V1T0. Without soil and water conserving 
technologies this may jeopardize agricultural sustainability in the long run. Furthermore, the use 
of more pesticides in the package that contains improved seed is probably because farmers would 
like to avoid risk as high yielding varieties may be susceptible to pest outbreaks (Jhamtani, 2011).  
 The above results have the following implications. First, adoption of SAPs increases 
maize income and the highest payoff is achieved when SAPs are adopted in combination rather 
than in isolation. Second, farmers appear to properly credit N fixed by legume crops and consider 
the soil fertility effects of conservation tillage because N fertilizer use is either lowered or turned 
out to be insignificant when bio-diversification was used in combination or isolation. Third, the 
notion that conservation tillage may increase pesticide application and labor demand to 
compensate for less tillage (Fuglie, 1999) is observed in this study. This is because pesticide use 
and labor demand increase in the package that includes conservation tillage. Fourth, in most cases 
pesticide use and the change in male and female labor demand was insignificant in the package 
that contains bio-diversification. This is perhaps because bio-diversification helps to maintain soil 
bio-diversity that can reduce pest and weed infestations that otherwise need pesticides and/or 
additional labor (Tilman et al. 2002; Hajjar et al. 2008). However, this effect of bio-
diversification is outweighed when it is used in combination with improved variety and 
conservation tillage (R1V1T1). Fifth, adoption of packages has different effects on male and 
female labor time allocation. In nearly all cases, the packages make females spend more time 
working on the farms than males do. This may negatively affect the larger households by 
diverting time from other activities such as food preparation and child care as women are often 
responsible for routine care of the household. Sixth, promoting bio-diversification and 
conservation tillage either in combination or isolation has an important positive long-term 
environmental implication without an economic trade-off.  
5. Concluding remarks 
Adoption and impact studies of SAPs have received considerable attention from development 
economists. Prior research focuses on specific practices; less information is available on joint 
18 
 
adoption of multiple and interdependent SAPs and their impacts. In this paper, we evaluate the 
adoption of multiple SAPs and their impacts on maize income and agrochemicals and labor input 
intensity in maize–legume farming systems of Ethiopia. A multinomial ESR is used to account 
for self-selection in choosing combined and potentially interdependent packages of SAPs and the 
interactions between them. 
 The multinomial logit selection model results revealed that the likelihood of adoption of a 
package of SAPs is influenced by observable plot, household and village characteristics. These 
include rainfall and plot level disturbances, soil characteristics and distance of the plot, social 
capital in the form of access and participation in rural institutions, the number of relatives and 
traders known by the farmer, market access, wealth, age, spouse education and family size, the 
farmer’s expectations of government support in case of crop failure, and confidence in the skill of 
public extension agents. These results can be used to inform and target policies aimed at 
increasing adoption rates of multiple and interdependent SAPs. For example, the correlation of 
spouse’s education with increased adoption of conservation tillage and improved seeds suggests 
that female education can be an important driver of adoption of sustainable agricultural practices 
in Ethiopia. Similarly, the significant role of social capital suggests the need for establishing and 
strengthening local institutions and service providers to accelerate and support adoption of SAPs. 
The effects of weather related risks are also important for enhancing SAPs adoption and 
underscore the need to provide climatic information, not only in terms of rainfall amount but also 
of timing and its distribution. Furthermore, the use of SAPs is positively associated with the 
farmer’s expectation of timely government support during crop failure and confidence in the skill 
of extension agents. These suggest a number of supplementary policy measures: investment in 
public safety-net programs (public insurance) and risk-protection mechanisms, and the need for 
technically capable extension service providers.  
 With regards to the results of adoption effects, adoption of multiple SAPs significantly 
increases maize income; and the package that contains all improved SAPs (bio-diversification, 
conservation tillage and improved varieties) provides the highest income. This has important 
policy implications. Efforts for improving productivity and food security should combine 
improved varieties with appropriate agronomic practices that increase the profitability of 
investments in seed-based technologies while enhancing ecosystem resilience and sustainability. 
Adoption of the combined SAP packages has a positive effect on N and pesticide application and 
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women and men labor use on-farm. However, it also appears that bio-diversification or 
conservation tillage, or both, with traditional varieties enables farmers to reduce N without 
significantly affecting income. On the other hand, comparing the change in pesticide use with the 
adoption of SAPs involving conservation tillage and bio-diversification with modern and 
traditional maize varieties reveals that pesticide application would not significantly increase when 
conservation tillage and bio-diversification is jointly used with traditional maize varieties. 
Conservation tillage requires application of some herbicides (e.g. glyphosate) to kill weeds before 
planting under reduced or zero till systems. This may have some undesirable environmental 
effects, but will progressively be reduced as the weed pressure decreases with retention of 
residues on the field. This suggests that policy makers, researchers and extension agents should 
use alternative options to design win–win strategies to address household food security and 
minimize the use of non-renewable external off-farm inputs (pesticides and fertilizers) that harm 
the environment.  
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ABSTRACT. In a mixed farming system in which farmyard manure (FYM) is considered
an important multipurpose renewable resource that can be used to enhance soil organic
matter, provide additional income and supply household energy, soil fertility depletion
could take place within the perspective of the household allocation pattern of FYM. This
paper estimates a system of FYM allocation regressions to examine the role of returns
to FYM and farmers’ impatience on the propensity to allocate FYM to different uses. We
parameterize the model using data from a sample of 493 households in Ethiopia. Results
indicate a heightened incentive for diverting FYM from farming to marketing for burning
outside the household when returns to selling FYM and the farmer’s discount rate are
high. These reveal the need for policies that will help to reduce farmers’ impatience and
encourage the substitution of alternative energy sources to increase the use of FYM as a
sustainable land management practice.
1. Introduction
The challenge of achieving sustainable development in developing
countries has been closely associated with reversing rates of resource
Financial and logistical support for this study from the Ethiopian Institute
of Agricultural Research (EIAR) and Swedish International Development and
Cooperation Agency (Sida) through the Environmental Economics Unit, Univer-
sity of Gothenburg is gratefully acknowledged. The paper has benefited from
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anonymous reviewers, as well as the editors, for careful reviews and helpful
suggestions. Constructive comments and suggestions from Gunnar Ko¨hlin and
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degradation (Pender, 1996). In countries where agriculture is the mainstay
of the economy, soil fertility depletion is an important cause of resource
degradation and leads to low agricultural productivity and declining per
capita income. Fundamentally, in the ideal agrarian economy, a productive
and sustainable production system requires a combination of inorganic fer-
tilizers and organic fertilizers such as farmyard manure (FYM) to replenish
the soil and maintain soil organic matter level (Place et al., 2003; Heerink,
2005). However, the limited use of inorganic and organic nutrient inputs
among smallholder farmers exacerbates soil nutrient deficiencies (Place
et al., 2003).
One particular strand of literature indicates that the use of inorganic
fertilizer is limited in developing countries due to low rural incomes,
the high cost of fertilizer, inappropriate public policies and infrastruc-
ture constraints (Croppenstedt et al., 2003). Another strand of literature
points out that, while FYM has been considered an important renew-
able resource (Place et al., 2003; Keplinger and Hauck, 2006; Erkossa and
Teklewold, 2009), improving soil fertility is severely constrained due to
the decline of FYM from the livestock system (Heerink, 2005). Given
the limited availability of FYM, household FYM allocation patterns are
interlinked with management of soil resources in such a way that the
demand for FYM for energy within and outside of farm households
shifts FYM allocation in ways that undermine its use in improving soil
fertility.
The use of FYM either to provide energy for farm households or to
improve soil fertility is well documented (Place et al., 2003; Mekonnen
and Ko¨hlin, 2008; Erkossa and Teklewold, 2009). Mekonnen and Ko¨hlin
(2008) examine the determinants of the rural households’ decisions to
use dung as fuel and as soil fertilizer in Ethiopia. Yet previous studies
have not considered the role of FYM as a source of additional income
when sold to peri-urban and urban dwellers outside the farming com-
munity. Our data indicate that farmers on average allocate 34 per cent
of their production of FYM for farming as organic fertilizer, 38 per
cent for selling as an additional source of income and the remaining
28 per cent for burning as a household source of energy. This mul-
tipurpose role of FYM could be associated with two important dis-
parities. First, there is growing evidence (see Mekonnen and Ko¨hlin,
2008) that, despite the knowledge of alternative energy resources such
as kerosene, electricity and liquefied petroleum gas, high prices and
lack of access hinder the wider use of these as sources of domestic
energy. As a consequence, due to the substitutability of FYM for these
alternative sources of energy (Heltberg et al., 2000), both the demand
for and market price of FYM have risen. Under such conditions, the
allocation of FYM among the various alternatives (farming, energy or
income source) depends on the selling price of FYM and the return from
farming.
Second, due to the long mineralization process whereby nutrients in the
organic compounds become available to the crop (Place et al., 2003) and
the seasonality of agricultural production, the benefit earned from farming
with FYM is not available in the short term compared to the return earned
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from selling FYM.1 The discounted utility model states that later returns
will be discounted by a fixed proportion of their utility for every time
interval that they are delayed. In a perfect market setting, this devaluation
should generally be closely related to the market interest rate. However, in
the presence of credit market failures and constrained access to financial
resources (typical for developing countries such as Ethiopia), farmers’ sub-
jective discount rates routinely deviate from and are usually higher than
the prevailing market interest rates (Pender, 1996; Bezabih, 2009; Yesuf
and Bluffstone, 2009). The underlying assumption of this relationship is
that poor individuals with limited financial resources and binding credit
constraints discount future consumption at a disproportionately high rate.
Following the definition of Becker and Mulligan (1997), an impatient farm
household has a low discount factor (high discount rate) and high rate of
time preference. The implication here is that allocation of FYM is depen-
dent on the extent of farmers’ degree of impatience in waiting for the
returns from FYM among the various alternatives. If individuals are impa-
tient, due to an inability to access formal markets to tradeoff current and
future consumption, through borrowing, then they may be disinclined to
invest in long-term investments Adjustments of FYM may result, such as
diverting the resources from the farm to the non-farm. Hence, soil fertil-
ity depletion may be explained by the impatience introduced by market
failures.
Therefore, building on the economic theory of the agricultural household
model under credit and financial constraints, this paper aims to examine
the effect of the farmer’s discount rate and various returns to FYM on the
propensity to allocate FYM as an input for agricultural production or for
burning as fuel within and outside of farm households. This study extends
the existing economics literature of soil fertility depletion by providing a
better understanding of how explicitly incorporating the sale of FYM for
an additional source of income competes with using FYM for farming. The
study also examines farmer’s impatience as a determinant of allocation of
FYM for alternative purposes. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
study to do so in the economics of soil fertility management.
2. Conceptual framework
To explain the FYM allocation behavior of agricultural households, we
construct a farm household model that assumes that farmers are engaged
simultaneously in production and consumption decisions. This model is
assumed to be non-separable due to the presence of financial and credit
market constraints. Non-separability is a common feature of studies with
applications to agriculture in developing countries (Jacoby, 1993; Skoufias,
1994). It means that each farm household determines FYM production
and consumption by maximizing its utility subject to a shadow price of
FYM for different activities, which is unobserved and unknown except to
1 Agronomic studies have shown that, while the returns from FYM farming are
not low, not all of the total nutrients are immediately available for crop uptake
(Eghball et al., 2004).
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the household itself, and which varies between households depending on
household and village characteristics (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). We
build on Mekonnen and Ko¨hlin (2008) and develop an approach in the
spirit of Shively and Fisher (2004) and Fisher et al. (2005), who derived a
model of a system of labor allocation and provided an assessment on the
effect of the household shadow price in a given activity for forest decline.
However, we add two main features to the model; first, we allow the var-
ious returns from FYM to be driven by profit or consumption motives;
and, second, we add an experimentally measured time-preference compo-
nent to capture farmers’ impatience on the decision to divide FYM among
household consumption, selling and farming. A detailed discussion of the
conceptual model is presented in appendix A.
3. Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy involves a sequence of estimation stages. First, we
estimate a production function to obtain the marginal product of FYM for
those participating in FYM farming. Second, we use the marginal revenue
product estimates from the above step along with the observed selling
price and employ a sample selection model to compute shadow returns
for the subsample of households that do not supply FYM for farming or
the market. Third, we estimate a system of FYM allocation function.
3.1. Estimation of shadow prices
Following Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias (1994), the first step in the empirical
analysis is to obtain the value of marginal productivity of FYM (p∗f ) esti-
mated at the slope of the production surface around the input use vector for
each farm household. The farm-level production function in logarithmic
form is specified as:
lnQa = β f lnM f +
∑
k
βk ln xk + ε (1)
where Qa refers to the total value of agricultural outputs (OUTVALU) pro-
duced, M f is the quantity of FYM used as organic fertilizer (FYMFARM),
and β f is the estimated parameter for it; xk is the quantity of other
inputs used, β ′ks are parameters estimated for other inputs, and ε is
the error term. The specified production function includes the follow-
ing inputs: quantity of inorganic fertilizer (FERTILIZER), seed used
(SEED), hours of labor (FARMLABR), cropped area (CROPAREA),
draft animal services (BULOCK), share of area covered with mod-
ern crop varieties (MODERNVAR) and fraction of area with good soil
quality2 (GOODSOIL). Locational dummies (ZONE1 and ZONE2) are
also included to control village-specific factors.
2 Using farmers’ soil quality classification method, soil quality in the study areas
are grouped into three: lem, tef and lem-tef , which refer to good, medium and
poor soil quality, respectively. The characteristics used by farmers for classifi-
cation are mainly physical properties (such as depth and thickness of the soil,
moisture holding capacity, drainage, workability and erodability) that directly or
indirectly affect the soil’s capacity for sustainable productivity.
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Inorganic fertilizer and modern crop varieties are externally purchased
technological inputs. Thus, in the empirical model, they are considered
to be potentially endogenous. In line with Jacoby (1993), who worked
on cross-sectional data and relied on production and consumption-side
instruments that are valid under non-separability, the endogeneity (reverse
causation) of technological inputs such as fertilizer and improved varieties
is controlled with instruments using the two-stage least square method (IV-
2SLS). We identify these endogenous variables with village-specific and
household characteristics and verify the statistical validity of the instru-
ments by performing an over-identification test. Following the estimation
of the production function, the estimated parameters for FYM are used to
derive the value of marginal product (p∗f ) as follows:
p∗f =
Qˆa
M f
βˆ f (2)
where Qˆa is the predicted value of output from the estimated coefficients.
The subsamples in this study are likely to be non-random due to the
presence of non-participant farm households (about 20 per cent in each
activity) for which the marginal product or selling price is not observed.
Hence, direct estimation for participants only might lead to potential sam-
ple selection bias. A farmer’s decision regarding participation in FYM
farming or selling may, however, be endogenously determined with the
respective return from FYM. Therefore, following the approach of Shively
and Fisher (2004) and Fisher et al. (2005), we employ a Heckman spec-
ification with sample selection to jointly estimate participation in FYM
farming and the value of marginal product using maximum likelihood
(Heckman, 1974). The linkage between the discrete and continuous parts of
the model implies that the participation equation, which essentially serves
as an endogenous dummy variable to account for any gap between the
observed price and the household shadow price in the given activity, pro-
vides a correction for the estimation of the shadow value (Shively and
Fisher, 2004).
The empirical identification of the model requires that, in addition to
the exogenous variables (both in the participation and outcome equations),
one or more identifying variables must be included in the participation
equation and at least one variable in the shadow value equation that does
not enter into the FYM equations. In the case of FYM farming, to enable the
identification of the shadow value we use eight potential variables.3 These
variables are hypothesized to affect the likelihood of participation in FYM
farming by changing the household’s shadow value. For instance, average
plot distance affects FYM productivity and hence the decision to participate
3 Instruments include: average distance from home to farm (DSTFARM); house-
hold’s access to own means of transportation (DONKEY); off-farm income
(OFFINCOM); herd size (TLU); distance to the most visited market center
(DSTMKT); size of cultivated land (CRPAREA); whether household adopts stove
(STOVADOP); and expenditure on alternative energy sources (KEROSEN).
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in FYM farming. Identification of FYM allocation equations, on the other
hand, is obtained with the use of location variables (an approach employed
by Fisher et al. (2005)) and extension variables. We expect that the effect of
these identifying variables works through their effect on participation and
shadow value rather than directly. An estimation method similar to that
above is motivated by an extension of Heckman’s suggestion for imputing
a farmer’s asking price for FYM or the shadow price in FYM marketing
(the value that the farmer places on FYM for selling). Again, the estimation
relies on two behavioral schedules: the function determining participation
of a farm household on the market and the function determining the selling
price equation.
3.2. Econometric specification: farmyard manure allocation
Because a farmer’s FYM allocations decisions across various alternatives
are related to one another, it is expected that the disturbance terms across
models of each outcome might also be correlated. Such interconnectedness
thus implies that OLS models, which assume the absence of correlation
among the disturbance terms, yield inefficient estimates of coefficients.
A more efficient estimation technique in such a case is the seemingly
unrelated regression, or SURE (Zellner, 1962), which simultaneously esti-
mates the three equations as a set and allows for the potential correlation
among the unobserved disturbances as well as the relationship between the
decisions of FYM allocations. The systems of equations for FYM farming
(M f ), burning (Me) and selling (Ms), respectively, can be expressed more
simply as:
M f = αf f p∗f + αf s p∗s + α f δδ + αf zq zq + αf zc zc + υ f (3)
Me = αe f p∗f + αe s p∗s + αeδδ + αezq zq + αezc zc + υe (4)
Ms = αs f p∗f + αs s p∗s + αsδδ + αs zq zq + αs zc zc + υs (5)
where p∗f is the marginal value product of FYM, p
∗
s is the selling price
of FYM, and δ is the farmer’s discount rate; Zc and Zq are vectors of
household and farm characteristics, respectively; v is the error term. If
the regression disturbances in the different equations are mutually corre-
lated, then: E[υi , υ j ] = σi j for i, j = f , e, s. The Lagrange multiplier test4
will test the specification for the SURE model with the null hypothesis of
σf s = σf e = σs e = 0. If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, estimation
with SUR will be efficient.
4. Data and study areas
This study is based on data from household surveys conducted in the
mixed crop-livestock farming system of three zones in the central high-
lands of Ethiopia – East Shewa, West Shewa, and North Shewa. These
4 The test statistic is given by: λ = N ∑3i=2
∑i−1
j=1
σ 2i j
σi i σ j j . λ has a χ
2 distribution with
three degrees of freedom.
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surveys were conducted by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research
(EIAR) in 2006. Mixed crop-livestock farming is the dominant farming
system in the areas, where FYM is considered an important and integral
part of the farming system. The three study areas are found within a radius
of 100 km from the capital city of the country, Addis Ababa. The proxim-
ity to the capital and the peri-urban areas around the study areas provides
important market opportunities for farmers for their agricultural products
and byproducts. In particular, the three zones are characterized by differ-
ences in the availability and use of the FYM resources and their access to
FYM markets. The shorter the distance to the FYM market, the lower the
transaction cost, and hence the higher the selling price of FYM.
The initial sample contains 500 randomly selected farm households.
However, after removing inconsistent and non-systematically missing
information, data from 493 farmers remain for use in our empirical esti-
mation. A two-stage cluster random sampling technique was employed
for selecting districts and respondents from each area. The sample house-
holds were randomly selected from village rosters that exhaustively record
all members of the villages. The data set features detailed information
regarding household and farm characteristics, such as annual earnings
from selling livestock and livestock products, including selling FYM. The
selling price of FYM is defined as the quotient of annual earnings from
FYM and the total quantity of sales. The FYM price is determined in
local markets and, due to the high transaction costs associated with the
bulkiness of the product, we exhibit inter-village price variations. Table 1
contains the descriptions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the estimations.
Table 2 presents the farm household’s total annual production of FYM5
and its use for different activities. FYM selling in the study sites is also
an important source of household income, covering 28–47 per cent of total
livestock income. The empirical findings concerning the demand for FYM
for farming may be more clearly understood if they are prefaced by the
respondent’s classification of soil quality – an indicator of soil fertility
depletion due to lack of organic fertilizer. The survey participants were
asked to evaluate the soil quality of their farms according to the local
assessment criteria. Accordingly, on average 35 per cent, 31 per cent and
34 per cent of the respondents’ farms, respectively, were classified as hav-
ing good, medium and poor soil quality. Despite the positive correlation
between good soil quality and FYM used for farming (figure 1), having
farming plots with medium and poor soil quality might be an indication
that such plots need more FYM to improve the soil.
5 FYM refers to the amount of manure collected from the livestock system. In the
study areas, FYM is stored in a pit covered with grasses and leaves or simply put
into stacked piles outside the barn for some time prior to land application. At the
time of cropland application the quality (nutrient content) of the stored FYM is
generally heterogeneous across farmers depending on storage method, applica-
tion procedure (time and method of application) and the livestock management
system (the composition of feed ratio and its moisture content).
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Table 1. Definitions, means and standard deviations of variables used in the
regressions
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev.
OUTVALU Total output value, ETB 16,658.81 17,206.74
p∗f Predicted shadow price of FYM
for farming, ETB/ton
1,018.30 568.82
p∗s Predicted shadow price of FYM
for selling, ETB/ton
667.26 92.49
DISCOUNT Farmer’s discount rate 0.94 0.33
ZONE-1 Dummy: 1 if location is north
Shewa
0.42
ZONE-2 Dummy: 1 if location is west
Shewa
0.15
SEX Dummy: 1 if male-headed
household
0.88
MARITAL Dummy: 1 if married 0.86
EDUCATON Years of education 4.08 4.11
AGE Age of the household head, years 46.14 12.90
FAMLYSIZ Total family size (in adult
equivalenta)
4.69 1.80
MALFAMLSIZ Male family size (in adult
equivalent)
2.62 1.34
FEMFAMLSIZ Female family size (in adult
equivalent)
2.07 0.98
FERTILIZER Inorganic fertilizer applied, kg 38.72 37.31
FERTEXPEN Total expenditure on commercial
fertilizer, ETB
241.53 233.21
TOTALFYM Quantity of FYM produced,
ton/year
9.17 10.57
BULOCK Bullock services, hours 281.08 210.48
SEED Seed used, kg 105.96 80.85
FARMLABR Labor for farming, hours 664.45 223.54
CROPAREA Cultivated area, ha 2.33 1.71
MODERNVAR Fraction of area with modern
crop varieties
0.89 0.57
PRIVATGRAZ Private grazing area, ha 0.07 0.01
HIREINLABR Dummy: 1 if hire in labor 0.22
COMPOUND Size of the compound/garden
(m2)
405.99 143.65
EXTNFREQ Frequency of extension contact
per month
3.79 3.52
DEMONVISIT Dummy 1: if ever visited
demonstration field
0.41
DISTDA Distance to extension agent
office, hours
0.49
DISTFARM Average distance from home to
farming plot, hours
0.27 0.17
DISTMKT Distance to market, hours 0.16 0.16
(continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Variables Description Mean Std. Dev.
DISTWOOD Distance to fetch fire wood,
hours
3.49 1.75
ROTATION Fraction of area rotated with
legume crops
0.21 0.18
GOODSOIL Fraction of area with good
quality soil
0.35 0.05
Dummy: 1 if participated on
rotating saving and credit
EQUB club 0.44
DONKEY Number of donkeys owned 1.66 1.65
OFFINCOM Off-farm income, ETB 111.59 231.11
TLU Herd size (in TLUb) 6.73 4.09
KEROSEN Annual kerosene consumption,
lit
86.51 78.59
POPSIZE Population size in the nearest
town (’000)
23.46 31.55
TREE Number of trees owned 98.40 124.11
STOVUSE Dummy: 1 if use energy saving
stove
0.49
aAdapted from the Amsterdam scale (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980).
bHerd size measured in terms of Tropical Livestock Unit where 1 TLU
(which equals 250 kg body mass) = 1 cattle = 6.67 sheep/goat = 1 horse
= 1.15 mule = 1.54 donkey = 0.87 mule = 200 poultry.
Table 2. Average shares of FYM by purposes, contribution of FYM to annual livestock
income
Purpose North Shewa West Shewa East Shewa Total
FYM produced
(ton/annum)
9.33 (8.18) 12.67 (16.69) 6.98 (10.11) 9.17 (10.57)
Farming (Mf) 0.27 (0.26) 0.32 (0.20) 0.46 (0.23) 0.34 (0.25)
Selling (Ms) 0.42 (0.27) 0.36 (0.25) 0.31 (0.23) 0.38 (0.26)
Household
energy (Me)
0.31 (0.25) 0.31 (15) 0.23 (0.22) 0.28 (15)
Annual livestock 4,476.88 4,313. 42 2,966.05 4,022.97
income (Birr) (5,180.29) (8,835.40) (4,505.32) (5,747.32)
Share of FYM
income
0.30 (0.28) 0.47 (0.39) 0.28 (0.33) 0.32 (0.32)
Number of
observations
278 75 140 493
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation.
In this study, to elicit the farmer’s discount rate, a simple choice task was
used. This is the most common method for eliciting time preferences (Pen-
der, 1996; Holden et al., 1998; Frederick et al., 2002; Bezabih, 2009; Yesuf and
Bluffstone, 2009). All sample respondents in the household survey were
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Figure 1. Correlation between soil quality and FYM used for farming
confronted with a hypothetical experiment designed to elicit their willing-
ness to delay current consumption. Here, subjects were asked to choose
between a smaller, more immediate reward and a larger, more delayed
reward. This is the choice between the hypothetical future value payable
after one year (almost one growing season) equivalent to a fixed present
value. As discussed by Frederick et al. (2002), to precisely estimate the dis-
count rate and to avoid a single choice between two inter-temporal options
that only reveal an upper or lower boundary of the discount rate, this
experiment presented a progression of choices that vary by the amount
of delay rewards. Hence, a series of six binary choices between the speci-
fied amounts of wheat grain to be received now (50 kg) or the alternative
amount of wheat grain to be given a year later (65, 80, 105, 130, 160 and
195 kg)6 were presented in the order mentioned to show which option the
farmer preferred within each choice pair (see appendix B for a description
of the experiment).
A few words of caution about the hypothetical approach are in order.
One limitation of the hypothetical choice experiment is the uncertainty
regarding whether people are motivated to do as they would do if out-
comes were real (Frederick et al., 2002). Becker and Mulligan (1997) and
the references therein also state that, in imagining future wants, the
rate-of-discount factor grows larger as the future becomes more remote.
6 The choice of the alternative amounts for future rewards is based on taking the
midpoint of the alternatives from the credit terms of the local merchants who
sometimes provide credit for cash-constrained farmers. The agreement stipulates
repayment in kind with grain after harvest at about a 100 per cent interest rate.
Formal credit usually linked to farm inputs (modern seeds, fertilizer and pesti-
cide) is provided by farmers’ cooperatives with some down-payments, usually
50 per cent. Friends, relatives and neighbors who constitute the other informal
sources of financing often provide credit at a zero interest rate or certainly much
lower than the rate offered by local merchants.
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However, one can also note that the formulation of large-stakes rewards in
a one-year timeframe, as in this experiment, might agree with the actual
yearly agricultural production cycle, but in terms of cost it is also difficult
to conduct with real rewards. Like all experimental elicitation procedures,
the results from such types of choice tasks can also be affected by procedu-
ral nuances such as the anchoring effect that occurs when respondents are
asked to make multiple choices between immediate and delayed rewards;
the first choice they face often influences subsequent choices (Frederick
et al., 2002).
5. Empirical results
5.1. Estimation of shadow values
The first step in the empirical analysis is estimation of the agricultural tech-
nology to obtain the marginal revenue product of FYM. Table 3 reports
the instrumental variable (2SLS) estimates of the agricultural production
function. This estimation is based on farm inputs and the total value of
outputs recorded during the main growing season of the 2006 cropping
period.7 The results show that agricultural output significantly increases
with the application of FYM. Output is also positively correlated with
labor input, seed and cultivated land area. A concern in the estimation
of agricultural production function is that agricultural outputs are in part
determined by the agricultural activities chosen by the farm households,
a worry for the possibility of simultaneity bias. Because of the expectation
of reverse causality that inorganic fertilizer and modern seed varieties are
determinants of agricultural output and are hence assumed to be poten-
tially endogenous, the model is estimated using an instrumental variable.
The choice of instruments for the endogenous regressors in this case is
hypothesized to satisfy the relevance and validity conditions in which the
instruments are engaged. The application of inorganic fertilizer and mod-
ern seed varieties are partly related to the farmer’s access to information
and household and farm characteristics.
The correlation of the included endogenous regressors with the instru-
ments can be assessed by an examination of the explanatory power of
the excluded instruments in the first-stage regressions. The F-statistics in
the first-stage regressions for both endogenous variables are jointly sig-
nificant at the 1 per cent level, which satisfies one condition that ensures
instrument validity. However, for models with more than one endogenous
variable, as specified here, these indicators may not be sufficiently infor-
mative. The Hanson J-test of over-identifying restriction is found not to be
significant and therefore confirms the validity of our instruments to satisfy
the orthogonality condition required for their employment.
7 Similar to Skoufias (1994) and Jacoby (1993), the presence of zero values for some
inputs is common in smallholder farming. Hence, to keep the empirical estimation
manageable in such a case, the logarithmic transformation was carried out by
adding one to the relevant inputs.
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Table 3. Instrumental variable (2SLS) estimation of agricultural production
function (dependent variable: ln (OUTVALU))
Variables Variable descriptions Coefficients Robust Std. Err.
ZONE-1 Dummy: 1 if location
is north Shewa
−0.809∗∗∗ 0.131
ZONE-2 Dummy: 1 if location
is west Shewa
−0.344∗∗ 0.154
ln(FYMFARM) FYM used for farming,
tons
0.214∗∗ 0.089
ln(MODERNVAR) Fraction of area
with modern crop
varieties
0.523 0.467
ln(FERTILIZER) Inorganic fertilizer
applied, kg
−0.151 0.282
ln(BULOCK) Bullock services,
hours
−0.015 0.036
ln(FARMLABR) Labor for farming,
hours
0.329∗∗∗ 0.087
ln(CROPAREA) Cultivated area, ha 0.375∗∗∗ 0.131
ln(SEED) Seed used, kg 0.365∗∗∗ 0.113
GOODSOIL Fraction of area with
good quality soil
0.979 0.939
CONSTANT 5.922∗∗∗ 1.357
Joint significance: F (10, 482) 71.10∗∗∗
Instrumented variables: FERTILIZER, MODERNVAR
DISTDA, DISTFARM, EQUB,
Excluded instruments AGE, FAMLYSIZE
F test of excluded instruments:
FERTILIZER: F(5, 479) 3.04∗∗∗
MODERNVAR: F(5, 479) 3.60∗∗∗
Over identification test of all instruments:
Hansen J Statistic: 5.185
χ2(3) p-value: 0.159
Notes: ∗∗, ∗∗∗ refer to significance level at 5% and 1%, respectively.
The marginal product of FYM estimated from the production function
is observed only for FYM farming participant farmers. Not observing
marginal productivity is likely to be indicative of non-participation in FYM
farming. Hence, marginal products are imputed for each observation by
estimating participation and marginal product equations jointly, match-
ing with the household, farm and village characteristics. This is used to
estimate the parameters and thus predict the shadow value of FYM in
farming for each observation. Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood
result of the determinants of participation in FYM farming and the return
from it. Sample selection bias here may be due to self-selection by the
farm households who found FYM farming to be more advantageous (due
to pre-existing conditions or attributes) than non-FYM farming. Similarly,
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the shadow return of FYM selling is predicted for each observation by
estimating market participation and selling price jointly.
There are different factors determining the selection process. As
expected, with the additional eight variables that are included in the
participation equation (for both FYM farming and selling), the outcome
equations are jointly significantly different from zero (χ2(8) = 33.37 with
a p-value of 0.001 for FYM selling; and χ2(8) = 20.87 with a p-value of
0.008 for FYM farming). The results suggest the identifying variables are
successful at enabling identification. Hence, these variables are important
for explaining participation of FYM farming and selling equations. The
fitted shadow value of FYM in farming and selling from the above pro-
cedure is derived and kept for use in the FYM allocation model. Wald
tests for the joint significance of the instruments used in each shadow
value equation are presented in table 4.8 At 0.01 probability, the instru-
ments are jointly significant. This result confirms that our instruments are
informative for the identification of FYM allocation equations. A note of
caution is that, while the instruments are globally statistically significant,
individually some instruments are weak.
5.2. Testing equality of prices
In theory, an individual allocates scarce resources among various alterna-
tives until the point at which the marginal returns across alternatives are
equal. By doing so, farmers could choose the most profitable alternative
options. For instance, if the productivity of FYM in farming is higher than
the return of FYM from selling, it pays for farmers to shift FYM resources
into farming and away from selling in the market. It has been observed
that the average selling price of FYM (ETB 667/ton) is significantly lower
(t-value = 13.21) than the average marginal revenue product of FYM (ETB
1018/ton), but it is significantly higher (t-value = 7.36) than the discounted
marginal revenue product (ETB 544.74).9
In order to formally test whether the FYM allocations are efficient, the
equality between the estimated marginal returns of FYM and the observed
FYM price from the markets is tested. This test could shed some light on
the presence of farm household preferences that are relevant for determin-
ing the allocations. Following the approach of Jacoby (1993) and Skoufias
(1994), who relate market wage with marginal productivity of labor in their
agricultural labor supply analyses, we regress the discounted marginal
product of FYM on the selling price as follows:
ln p∗f = γ + ϕ ln p∗s + v (6)
where p∗f is the discounted marginal revenue product of FYM in farm-
ing; p∗s is the FYM price by selling on the market; and v is the random
disturbance.
8 Instruments include: location variables (ZONE-1 and ZONE-2) and extension
variables such as frequency of extension contact (EXTNFREQ) and whether
farmers ever visited demonstration fields (DEMONVISIT).
9 1 USD = 8.76 ETB at the time of survey.
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The regression result from (6) is shown as:10
ln p∗f = 13.094
(1.338)
− 1.077
(0.206)
ln p∗s
The null hypothesis of efficient FYM allocations is contained in the con-
ditions that (γ, ϕ) = (0, 1). The value of F-statistics for H0 : γ = 0 and ϕ = 1
is 139.26; and the 5 per cent critical value of F(2, 491) is 3.01. The value of
the joint F-statistics rejects the hypothesis at standard significance levels. As
explained by Skoufias (1994), these test results provide evidence contrary
to the efficient operation of the market, and thus indirectly support the
concern about non-separability between the production and consumption
decisions of farm households. It is possible that there are other expla-
nations for the rejection of the equality of the two values (p∗f and p
∗
s ).
Often the treatment of households’ resource allocation behavior, which
creates a wedge between the marginal revenue product and observed mar-
ket price, could be related to household characteristics and constraints on
factor availability and market imperfections (Jacoby, 1993). Another expla-
nation from Jacoby (1993) for this rejection is based on the grounds that
the estimated marginal products may in fact be systematically biased so
that the instrumental variable method does not lead to consistent estimates.
The next section explores the relationship between shadow prices, farmers’
impatience and FYM allocations.
5.3. Shadow prices on farmyard manure allocation
The estimated shadow values predicted in the first stage of the analysis
together with farmers’ degree of impatience and other socioeconomic infor-
mation were matched with the individual farm household FYM allocation
data. The estimation results are presented in table 5. The estimated model
performs well. The calculated χ2-statistic of 4702.75 is statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 per cent significance level, providing evidence for the hypoth-
esis of joint significance of the explanatory variables across all equations.
As expected, the test of independence confirmed the rejection of the null
hypothesis, which states that the covariance of the error terms across equa-
tions is not correlated. The test supports the estimation with SUR [χ2(3) =
152.477 with the associated p-value of 0.000]. The estimates of FYM alloca-
tion functions with a full set of regressors provide empirical evidence on
the effects of the shadow value of FYM-affecting allocations across differ-
ent purposes. The coefficients for shadow prices n p∗s and n p∗f provide
estimates of the uncompensated own-price elasticity for FYM farming and
selling, respectively.
The results also provide the uncompensated cross-price elasticity for
FYM farming, burning and selling. The estimated results are in agreement
with the expectations. The point estimate of the return of FYM from sell-
ing (n p∗s ) and farming (n p∗f ) in the FYM farming equation is negative
but individually statistically different from zero at the 1 per cent signifi-
cance level for selling price only. The negative sign of FYM selling price in
10 Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors.
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the farming equation indicates the expected cross-price effect; as the selling
price of FYM increases, the farmer responds by allocating less to farming.
The estimate for uncompensated elasticity is that a 1 per cent increment
of the selling price of FYM leads to an approximately 1 per cent decline
of FYM for farming. This jeopardizes a smallholder’s soil fertility mainte-
nance with adverse implications on sustainable management of one of the
most important natural resources.
The point estimates for the FYM selling price in the FYM selling equation
are positive and statistically different from zero at the 5 per cent sig-
nificance level. As expected, the findings reveal that farmers rationally
respond to the change in price of FYM in the allocation of FYM for sell-
ing. As for allocating FYM for selling, it basically depends on the extent
of the change in FYM for farming and the change in a household’s con-
sumption of energy from FYM burning. The increase in the selling price
of FYM increases the price in terms of burning at home, thereby making
burning FYM more expensive. This substitution effect, then, tends to cut
the amount of FYM allocated for household energy. The uncompensated
cross-price elasticity is positive but not significant.
5.4. Farmer’s impatience on allocation of farmyard manure
Typically, individuals show a systematic preference for receiving a reward
immediately rather than at some later moment in time. When a respon-
dent shifts preference from the early amounts to the amount for a later
reward, the implicit one-year rate of time preference was calculated as fol-
lows: δ = n( f/p), where the respondent is indifferent between an amount
of p at the current time and a reward of f received one year in the future
(appendix B). The mean discount rate in this experiment is about 94 per
cent. Pender (1996), however, reported a discount rate of 30–60 per cent for
Indian villages, whereas Holden et al. (1998) found a mean discount rate of
93 per cent for Indonesia, 104 per cent for Zambia and 53 per cent for one
village in Ethiopia. Similar to Holden et al. (1998) and Pender (1996), who
found an upward bias from their experiment that asked farmers to adjust a
present value equivalent to a fixed future value, about 64 per cent of farm-
ers in this study were found to have a high discount rate (95–135 per cent)
in an experiment that asks the future value equivalent for a fixed present
value (figure 2).
From the foregoing discussions, the marginal return of FYM in farm-
ing is higher than the price of FYM from selling on the market, although
the former presents a delayed outcome while the latter presents immedi-
ate benefits. The parameter estimates for the farmer’s discount rate are in
agreement with the expectation in the FYM allocation equations. The point
estimate of farmers’ degree of impatience in the FYM-selling equation is
statistically different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level. The pos-
itive sign indicates that farmers with a high degree of impatience increase
allocation of FYM for selling. The theory that people with a positive time
preference show a preference for receiving a commodity immediately is
consistent with behaviors observed in the FYM-selling equation. Here,
farmers usually receive the return immediately, so that, of the available
options, it is the option of choice for impatient farm households.
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Figure 2. Farmers’ discount rate responses for future value equivalents
In contrast, the farmer’s degree of impatience negatively affects the
allocation of FYM for farming and burning, but the effect is statistically sig-
nificant in the former case only. The outcome of allocating FYM for farming
is quite remote due to the seasonality in agriculture, forcing the impatient
farmers to switch away from FYM farming. Smallholders operating under
imperfect credit market settings may not invest their FYM today to increase
the future agricultural productivity of their farms when the alternative of
selling FYM is possible to meet immediate subsistence needs. The absence
of credit for investing in on-farm improvements or consumption credit to
meet immediate needs induces underinvestment and sacrifices the quality
of the soil, resulting in lower future productivity and persistent poverty
(Marenya and Barrett, 2007).
This result is in accord with the few other studies that combine time
preference experiments with field observations for better understanding of
field behavior. An empirical study of Ethiopia (Shiferaw and Holden, 1998)
found a negative correlation between an individual’s rate of time prefer-
ence and adoption of soil conservation technologies. In Brazil, impatient
fishermen in a time preference experiment exploited the fishing grounds
more (Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2008), whereas people in Sri Lanka with a
higher rate of time preference extracted more non-timber forest products,
causing depletion of forest resources (Gunatilake et al., 2007). Therefore,
a high rate of time preference is an important constraint for investments
in soil conservation and could be viewed as a cause of the continuous
depletion of soil resources. In this context, the allocation of FYM in farm-
ing plots can be considered a present investment to improve soil fertility,
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thereby improving future agricultural productivity and returns. The policy
implication of this is that fixing the broken credit market is important for
investing FYM as soil fertility.
Table 5 also provides several factors that are obvious determinants of the
allocation of FYM for the different activities. We find statistical evidence for
the change in allocations of FYM for household energy over the life cycle.
Our findings show a U-shaped relationship between age and consump-
tion of FYM for household energy. Households spend less FYM for energy
until they reach a certain age (around age 70), after which consumption
is increased. Herd size (TLU) is a resource variable that provides a good
indication of a household’s wealth status. The result shows that wealthier
households spent more FYM for farming and burning in the households.
TLU could also approximate the household’s capacity to produce more
FYM. The result shows that, as the capacity to produce FYM increases, the
amount of FYM spent for farming and burning in the household increases
as well. This result corroborates the effect of the quantity of FYM produced
at the household level. As production of FYM increases, the amount of FYM
allocated for each purpose is increased significantly. The size of the effect is
higher for selling and farming, however.
We observe a negative and statistically significant relationship between
expenditure on inorganic fertilizer and FYM for farming, suggesting substi-
tutability between FYM and inorganic fertilizer. Although the complemen-
tarity is likely due to the beneficial interactive effects of FYM on fertilizer
efficiency (Marenya and Barrett, 2007), the substitutability is important for
poor smallholders, as they use lower quantities of commercial fertilizers
largely due to high price as well as liquidity constraints. The positive and
statistically significant coefficients of fertilizer expenditure on FYM selling
and burning in the household would seem to show an increase in quantity
of FYM for selling and burning in the household when inorganic fertilizer
substitutes for FYM for farming.
We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient of the
‘KEROSEN’ variable in the FYM-burning equation.11 A possible explana-
tion is the complementarity between consumption of kerosene and FYM
used for household sources of energy, though the size of the effect is very
small (the elasticity is about 0.08). In rural Ethiopia it is not uncommon to
use kerosene as a source of lighting. The coefficient of use of improved
stoves in the FYM-burning equation is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, however. This coefficient is a measure of the technical substitution
(Amacher et al., 1993) of stoves for FYM, suggesting that improved stoves
reduce household FYM consumption by about 15 per cent. This result is
consistent with Mekonnen and Ko¨hlin (2008). The same study also indi-
cated that encouraging households to use more efficient cooking stoves is a
possible solution to the problem of the limited use of dung as manure. We
also observe a positive and statistically significant correlation between use
of stoves and FYM selling.
11 Controlling the prices of alternative sources of fuel (e.g., kerosene) might better
capture incentives to participate in alternative uses of FYM. In our case, however,
we lack variation if we control these prices.
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6. Conclusions
The causes of soil fertility depletion extend beyond the farm, receiving
effects from market fundamentals and farmer preferences. The main con-
tributions of this study are the analyses of the effects of various returns
of FYM and farmers’ impatience with the trade-offs of using FYM as
inputs to agriculture or burning FYM within or outside of the household.
The empirical analysis is based on a system of equations for the farm-
ers’ allocation of FYM for different purposes. The farm household survey
data comes from the central highlands of Ethiopia, where a mixed crop-
livestock farming system is practiced. The data support the predictions and
show that the farmer’s time preference and the returns to FYM are impor-
tant predictors of the allocation of this multi-purpose resource in the real
world. Farmers with a high degree of impatience decrease the allocation
of FYM to the farm. The higher the selling price of FYM, the higher the
incentive for farm households to sell FYM for burning outside the farm
households.
In smallholder agriculture, where agricultural productivity remains low,
the returns from selling FYM will increase as the demand for biomass fuel
rises and supply declines. In Ethiopia, where fuel prices have been rising
and electricity infrastructure is poor, there is growing interest in using FYM
for energy production. In order to encourage adoption of FYM farming
as sustainable land management practice, the results suggest that incen-
tive policies may be developed in conjunction with the fuel-pricing system,
including substitution and energy conversion technology such as promo-
tion and dissemination of improved stoves not only to the rural areas but
also the surrounding towns.
The high discount rate of the poor due to serious imperfections in the
credit markets has received previous attention (Pender, 1996; Becker and
Mulligan, 1997; Holden et al., 1998; Bezabih, 2009; Yesuf and Bluffstone,
2009; Tanaka et al., 2010). The high discount rates observed in this study,
on the other hand, indicate the disregard of most farm households for the
use of FYM farming with effects on sustainable management of the soil
resources. This implies that the poverty reduction scheme and ensuring
the functioning of rural credit markets are also important policy directions
associated with sustainable land management practices.
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Appendix A: FYM-allocation model
The model presented below captures the case of a farm household
involved in a mixed farming system, where FYM (Qm) is one of the
most important byproducts of the system, assumed to be a function
of the vector of farm inputs and structural characteristics of the farm
household. Utility is derived from consumption of agricultural and pur-
chased goods (C), energy (E), and leisure (Ll). The demand for FYM
burning at the farm household level is a derived demand from the
demand for energy (E), where energy is sourced from FYM (Me) and
other sources such as kerosene and other biomass (Oe). Agricultural pro-
duction (Qa) takes place on individual plots using organic (FYM) and
inorganic fertilizer. We assume inorganic fertilizer is the purchased vari-
able input, while FYM is obtained from livestock production within the
farm households.
Given a total amount of FYM at the farmer’s disposal, the farmer’s
decision consists of allocating Qm between farming (M f ), burning in the
household (Me), and selling on the market as an additional source of
income (Ms) for burning outside the household. The implication is that
farm households in the area are semi-commercial; even if markets for
FYM exist, most retain some FYM for home consumption and farm pro-
duction. Examination of the data for this study has also revealed that
all farm households obtained FYM for burning (Me) and farming (M f )
from their own production system without making any purchase. The net
marketed amount of FYM is therefore non-negative: Qm − Me − M f ≥0.
Households also choose the amount of labor for on-farm (L f ) and off-
farm (Lo) activities. The household budget constraint binds the value
of consumption of agricultural goods and purchased goods (C) by a
household’s total income (Y ) that originates from agricultural income
(π), off-farm work (Lo) at wage rate (w) and FYM sales (Ms) at a price
(ps). Agricultural production is specified as a function of M f , L f and
other variable inputs (X), such as inorganic fertilizer, seeds, pesticide, etc.
Agricultural income is the farm-restricted profit where the value of the
cost of production is subtracted from the total amount of crop produced
(pa Qa).
For each year, the agricultural season is divided into the wet or
planting season and the dry or harvesting season. The nature of the
agricultural production is such that for FYM applied to the field during the
planting season, agricultural output is expected at the harvesting period.
In Ethiopia, where agricultural production is mainly rain fed, this is nearly
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a year-round process. Investing FYM on the farm means postponing the
current consumption originated from burning FYM in the household or
income earned from selling FYM on the market. This loss, interpreted as
the benefit obtained from selling or burning FYM now, is assumed to be
compared and offset by the discounted returns of FYM in farming at a later
time. When imperfect credit markets prevent perfect consumption smooth-
ing, depending on the individual implicit discount rate, farmers often opt
to sell or burn FYM, which limits their ability to use FYM for farming.
Hence, with the subjective discount rate parameter (δ), the relationship
between time preference and allocation behavior is more pronounced. A
farmer’s discount rate is expected to affect household resource alloca-
tion following the standard intuition: a higher δ should result in higher
resources toward current consumption. Formally, given these specifica-
tions, farmers are assumed to choose M f , Me, Ms , Ll , L f , Lo, and X so
as to:
MaxU = U (C, E, Ll; Zc) (A.1)
subject to farmers’ resource and productivity restrictions:
Y = 1
δ
π + wLo + ps Ms (income constraint) (A.2)
π = pa Qa(M f , X, L f ; Zq) − px X (farm restricted profit) (A.3)
E = E(Me, Oe) (energy constraint) (A.4)
Qm = Me + Ms + M f (FYM constraints) (A.5)
L = Ll + Lo + L f (household time constraints) (A.6)
Mi ≥ 0 for i = e, s, f (non-negativity constraints) (A.7)
where Zc and Zq are vectors of household and farm characteristics influ-
encing preferences and farm production, respectively.
Substituting the constraints into the utility function above and assuming
the farm household’s choice at the start of the dry season, we can specify
the Lagrangean as:
 = U (C, E(Qm − Ms − M f , Oe), L − Lo − L f ; Zc
)
+ λ [1/δ (pa Qa(M f , X, L f ; Zq) − px X
)+ wLo + ps Ms
]
+ η f M f + ηe Me + ηs Ms (A.8)
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with income constraints
and η f , ηe and ηs are Lagrangean multipliers associated with inequality
constraints on FYM farming, burning and selling, respectively.
Maximization of the Lagrangean with respect to Ms , M f and Me provides
the following first-order conditions:
∂U
∂E
∂E
∂Me
= λ ps + ηs (A.9)
∂U
∂E
∂E
∂Me
= λ 1
δ
pa
∂Qa
∂M f
+ η f (A.10)
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The above first-order conditions indicate that, at the optimum, farm
households allocate FYM across alternative options so as to equate the
marginal value of household energy from FYM with that of FYM spent on
selling (A.9) or farming (A.10) – that is, the discounted future marginal rev-
enue product from agricultural production or net returns from marketing.
In other words, the discounted gains from the extra increment of future
agricultural production due to improved soil fertility and the net returns
from FYM selling are equalized to the household-specific opportunity
cost of FYM for burning. The complementary slackness condition for con-
strained maximum in equation (A.9) and (A.10) may infer the shadow price
of FYM for selling and farming, respectively. When households optimally
allocate FYM in the market and in farming, the shadow price of FYM sell-
ing (p∗s = ps + ηs/λ) and FYM farming (p∗f = (1/δ)pa(∂Qa/∂M f ) + η f /λ)
is equal to the respective observed FYM price (p∗s = ps) or the discounted
marginal value product of FYM (p∗f = (1/δ)pa(∂Qa/∂M f )). This is because,
for an interior solution, the complementary slackness condition requires
ηi = 0 given (Mi > 0; for i = f, s).
However, again following the complementary slackness condition that
requires ηi > 0 for a farmer who exhibits corner solutions (Mi = 0; for
i = f, s), the shadow prices, p∗s and p∗f , will be in general greater than the
observed selling price and the marginal value product, respectively. The
shadow prices of FYM are measured in real terms denoting the unobserv-
able internal prices in the case of non-separability. They may be defined as
the market price or returns plus the value that farmers assign to themselves
for supplying or not supplying FYM to the market or to the farm. Thus the
shadow prices of FYM are endogenously determined by parameters affect-
ing the household’s production and consumption decision variables. The
first-order conditions above can be combined to derive a set of reduced
form of Marshallian demand functions for FYM for farming, for house-
hold energy, and the supply of FYM for selling in the market. These are
expressed as functions of shadow prices, farmer’s time preference, and
other individual and farm characteristics:
M f
Ms
Me
⎫⎬
⎭ = m
(
p∗s , p
∗
f , δ; Zq , Zc
)
(A.11)
Appendix B: Structure of the time preference experiment and farmer’s
discount rate
Instruction
We would like to know your preference for taking wheat grain now com-
pared to taking wheat grain after a year. Please indicate for each of the
following number of choices, whether you would prefer to receive the
smaller amount of wheat now or the bigger amount of wheat one year
from now. For instance, which would you choose: 50 kg wheat now or 65 kg
wheat exactly after one year?
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Nominal size in kg of wheat
Rate of time Discount
Choice Now (p) 12 months (f) preferencea (δ), % rate class
1 50 65 26 Almost neutral
2 50 80 47 Slight
3 50 105 74 Moderate
4 50 130 96 Intermediate
5 50 160 116 Severe
6 50 195 136 Extreme
aThe implicit one-year discount rate: δ = n( f/p)
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Abstract 
Even though farmyard manure is considered a promising soil fertilizer in many developing 
countries, its use in soil fertility restoration is constrained by a multitude of factors. Yet the 
adoption of a crop-livestock technology could relax these constraints. This paper examines 
the impact of a joint crop-livestock technology on farmyard manure production and factors 
determining livestock technology adoption. An endogenous switching regression model is 
employed to account for self-selection in technology adoption. The model is implemented 
using survey data from 491 households collected in the central highlands of Ethiopia. The 
results show that farmers’ risk preference, distance to the extension service center, and 
market access to complementary inputs significantly influence the adoption of improved 
livestock technology. Adoption of crossbreeding technology creates a positive and significant 
impact on organic fertilizer production. The positive indirect effect of crop technology is 
significantly higher for those who adopt livestock technology. This implies that a policy 
supporting crop-livestock synergies through joint provision of technologies is important in 
order to increase agricultural productivity through better soil fertility management. 
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1.  Introduction 
Soil fertility management and food production in the Ethiopian highlands take place 
in mixed crop-livestock farming systems. Studies carried out in the highland areas have 
shown that declining soil fertility, which is closely linked to productivity, has been identified 
as a root cause of declining per capita food production (Pender et al., 2007; Kassie et al., 
2009; Kassie et al., 2010). Crop-livestock systems can potentially play a key role in soil 
fertility management and in ecological balance. Livestock plays a crucial role in providing 
draft power and recycling of waste products and residue from cropping or agro-industries, and 
manure from livestock is used for crop production. 
Farmyard manure (FYM) use is a commonly suggested method of improving soil 
fertility in crop-livestock systems. The benefits of using FYM in crop production include 
improvements in the physical properties of soil and provision of nitrogen, phosphorous, 
potassium and other mineral nutrients. The application of FYM increases soil organic matter 
content, and this leads to improved water infiltration and water holding capacity as well as an 
increased soil carbon content (Kassie et al., 2009; Manyong et al., 2006; Marenya and Barrett, 
2007; Girmay et al., 2008). In recognition of these benefits, government and non-
governmental organizations have focused on promoting farming with FYM as part of the 
current agricultural extension system. However, despite the potential advantages, FYM 
production is constrained by limited supply due to the low performance of indigenous 
livestock, lack of veterinary services and non-adoption of improved feed and livestock 
technologies. 
The crop sector also plays an important role in the livestock sector by serving as a 
major source of feed and increased productivity. This jointness of crop-livestock production 
provides opportunities to think beyond the confines of either crops or livestock enterprises 
alone and understand the crop-livestock production interdependence. Generally, jointness in 
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agricultural production stems from (1) technical interdependences of multiple products where 
changes in the level of one output influence the supply of the other inputs, (2) non-allocable 
inputs where multiple outputs can be produced from the same input, and (3) allocable inputs 
where the available amount of inputs are used to the various outputs in the production process 
(Shumway et al., 1984).  
Specifically, jointness caused by non-allocable technology (Shumay, 1984) in this 
study entails the production of outputs such as FYM from the livestock technology and crop 
by-product (e.g., straw) from the crop technology. The other form of jointness of interest in 
this study stems from the technical interdependence where changes in the level of one output 
(i.e., the effect of crop technology in straw production) indirectly influences the supply of 
input in other production (i.e., straw as livestock feed for FYM production). Hence, the effects 
of joint crop-livestock technologies in the mixed farming system are thus understood in that 
technologies for crop production are likely to improve livestock feed and productivity. These 
effects, jointly with livestock technologies, could improve income and crop-livestock nutrient 
transfers through increased availability of FYM.  
However, empirical research on the impact of joint crop-livestock technologies in the 
mixed farming system for improving availability of FYM is limited. Additionally, although 
there is a wealth of empirical studies on agricultural technology adoption and its economic 
and environmental impacts, the literature on the determinants of livestock technology 
adoption in developing countries is very thin. 1  Hence, many questions concerning the 
determinants of adoption of technology in this sector in developing countries remain 
unanswered. The objectives of this study are threefold. First, assess the contribution of 
adoption of crossbreeding livestock technology on FYM production; Second, examine the 
indirect effect of modern crop varieties on FYM production; and third, explore the effect of 
                                                          
1 An exception to this is Abdulai and Huffman (2005), who used a farm-level model of the adoption rate for 
crossbred cattle technology to establish the importance of learning effects, geographical proximity to markets, 
and credit constraints in Tanzania. 
4 
 
farmers’ risk preference, market access to complementary inputs, spatial distance to extension 
services, and other socio-economic characteristics on the propensity of crossbreeding 
technology adoption.  
The paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we aim to provide 
empirical evidence on adoption of livestock technology – a neglected area in the existing 
technology adoption literature. Second, the outcome of the study will help policy makers and 
development practitioners understand the impacts of joint crop-livestock technologies on 
production of yield-augmenting input, i.e., farmyard manure, as this is lacking in previous 
studies. 
2. Econometrics framework  
We develop a framework that will allow us to study the mechanics of the household 
adoption decision of livestock technology and the effect of technology in the production of 
FYM in a crop-livestock mixed farming system. While the propensity to adopt livestock 
technology depends on the gains from using the technology, adopters and non-adopters may 
be systematically different in their observed and unobserved characteristics that 
simultaneously affect the adoption decision and the outcome variable. This may lead to self-
selection problems. A farmer’s decision regarding the participation in livestock technology 
adoption may thus be based on individual self-selection and hence be endogenously 
determined.  
Econometric approaches to deal with selection bias in cross-sectional data include 
propensity score matching (PSM) and instrumental variable (IV) approaches. PSM only 
controls for observed heterogeneity while IV can also control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
The traditional IV treatment effect models with one selection and outcome equation assumes 
that the impact can be represented as a simple parallel shift with respect to the outcome 
variable. This is not true in our case where the chow test rejected the assumption of parallel 
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shift [F(18,455) = 6.22, p = 0.000], indicating interaction between observed covariates and 
adoption of crossbreeding cattle. The endogenous switching regression (ESR) framework can 
capture such interactions by estimating two separate equations (one for adopters and one for 
non-adopters) along with the selection equation. In this paper, ESR treatment effects approach 
adopted to correct for selection bias by controlling for both observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity. We check robustness of estimates from this model using PSM. 
3. Modeling the impacts of crossbred cattle on Farm Yard Manure production 
 The observed outcome of adoption of crossbred cattle can be modeled following a 
random utility formulation. Consider the thi  farm household facing a decision on whether or 
not to adopt crossbred cattle. Let aπ  represent the benefits to the farmer from adoption of 
crossbred cattle, and let nπ represent the benefit stream from traditional cattle. If other 
adoption constraints are not limiting, the farmer will adopt crossbred cattle if
0)( * >π−−π= nai KT . The net benefit )(
*
iT that the farmer derives from the adoption of 
crossbred cattle is a latent variable determined by observed characteristics )( iw and the error 
term )( ie : 
iii ewT += α
*  with   


 >
=
otherwise 0
0 if 1 *i
i
T
T    (1) 
where iT is a binary indicator variable that equals 1 if a farmer adopts crossbred cattle and 
zero otherwise;α  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and K is the additional fixed cost 
associated with adoption of crossbreeding.  The outcome functions, conditional on adoption, 
can be written as an endogenous switching regime model: 
1 :1 Regime  ,
a
im =+= TifuxQ iaaiaβ     (2)  
0  :2 Regime  ,im =+= TifuxQ innin
n β     (3)  
where nm
a
m  and QQ are representing FYM production, with and without adoption, respectively; 
x represents a vector of covariates, and β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ua, un, 
and e are error terms assumed to be trivariate normally distributed with mean zero and a 
variance-covariance matrix specified as follows: 
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where ).,cov( and ),,cov(  ),var(u ),var( ),var( a
2
n
22
neneanaae ueueue =σ=σ=σ=σ=σ  The 
variance of 2εσ  can be assumed to be equal to 1 since the β  coefficients in the selection model 
are estimable up to a scale factor. The covariance between nuu  and a is not defined since
n
im
a
im  and QQ are not observed simultaneously (Maddala, 1983). The expected values of 
nuu  and a conditional on the sample selection is non-zero because the error term in the 
selection equation (1) is correlated with the error terms of the FYM functions ( ) and a nuu : 
( ) iaeiai TuE λσ== a1  
( )
( )αΦ
αφ
σ=
i
i
ae w
w
                 and 
( ) iniin TuE λσ== ne0  
( )
( )αΦ−
αφ
σ−=
i
i
ne w
w
1
                 , 
where iaλ and inλ  are the inverse Mills ratios computed from the selection equation and will be 
included in 2 and 3 to correct for selection bias; (.)φ is the standard normal probability density 
function, (.)Φ  is the standard normal cumulative density function.  
Following Carter and Milon (2005) and Di Falco et al (2011), the conditional 
expectations of Eq. (2) and (3) are used to derive unbiased estimate of the average adoption 
effects on the treated and untreated by comparing the excepted outcomes of adopters and non-
adopters with and without adoption. These are given as: 
iaaeaaai
a
m xwxTQE λσ+β== ),;1(     (5a) 
ianenani
n
m xwxTQE λσ+β== ),;1(      (5b) 
( ) innennninm xwxTQE λσ−β== ,;0     (5c) 
inaeanai
a
m xwxTQE λσ−β== ),;0(     (5d)  
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Note that ( )1=iaim TQE  and ( )0=inim TQE  represent observed expected FYM 
production quantities, while ( )1=inim TQE  and ( )0=iaim TQE represent counterfactual expected 
production quantities. Using these four expected values, the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT) and untreated (ATU) computed as follow. The ATT computed as the difference 
between (5a) and (5b): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )neaeianaianimaim xwxTQEwxTQEATT σσλββ −+−==−== ,,1,,1   (6)  
Similarly, the expected change in non-adopter’s FYM production, the effect of the treatment 
on the untreated (ATU) is given as the difference between (5d) and (5c): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )εε σσλββ nainnainnimaim xwxTQExTQEATU −+−==−== ,,0,0    (7)  
The first term on the right hand side of equation (6) represents the expected change 
in adopter’s mean outcome, if adopters’ characteristics had same return as non-adopters, or if 
adopters had similar characteristics as non-adopters. The second term )(λ is the selection term 
that captures all potential effects of difference in unobserved variables. For the effect of 
treatment on the untreated, Equation (7) can be interpreted in the same way.  
The difference between equations (6) and (7) gives the transitional heterogeneity 
effect. This provides information on whether the adoption effect is larger or smaller for the 
adopters or non-adopters groups. This difference between the two groups could happen 
because those who adopt may exhibit a different outcome regardless of adoption due to other 
endogenous determinants of the outcome.  
Identification is fundamental in the endogenous switching regression model. The w  
vector therefore should contain additional explanatory variables that affect the adoption 
equation directly but not the outcome equations. The variables considered as instrument 
include farmers’ risk preference, distance to development workers office and credit 
(participation in rotating saving and credit clubs). We follow the simple falsification test of Di 
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Falco et al. (2011) to establish the admissibility of these instruments. The results reveal that 
the instruments are jointly statistically significant in the adoption equation (χ2(3) = 21.18, p = 
0.000) but not in the outcome equations (F(3, 199) = 1.46, p = 0.223). 
The ESR estimated using full information maximum likelihood method (FIML) 
following Lokshin and Sajaia (2004). 
 In addition to the ESR, we also employed a semi-parametric matching procedure to 
further check results robustness. The parametric method used in this paper might have some 
limitations. The resulting parameter estimates from endogenous switching regression model 
are subject to the underlying assumption of trivariate normal distribution of the errors in the 
adoption and outcome equations. Moreover, the production equations also tend to impose a 
linear functional form assumption. We therefore implement a propensity score matching 
(PSM) method because of the free distributional and flexible functional form assumption. The 
matching process involves pairing a group of adopters and non-adopters of crossbreeding that 
are similar in terms of all their relevant observable characteristics.  
The PSM model used to construct counterfactual and reduce problems of sample 
selection bias due to observables. It is defined as the conditional probability that a farmer 
adopts crossbreeding cattle given covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This is given as: 
)/()/1(Pr)( wTEwTwp ii ===      (8) 
 The conditional distribution of w , given the propensity score )(wp , is similar for 
adopters and non-adopters. After estimating the )(wp , the average adoption effect for adopter 
households (ATT) can be estimated as: 
{ })(,1/ wpTQQEATT inimaim =−=      (9) 
Various matching techniques have been proposed in the literature to match adopters 
and non-adopters with similar propensity scores. The nearest neighbor matching (NNM) and 
kernel-based matching (KBM) methods are widely used in matching studies (Kassie et al., 
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2010). We employed both approaches in this study. The basic idea of the methods is to 
numerically search for neighbors of non-adopter farm households that have a propensity score 
that is very close to that of the adopter farm households (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
4. Study areas and data descriptions 
The data used in this study comes from a survey of farm households conducted in 
2006 by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR). The survey consists of 491 
farm households from seven different districts of Ethiopia’s central highlands. In Ethiopia, the 
highlands represent areas higher than 1,500 m above sea level. They cover about 44% of the 
total area and are inhabited by 90% of the country’s human population and 75% of the 
livestock population. In Ethiopia, the livestock sector contributes about 16% of the national 
and 27%-30% of the agricultural GDP, and generates 13% of the country’s export earnings 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 2007). Farmers in the study areas are 
familiar with the traditional crop-livestock mixed farming systems. The mixed farming 
system in these areas is considered as integrating different type crop and livestock. The major 
crops grown in the study areas include wheat, tef 2 , chickpeas, lentils, grasspeas, and 
fababeans. Cattle (oxen and cow), small ruminants (sheep and goat), and poultry are also part 
of the area’s farming system. 
We employed a two-stage cluster random sampling technique for selecting districts 
and households from each area. A structured questionnaire was prepared and administered 
using trained enumerators for the purpose of interviewing each sampled household’s head.  
The adoption model incorporates household-specific constraints that are due to the 
associated market and institutional failures, including poor access to information and 
complementary inputs, and risk and uncertainty associated with farm households’ engagement 
in the adoption process. As pointed out by Abdulai and Huffman (2005), livestock 
                                                          
2An indigenous small seeded cereal crop mainly used for making a popular traditional pancake – like the local 
bread called injera. 
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technologies have been the source of puzzling outcomes stemming from the fact that livestock 
production is usually very sensitive to changing environments and market conditions. Dairy 
production, for example, which has received major attention in almost all countries and has 
shown varying degrees of success, is hampered by yield-reducing environmental stresses, 
inadequate feed production, poor nutritional management, high capital costs, limited market 
size, low costs of competing imports, and product perishability (Steinfeld et al., 2006). Under 
such uncertain conditions, risk-averse farmers are less likely to adopt livestock technologies 
such as crossbreeding to improve productivity. 
Thus, the survey was designed to include instruments 3  to elicit farmers’ risk 
preferences as well. The approach was set up following the experimental method of 
Binswanger (1980). This approach, which could be conducted as a hypothetical or a real-
payoffs situation, measures attitudes by observing farmers’ reactions to a set of gambles. In 
the survey, respondents were presented with certain real lotteries of the form (qmax, qmin, p), 
promising a real monetary prize for qmax with probability p, or qmin with probability 1 − p. The 
lotteries represent different farming conditions with six different payoff levels for a given 
probability of bad or good outcome (such as harvesting). The sample farm households were 
allowed to choose from the different payoff alternatives. Once the households had selected 
one of the alternatives, they had a 50/50 probability of getting the bad and getting the good 
payoff. 
The experimental method consisted of offering farmers a set of alternatives 
representing different risk-aversion classes (extreme, severe, intermediate, moderate, slight, 
and neutral risk aversion), within which a higher expected gain could only be obtained at the 
cost of higher variance, and thus a decline in risk aversion. It is generally acknowledged that 
experiments conducted without real payment options may suffer from hypothetical bias. In 
                                                          
3See Teklewold and Köhlin 2011 for the basic structure of the instrument used for measuring farmers’ risk 
preference. 
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order to avoid such a problem and provide enough incentive for the farmers to reveal their 
true preferences, our experiment included a real payoff. 
As is common in many developing countries, the public research and higher 
education institutions as well as some non-governmental organizations are the major suppliers 
of crossbreeding in Ethiopia. The diffusion of the technology from these sources is often 
channeled to farmers through extension agents, with limited private-sector participation. This 
indicates that with a weak institutional setup, the role of access to information in the 
crossbreeding adoption decision is measured based on farmers’ travel distance to the 
extension service center.  
Furthermore, as with most innovations that involve a package of inputs (Carlson et 
al., 1993), lack of access to complementary inputs such as veterinary services, supplementary 
feeds, and human capital may also influence the productivity of the livestock production 
system and therefore hinder adoption of crossbred cattle. The constraints in accessing 
complementary input markets to obtain, e.g., veterinary services and supplementary feeds are 
directly associated with the transaction cost that farmers may face in these markets. This 
access to inputs is measured by the distance to the nearest input markets and distance to main 
road in hours of walking.  
Increases in human capital increases the returns to adopting new technologies and 
make the potential user more efficient in gathering and interpreting information (Woznaik, 
1993). Technical training is usually considered as a component of human capital. Carlson et 
al. (1993) define it as disembodied technological change taking the form of knowledge about 
improved methods of production.  Because of technical training, farmers could realize the 
advantages of new technologies and adjust their production decisions by incorporating the 
innovations in to the production process.  We thus control for the possible role of subject-
oriented technical skill by including a dummy variable taking the value one if the household 
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attends training on livestock production and management practices before adoption takes 
place. 
The quantity of FYM produced (metric tons per annum) is the dependent variable in 
the outcome equation. Modern livestock technologies (such as crossbred cattle) are important 
in order to increase the production of livestock products and by-products (Steinfield et al., 
2006). Thus it is reasonable here to consider FYM production differential among adopters and 
non-adopter households. Following the definition of Abdulai and Huffman (2005), and to 
identify the regimes in the switching regressions, we considered livestock technology-
adopting households defined as households reporting to own at least one crossbred4 cattle, 
while non-adopting households are defined as those that use only indigenous or local breeds. 
Based on this classification, at the time of the survey, 227 farm households (46%) in the 
sample were adopters. We control crop technology via cultivated area covered with improved 
crop varieties. Modern seed varieties are the major agricultural technologies used for crop 
production in the study areas. Improved cereal and legume crop seeds covered about 50% of 
the total cultivated land in the 2006 cropping season. Table 1 presents definitions and 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the regression. 
  
                                                          
4 Crossbreeding of indigenous cattle breeds (Borana, Barca, and Horro) with exotic sire breeds (Fersian, Jersey, 
and Simmental).  
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Table 1. Definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variables Definition Non-adopter adopter 
Technologies    
LIVETECHNO 1 if own crossbred cattle 0.54 0.46 
CROPTECHNO Area covered with modern crop variety, ha 0.79 (0.75) 1.01 (0.69) 
Extension service 
 DISTANCEDA Spatial distance to extension agent office, hrs 0.50 (0.40) 0.40 (0.40) 
RISK Farmer’s risk preference (Rank)   
 1=Neutral to preferring 0.12 0.21 
 2=Slight to neutral 0.09 0.15 
 3=Moderate 0.20 0.19 
 4=Intermediate 0.18 0.19 
 5=Severe 0.14 0.08 
 6=Extreme aversion 0.27 0.18 
Market access 
 DISTROAD Distance to the main road, hrs 0.08 (0.14) 0.12 (0.19) 
DISTMKT Distance to market, hrs 0.15 (0.13) 0.17 (0.18) 
Other socio-economic variables 
COMUNALGRAZ 1 if farmer has access to communal grazing 
land  0.34 0.37 
PRIVATGRAL Private grazing land area, ha 0.06 (0.06) 0.08 (0.10) 
TLU Livestock size (in Tropical Livestock Unit) 5.82 (3.01) 7.82 (4.86) 
COOPMEMB 1 if member of the cooperative 0.08 0.21 
ZEROGRAZ 1 if uses cut and feeding system 0.03 0.09 
OFFARM 1 if involved in off-farm work 0.36 0.47 
CULTIVATED Cultivated land area, ha 2.15 (1.53) 2.54 (1.88) 
AGE Age in years 46.00 (13.00) 47.00 (13.00) 
MALEHEAD 1 if household head is male 0.87 0.91 
FAMLYSIZE Family size (in adult equivalent) 5.00 (2.00) 5.00 (2.00) 
EDUCATION Years of education 3.29 (3.72) 4.99 (4.35) 
TRAININGLIVE 1 if participated in training on livestock 
management before adoption 0.05 0.30 
EQUIB 1 if involved in rotating credit and saving club 0.42 0.47 
Locations    
ALELTU 1 if located in Aleltu district 0.15 0.14 
BEREH 1 if located in Bereh district 0.12 0.17 
SULULTA 1 if located in Sululta district 0.13 0.15 
ALEMGENA 1 if located in Alemgena district 0.18 0.12 
ADA 1 if located in Ada district 0.14 0.14 
AKAKI 1 if located in Akaki district 0.17 0.11 
KUYU 1 if located in Kuyu district 0.11 0.18 
N Number of observations 265 226 
* Figures in parentheses are standard deviation. 
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5. Estimation results 
5.1 The switching equation: determinants of adoption  
Table 2 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the switching 
regression for the crossbreeding adoption and the outcome equations.  
Table 2. Endogenous switching regression results: livestock technology adoption and FYM 
equations 
  
 Variables 
  
Switcher 
 
FYM equation  
Adopter Non-adopter 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
CONSTANT -0.922 0.838 0.828 0.529 1.634*** 0.386 
CROPTECHNO 0.744 0.797 0.549*** 0.100 0.275** 0.136 
Residual for CROPTECHNO 0.006 0.817 - - - - 
FAMLYSIZE 0.049 0.043 0.027 0.024 0.022 0.025 
CULTIVATED -0.037 0.070 -0.067** 0.029 -0.007 0.035 
PRIVATGRAZ -0.236 1.031 0.365 0.423 0.826 0.656 
COMUNALGRAZ 0.009 0.178 -0.013 0.093 -0.234** 0.106 
TLU 0.020 0.068 0.126*** 0.028 0.016 0.044 
TLU-squared 0.003 0.004 -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
ZEROGRAZ 1.205*** 0.288 0.712*** 0.221 -0.008 0.212 
TRAININGLIVE 0.971*** 0.232 0.245** 0.108 -0.289* 0.163 
COOPMEMB 1.236*** 0.333 0.571*** 0.202 0.292 0.238 
OFFARM 0.251* 0.143 0.030 0.082 -0.284*** 0.082 
DISTROAD -2.327*** 0.604 -1.084*** 0.332 -0.661 0.467 
DISTMKT -1.926 1.923 -1.801*** 0.388 -1.752*** 0.479 
AGE 0.014 0.030 -0.001 0.022 -0.013 0.014 
AGE2/1000 -0.071 0.289 0.061 0.216 0.095 0.130 
MALEHEAD -0.103 0.201 -0.277** 0.119 -0.055 0.095 
EDUCATION 0.071*** 0.019 0.031*** 0.010 -0.032*** 0.011 
EQUIB 0.010 0.117 - - - - 
RISK -0.082** 0.034 - - - - 
DISTANCEDA -0.316** 0.138 - - - - 
Sigma (σi)   0.606*** 0.073 0.568*** 0.091 
rho (ρi)   0.859*** 0.099 -0.929** 0.100 
Joint significance of instruments  
F(3, 199)a = 1.46 
χ2(3)b = 21.18*** 
 
Number of observation  491 
Wald χ2  167.90 
Log pseudolikelihood  -544.09 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; a and b refer to joint significance test in the 
outcome and selection equation, respectively. District dummies are included to control for agro-ecological 
differences across locations, but the results are not shown here.
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Most of the results in the switching equation are in line with the expectation. There is 
a negative association between distance to extension services from residences and adoption of 
crossbreeding – as the distance increases, adoption of the technology decreases. The result is 
consistent with the prediction of the innovation adoption model that the shorter the distance, 
the better the opportunity to obtain information, the better the communication in the 
innovation diffusion process, and the lower the transaction cost of accessing the information 
and technologies (Rogers, 1962; Wozniak, 1993; Abdulai et al., 2008). 
Farmers’ market access to improved livestock feeds (concentrate feeds) and to 
veterinary services are found to be important determinants of crossbreeding adoption. The 
coefficients of variables for input market access (distance to road and distance to market) are 
both negative and jointly statistically significant. The result is in agreement with Abdulai and 
Huffman (2005), who argue that increased productivity of the livestock system based on 
crossbreeding is not intrinsic to the modified germplasm but is rather a function of the 
availability of complimentary inputs; without coupling these supporting technological inputs, 
adoption of crossbred cattle by farmers might not be likely. The positive and significant effect 
of technical training on adoption of crossbreeding is a clear indication of the importance of 
subject-specific skills for the critical evaluation of innovations. With subject-oriented skills – 
here training on livestock production and management practices before adoption takes place – 
farmers’ entrepreneurial abilities, resource allocation skills in particular, become increasingly 
advanced (Schultz 1975; Carlson et al., 1993; Wozniak, 1993). Evidence on the importance of 
human capital in the adoption of new technologies provides support for policy initiatives such 
as educational support facilities for the technologies. 
About 44% of the sample households (about 58% of crossbreeding non-adopters and 
45% of crossbreeding adopters) preferred the alternatives representing the intermediate to 
extreme risk-aversion categories (Table 1). This figure agrees with that of Yesuf and 
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Bluffstone (2009) and is slightly lower than that of Teklewold and Köhlin (2011), who found 
that about 50% and 63% of farm households in the Ethiopian highlands fell in the mentioned 
risk-aversion categories, respectively. The estimation results show that farmers’ attitudes to 
risk have a negative effect on the propensity to adopt crossbreeding livestock technology. 
Understandably, keeping crossbred cattle is likely affected by several random variables that 
bring uncertainty to the yield and even risk of technology failure, e.g., death of cattle due to 
the need for intensive and costly management practices (Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). 
Consistent with Baerenklau (2005) and Carlson et al. (1993), the risk-averse farmers who do 
not invest in livestock technology may accept the uncertain consequences, hence a 
disincentive effect on the likelihood of using the technologies. Risk-averse farmers endeavor 
to stay away from strategies of having crossbred cattle that are expected to yield relatively 
high variance in farm income, and instead tend toward the status quo with relatively low 
variance, possibly at the cost of some reduction in expected farm income. 
The estimated coefficient for the crop technology is positive on livestock technology 
adoption, but not statistically significant at conventional levels. We expect crop technology to 
be endogenous to the adoption of livestock technology. For instance, farmers may allocate 
more land to improved crop technology if they own crossbred cattle. Hence, we need to 
instrument crop technology. We do so by using as instruments the average distance of farming 
plots and whether farmers visited crop demonstration farms. There is no reason to suspect that 
the distance to plots and visiting demonstration farms will affect the decision to adopt 
livestock technology except through their effect on adoption of crop technology. The 
instruments are jointly highly significant with an F-statistic of 4.95. Since the livestock 
technology adoption variable is dichotomous and our endogenous variable is continuous, we 
use the Rivers and Vuong (1988) approach to instrumentation and include the reduced form 
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residuals from the instrumenting regression5 in the regression. The t-statistic of the predicted 
residual is only 0.01, which suggests that endogeneity is not a problem.  
The additional insight from the switching equation is that the coefficient of education 
is positive and statistically significant, which supports the human capital theory of innovation 
diffusion (Wozniak, 1993; Abdulai and Huffman, 2005). The use of a zero grazing system, 
membership in farmers’ cooperatives, and participation in off-farm activities are all positively 
correlated with adoption of crossbreeding. This points to the important role of product market 
and asset market imperfections in the technology adoption process. 
5.2 The farmyard manure production equation 
Table 2 presents estimates of the endogenous switching FYM production regression 
model. We also estimated the exogenous switching 6  FYM production model to reveal 
important differences between the two models. This approach assumes that technology 
adoption is exogenously determined although it is potentially a choice variable. However, 
allowing for correlation between the error terms of the FYM equations and the selection 
equation leads to an upward correction for the adopters and downward correction for the non-
adopters for most of the coefficients of the covariates.  
For farm households that did not adopt crossbreeding, the correlation coefficients are 
negative (ρ = −0.929) and statistically significant; for the adopters they are positive (ρ = 
0.859) and significantly different from zero. Therefore, the hypothesis of absence of sample 
selectivity bias may be rejected, and the estimated selection effect is negative for the non-
adopters and positive for the adopters. The result allows estimation with endogenous 
switching to control for the predicted probability of adoption in order to correct for a possible 
selection effect associated with unobserved factors that might simultaneously affect the 
participation and outcome decision. 
                                                          
5 To save space, the results for the instrumenting regression are omitted. 
6 To save space, the empirical estimates of the exogenous switching model are not presented here. 
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The signs of the correlation coefficients imply that farm households that adopted 
crossbreeding have unobserved characteristics that allow them to produce more than a random 
farm household from the sample. However, non-adopters do not do better than random 
households.  
The result of the switching regression model could logically link joint application of 
crop-livestock technologies to organic fertilizer production. As expected, the result reveals the 
difference between adopters and non-adopters of crossbreeding on the effect of crop 
technology on FYM production. In both cases, this effect is positive and significant. However, 
the effect of crop technology is higher for farm households that adopt crossbreed cattle (0.55 
percentage points) than those that use traditional livestock production practices (0.28 
percentage points). The explanations for the significant indirect effect of modern crop 
varieties adopted in the cropping system on FYM production in the livestock system may hold 
in two ways. Firstly, in crop-livestock systems, farmers usually choose to grow modern crop 
varieties that could increase both grain and straw yields (Traxler and Byerlee, 1993; Magnan 
et al., 2012). Straw is a valuable source of animal fodder to increase the production of 
livestock products and by-products such as FYM for small farmers in regions characterized by 
an intensive crop-livestock system, low or high seasonal biomass production, and local fodder 
markets that are isolated due to high transportation costs (Traxler and Byerlee, 1993; Marenya 
and Barrett, 2007; Magnan et al., 2012). Secondly, the increase in grain productivity and 
income may relax financial constraints to buy inputs for livestock production. 
The switching regression results also provide insight on the contribution of other 
socio-economic variables to FYM production. The use of zero grazing systems (stall-feeding), 
herd size (in terms of tropical livestock unit (TLU)), and membership in farmers’ cooperatives 
are the three most important variables positively affecting FYM production of farm 
households that adopted crossbreeding. The role of the zero grazing system is important for 
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increasing FYM production, compared to the open grazing system. With stall feeding 
systems, farmers basically keep their livestock at a certain place that allows them to provide 
better management and close follow-ups, and that naturally also offers the opportunity for 
farmers to collect the by-products (such as dung) with minimum effort.  
Even though TLU has a positive effect on FYM production, its implication for policy 
recommendations must be considered with great care, as it might be constrained, e.g., by 
shortage of grazing land as well as overgrazing (because of overstocking) – problems that 
might cause land degradation. Here we may also observe a parabolic-shaped relationship 
between FYM production and herd size. This non-linear relationship indicates that livestock 
output increases with the size of livestock until a certain herd size and then declines due to 
overstocking. The result also implies that controlling the number of animals and shifting to 
improved breeds are other possible important sources of efficiency gains, especially in a 
developing country where large numbers of low-producing animals are available (Herrero et 
al., 2009).  
The regression result also reveals the negative and significant effect of market access 
on FYM production. Education has significant impacts, with a positive effect for adopters and 
a negative effect for non-adopters. Female-led households produce significantly more FYM 
than do male-led households. Perhaps in rural areas women could be responsible for the 
collection, management, marketing, and utilization of FYM. However, a non-significant 
gender effect on FYM production is found in the absence of the crossbreeding technology. 
5.3 Estimation of average crossbreeding adoption effect 
We predict unconditional and conditional expected FYM production in each regime 
(Table 3). The unconditional FYM production could be interpreted as the expected or 
suggested FYM quantity before the farm household decides on a particular regime, while 
conditional FYM is the quantity for farm households that actually made a decision on whether 
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or not to adopt the technology. As for the unconditional FYM production, we find an average 
production of 6.49 and 3.97 tons for adopters and non-adopters, respectively. This represents 
a 64% (2.52 tons) advantage of adopting the livestock technology for a randomly selected 
farm household. This expected effect is lower than the difference between the sample means 
of FYM production under actual conditions, which is ~5 tons (calculated as 10.67 – 5.53). 
This illustrates the fact that adopters and non-adopters have systematically different 
characteristics; simply contrasting sample averages is likely to provide misleading estimates. 
Table 3.  Expected quantity (ton/year) of FYM produced under actual and counterfactual conditions 
and average adoption effects 
Decision Unconditional Conditional on farm households that 
Adopted Did not adopt 
Adopting ( )amiQE  = 6.49 (0.19) ( )1=liami TQE  = 10.67 (0.33) ( )0=liami TQE  = 3.68 (0.08) 
Not-adopting ( )nmiQE  = 3.97 (0.08) ( )1=linmi TQE  = 2.72 (0.09) ( )0=linmi TQE  = 5.53 (0.14) 
Effects 2.52 (0.20) 7.94 (0.34) -1.84 (0.16) 
* Figures in parentheses are standard errors. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level 
The average adoption effect for farm households that did adopt in the actual and 
counterfactual case is 7.94 tons (10.67 tons versus 2.72 tons), an increase of 292%. This is the 
effect of crossbreeding on the treated households (i.e., households that adopted the 
technology). The result points to a higher-than-expected crossbreeding effect for randomly 
drawn farm households. The difference between the two measures (i.e., 7.94 – 2.52 = 5.42 
tons) indicates the extent of positive self-selection. The expected adoption effect for untreated 
households (farm households that did not adopt crossbreeding) is -1.84 tons FYM (3.68 tons 
versus 5.53 tons). This is, however, lower than the unconditional adoption effect (i.e., 2.52 – -
1.84 = 4.36 tons), which indicates negative self-selection. The difference between the average 
adoption effect for farm households that did adopt (7.94) and those that did not adopt (-1.84) 
is the transitional heterogeneity (Di Falco et al., 2011). This indicates that farm households 
that did adopt the technology have systematically different characteristics than those that did 
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not adopt, making adopters better producers than non-adopters even without adopting the 
technology. This finding highlights that improvement in FYM production requires not only 
encouragement of adoption of high breed livestock technology but also consideration of the 
associated socio-economic characteristics such as complementary market, cropping, and 
livestock management options.  
To analyze FYM production heterogeneity further, we predict unconditional and 
conditional production with different market, livestock, and crop production characteristics 
(Table 4).  
Table  4. Estimation of average crossbreeding adoption effect on FYM production (tons/year) under 
different crop-livestock production scenarios using switching regression 
Scenarios 
 
 
                    Average adoption effect 
Zero 
grazing* 
Cooperative 
member* 
Proportion of area 
covered with improved 
crop varieties 
Unconditional Conditional on farm households that 
Adopted Didn’t adopt 
0 0 < 0.25 1.33 6.49 -2.72 
0 0 0.25 - 0.85 1.97 6.22 -2.96 
0 0 0.85 - 1.0 2.56 7.47 -2.62 
0 1 < 0.25 5.17 6.05 -2.90 
0 1 0.25 - 0.85 4.84 9.29 -2.33 
0 1 0.85 - 1.0 3.62 5.43 -4.16 
1 0 < 0.25 3.79 6.44 -2.52 
1 0 0.25 - 0.85 7.85 11.81 -2.11 
1 0 0.85 - 1.0 7.46 10.56 -5.87 
1 1 < 0.25 8.65 10.37 -3.14 
1 1 0.25 - 0.85 2.25 6.66 -0.91 
1 1 0.85 - 1.0 6.21 11.35 -0.47 
*: 1= if practiced; 0=otherwise 
The unconditional and conditional average crossbreeding adoption effects tend to 
increase when the livestock management practice is further integrated with increased intensity 
of crop technology. For instance, farm households that practiced the stubble-feeding system 
and grew modern crop varieties on more than 85% of the cultivated land produced 14.7 tons 
of FYM if using crossbred livestock, while they produced only 3.4 tons under the traditional 
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livestock production system. Under such a scenario, the average adoption effect for farm 
households that did adopt is 11.3 tons and -0.47 tons for farm households that did not adopt 
crossbreeding. This pattern probably reflects the complementarity between crop and livestock 
production. 
Table 5 also presents the average crossbreeding adoption effects estimated by the 
KBM and NNM methods, as well as indicators of the matching quality from the matching 
models.  
Table 5 Estimation of average crossbreeding adoption effects (ATT) according to extent of modern 
crop variety adoption using Propensity Score Matching Methods 
Matching 
algorithm 
Proportion of 
area covered 
with improved 
crop varieties 
ATT 
Absolute standardized bias p-value of LR 
Number of 
observations with in 
common support 
Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
% bias 
reduction 
Unmatched Matched 
Number 
of treated 
Number 
of control 
N
ea
re
st
 n
ei
gh
bo
r m
at
ch
in
g <0.25 
5.64* 
(3.09) 
22.56 21.41 5.1 0.000 0.093 46 73 
0.25 - 0.85 
3.49** 
(1.55) 
22.56 15.78 30.1 0.000 0.099 82 134 
0.85 - 1.00 
5.09 
(5.89) 
22.56 20.64 8.5 0.000 0.429 33 57 
Total 
3.91** 
(2.14) 
22.56 10.79 52.2 0.000 0.146 191 265 
K
er
ne
l-b
as
ed
 m
at
ch
in
g 
<0.25 
4.45* 
(2.70) 
22.56 15.30 32.2 0.000 0.954 43 73 
0.25 - 0.85 
3.49*** 
(1.38) 
22.56 11.36 49.6 0.000 0.959 82 134 
0.85 - 1.00 
4.89 
(7.36) 
22.56 15.57 30.9 0.000 0.987 33 57 
Total 
2.66* 
(1.64) 
22.56 7.16 68.2 0.000 0.782 191 265 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are bootstrap standard errors; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The results are consistent with the parametric results. The matching results from the 
KBM and NNM approaches indicate that adoption of crossbreeding leads to a positive and 
significant effect on FYM production. Specifically, the KBM and NNM causal effects of 
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crossbreeding adoption on FYM production suggest that the quantity of FYM produced is 
2.66–3.91 tons higher for adopters than for non-adopters. Table 5 also presents results of the 
causal impacts of crossbreeding adoption on FYM production for different intensities of 
modern crop technologies. As in parametric regression, the results generally reveal that even 
within the different intensities of modern crop varieties, crossbreeding tends to affect 
positively the quantity of FYM produced. This finding is robust7 in suggesting integration of 
crop-livestock technology adoption in the mixed farming system.  
The major objective of propensity score estimation is to balance the distribution of 
relevant variables across the groups of adopters and non-adopters, rather than obtaining a 
precise prediction of selection of treatment (Kassie et al., 2010). The covariate balancing test 
before and after matching, using the NNM and KBM methods, is used to examine whether the 
differences in covariates in the two groups in the matched sample have been eliminated. As 
shown in Table 5, the results revealed that a substantial reduction (up to 68%) in absolute 
standardized bias was obtained through matching. This is higher than what Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggested is reasonable, as according to them a standardized difference of 
greater than 20% should be considered as large. The p values of the likelihood ratio tests 
before and after matching indicate that the joint significance of the regressor is always 
rejected after matching, whereas it was never rejected before matching. The results suggest 
that there is no systematic difference in the distribution of covariates between adopters and 
non-adopters after matching. 
7. Conclusions 
A negative soil-nutrient balance is the main constraint in most crop-livestock mixed 
systems on smallholder farms in many developing countries. Jointness of crops and livestock 
                                                          
7 The results of the logit specification of the propensity score to predict the probability of adopting the 
crossbreeding is similar to the results of the probit specification in the switching regression. For the sake of 
space, this result is not reported here. 
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production in the mixed farming system is often considered to be an opportunity for 
smallholder farmers to move toward sustainable agricultural production because of the 
associated intensified organic matter and nutrient recycling (Marenya and Barrett, 2007). In 
the mixed farming system, adoption of crop-livestock technologies that contribute to better 
nutrient cycling would be an important part of the attraction for greater crop-livestock 
integration. However, agriculture development policies in developing countries are sometimes 
at odds with realities of agriculture jointness. The lack of due consideration of livestock 
production and improvement, due to policy makers and planners underestimating the 
importance of farming system approaches that consider livestock an integral and significant 
component of a mixed farming system, affects the sustainable management of resources. In 
further support of the idea, using farm household data from Ethiopia this study employed an 
endogenous switching model to examine the effect of crop and livestock technology on FYM 
production and identify factors limiting the adoption of livestock technology.  
The results indicate that the likelihood of adopting livestock technology is positively 
correlated with complementary livestock production inputs such as improved grazing systems, 
veterinary services, improved feeds, and access to extension services. It is, however, 
negatively correlated with an individual’s risk aversion. The extent of the FYM production 
gap between adopters and non-adopters of livestock technology – particularly with respect to 
improved crop, livestock, and market conditions – suggests that non-adopters might face 
difficulties increasing FYM production without using the improved livestock technologies. 
The most salient feature of the above result is that it is a clear indication for the importance of 
the most subtle and often ignored issues of the farming systems as far as agricultural 
technologies development and dissemination are concerned. As is the case for the mixed 
farming system, provision of technologies consistent with the system for joint intensification 
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of the crop and livestock systems is perhaps required to maximize the positive external effect 
that one produces over the other.  
Motivated by the limitations of this study, we also highlight a few points for possible 
further investigation that would conceivably complement the results found here. Critical 
analysis of the diversification of FYM utilization with options for analyzing the allocation 
patterns must be sought to couple the implications of the production-side problems.  
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Abstract: Soil degradation is one of the most serious environmental problems in the high-
lands of Ethiopia. The prevalence of traditional agricultural land use and the absence of 
appropriate resource management often result in the degradation of natural soil fertility. 
This has important implications for soil productivity, household food security, and poverty. 
Given the extreme vulnerability of farmers in this area, we hypothesized that farmers’ risk 
preferences might affect the sustainability of resource use. This study presents experimental 
results on the willingness of farmers to take risks and relates the subjective risk preferences to 
actual soil conservation decisions. The study looked at a random sample of 143 households 
with 597 farming plots. We found that a high degree of risk aversion significantly decreases 
the probability of adopting soil conservation. This implies that reducing farmers’ risk expo-
sure could promote soil conservation practices and thus more sustainable natural resource 
management. This might be achieved by improving tenure security, promoting access to 
extension services and education, and developing income-generating off-farm activities.
Key words: adoption—Ethiopia—risk preference—soil conservation
The Ethiopian highlands cover 40% of 
Ethiopia’s land mass but account for 
about 95% of all cultivated land. Almost 
88% of its human population lives there, 
with 70% of the total livestock population 
of the country (Ayele 1999). It is estimated 
that over 90% of the economic activities in 
Ethiopia are concentrated in the highlands. 
The sustainable use of land in these areas 
faces problems due to continuous cropping 
and repeated cultivation of sloping lands 
without proper consideration for soil con-
servation and fertility amendments. The soil 
resources are eroding at an alarming rate, but 
at this time, there is insufficient awareness, 
both within and outside the farming com-
munity, of the sources of this problem. Now, 
even the more productive areas in Ethiopia 
are facing high rates of soil erosion.
Soil erosion—averaging 4.2 t ha–1 y–1 (1.68 
tn ac–1 yr–1) of soil loss—is a huge contribu-
tor to the low productivity of Ethiopian soils 
(Hurni 1993). As a result, soil erosion is putting 
out of use some 20,000 to 30,000 ha (49,600 
to 74,400 ac) of croplands annually (Bewket 
2007; FAO 1986). The Soil Conservation 
Research Project (Hurni 1993) estimated 
the effect of soil erosion on crop productiv-
ity for the major crops using a production 
function based on time-series data. In this 
study, a loss of 1 cm of soil depth (about 100 
t ha–1 [40 tn ac–1] of soil) was estimated to 
reduce about 2% and 4.5% of the production 
of wheat in vertisols (black, fissured soil) and 
red upland soil, respectively. Like in other 
subSaharan African countries (Sanchez et al. 
1996), depletion of the soil fertility of small 
Ethiopian farm plots is the fundamental bio-
physical limiting factor responsible for the 
declining per capita food production (Elias 
and Scoones 1999). In view of this, soil ero-
sion and soil depletion constitute a national 
hazard, whose containment is a prerequisite 
for national development, particularly in a 
society that is agriculture based.
The traditional explanations for soil deg-
radation relate to resource depletion and 
land mismanagement associated with lim-
ited soil conservation practices. Generally, 
the objectives of soil conservation are pre-
vention of soil loss and management of soil 
fertility. Sheng (1989) defined soil conserva-
tion as a conscious process for the use and 
protection of land, including wise land use, 
necessary soil management, and erosion con-
trol. Some studies on the economics of soil 
conservation in developing countries have 
suggested incentives for farmers to adopt soil 
conservation by analyzing their household 
characteristics and the features and attri-
butes of their farm operations (Thao 2001; 
Ervin and Ervin 1982; Saliba and Bromley 
1986; Soule et al. 2000; Gebremedhin and 
Scott 2003). Generally, land tenure arrange-
ments, soil characteristics, input and output 
prices, availability of off-farm employment, 
farm size, household size, discount rates, and 
government policies influence the use of (or 
refusal to use) soil conservation measures by 
farmers in developing countries.
Rarely, however, has the influence of risk 
aversion for adoption of soil conservation 
practices been addressed, and strong empiri-
cal evidence to test its importance and impact 
has been scarce and scattered. Feder et al. 
(1985), in their review of the conservation 
adoption literature, attributed this scarcity 
to difficulties in observing and measuring 
risk and uncertainty. Farmers are unlikely to 
invest in soil conservation unless they can see 
the benefits of soil erosion control. In prac-
tice, the major benefit that a farmer receives 
from soil conservation is the soil itself—a 
potential asset for future income. The stock 
of soil available to a farmer is essentially an 
economic asset that can be exploited through 
cultivation to yield a stream of present and 
future income (Barbier 1990). Often, the 
return for practicing soil conservation can be 
long in coming, a feature that helps explain 
low adoption rates (Shively 1997). However, 
delays in payback do not completely explain 
low rates of investment, even if subjective 
discount rates are high. In many cases, practi-
cal strategies to reduce soil erosion introduce 
economic risks that reduce their potential 
value. Although several empirical studies have 
shown that the assumptions of risk neutrality 
can overestimate the value of soil conserva-
tion (e.g., Ndiaye and Sofranko 1994), such 
assumptions remains pervasive in studies of 
soil conservation adoption and performance.
Considering the importance of risk, 
Binswanger et al. (1980) validated that a 
portion of the observed variation among 
doi:10.2489/jswc.66.2.87
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individual farmers’ agricultural decisions can 
be related to variations in the same farm-
ers’ degrees of risk aversion (as measured in 
experiments), where the more risk averse 
choose more conservative options. Yesuf 
and Bluffstone (2009) also indicated that, in 
countries where poverty and environmental 
degradation are intertwined and credit and 
insurance markets are imperfect or com-
pletely absent, the critical factors affecting 
sustainability of resource use are the extent 
to which people discount the future and 
their willingness to undertake risky activi-
ties, such as investment decisions. Dillon and 
Scandizzo (1978) and Binswanger (1980) 
mentioned that poor people are risk averse 
and their production and investment deci-
sions are characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty and inefficiency, which in turn 
affects sustainable use of their resources.
Our study, therefore, was intended to 
measure the degree of risk preference of 
smallholder farmers and empirically exam-
ine the effects of farmers’ risk preferences 
(plus other socioeconomic factors) on soil 
conservation decisions at the farm level. The 
importance of this study lies in identifying 
ways to enhance soil conservation practices 
and to assist policymakers in promoting 
appropriate soil conservation strategies. We 
test two main researchable hypotheses: that 
farmers with high-risk aversion behavior 
exist in the study area, and that the prob-
ability of farm households’ soil conservation 
decision is negatively affected by a high 
degree of risk aversion. In addition, we 
expect that the choice of conservation sys-
tem would be influenced by a number of 
factors, namely, farmers’ attributes (level of 
education, farming experience, labor avail-
ability, wealth status, and social capital), farm 
characteristics (soil types, soil fertility, slope, 
plot size, and distance of plot from house), 
and policy-related variables (extension ser-
vices, use of radio, market access, off-farm 
work, and land tenure security).
Economic Model for Soil Conservation. 
There are a range of approaches applied in 
the analysis of soil conservation, ranging from 
quantification of the national impacts of soil 
loss to the identification of factors that influ-
ence farmers’ soil management decisions. 
The model used in this paper is an adapta-
tion of Barbier’s (1990) economic model of 
the soil-conservation investment decision of 
farmers in developing countries. The model 
posits price-taking producers who choose to 
install and maintain conservation practices in 
order to maximize the net present value of 
output. In our study, we extend the Barbier 
(1990) model to include farmers’ risk prefer-
ences and other socioeconomic characteristics 
as factors influencing the adoption decision.
Let f(xt, st) be a vector of outputs produced 
at time t, with xt as a vector of production 
inputs used at time t, and st as soil stock at 
time t. Consider a farm household that pro-
duces farm output in each period using a 
depletable input, st, and production inputs, 
xt. Soil dynamics, ds/dt, is represented by the 
soil quality retained by the investment in 
soil conservation, I(kt, θt, ht), and loss of soil 
from inputs used in agricultural production, 
xt. Investment in soil conservation, in turn, is 
a function of the stock of soil conservation 
structures (kt) and other factors, such as farm-
ers’ risk preferences (θt) and socioeconomic 
characteristics (ht). Let pt, wt, and ct be the 
respective price vectors corresponding to out-
put, input, and soil conservation, respectively, 
at time t. The net present value of a stream 
of output is defined as the accumulated crop 
revenue minus the cost of production inputs 
and the cost of soil conservation investment 
discounted by the discount rate (δ). Thus, the 
farmer’s objective function is to maximize 
the net present value of profit from agricul-
tural production using the production inputs 
(xt) and soil conservation (kt) (Max [x,k] II) 
(subscripts are suppressed), given by
e-δt[pf(x,s) - wx - ck]dt + e-δt V(st)
Max
{x,k} ∏- ∫ Tt = 0  
, (1)
and subject to
ds/dt = I(kt,θt,ht) - x  
, (2)
where T is the last period, dt is a mathemati-
cal expression indicating the change in time, 
and V(sT) is the scrap value of soil stock at 
the last period.
The first step in the optimization is the 
construction of the Hamiltonian (H) in 
equation 3. The right-hand side of the equa-
tion of motion (equation 2) is multiplied by 
the costate variables λt and is appended to 
the objective function from equation 1:
H = e-δt[pf(x,s) - wx - ck] + λ [I (k,θ,h) - x] . (3)
The costate variable λ represents the 
shadow or implicit price of the equation 
of motion or the shadow price of the soil 
stock in time t. The amount of soil stock used 
(the right hand side of the motion equation 
[equation 2]) multiplied by the implicit price 
of the soil stock gives the shadow value of 
soil capital (or the dynamic cost to future 
generations using the soil). The optimal level 
of soil conservation investment can be deter-
mined by differentiating equation 3 with 
respect to k:
 = -e-δtc + λ [Ik(k,θ,h)] = 0
∂H
∂k  
. (4)
By rearranging equation 4, the condition 
e–δt c = λ[Ik(k, θ, h)] implies that optimal soil 
conservation investment takes place at the 
level where the present value of the addi-
tional income derived from soil conservation 
equals the discounted additional cost of soil 
conservation. Alternatively, the optimal level 
of soil conservation can be determined as the 
level at which the additional user cost of soil 
erosion avoided just equals the discounted 
additional cost of soil conservation.
Soil is necessary for agricultural produc-
tion, and yield increases with soil stock (∂f [s, 
x]/∂s > 0), but yield also depends on other 
production factors. One of the features of 
this type of model is that stock of soil can 
be enhanced by investment in soil conser-
vation (∂s /∂I > 0). In turn, risk aversion is 
related to soil stock through investment in 
soil conservation structures, implying that 
soil conservation investment decreases with 
the farmer’s risk preferences (∂I/∂θ < 0). The 
more risk-averse farmers may be reluctant to 
sacrifice short-term returns for less certain 
long-term benefits of conservation practices.
Materials and Methods
Econometric Approach: Analysis of Soil 
Conservation Decision. Most adoption stud-
ies treat the use of soil conservation measures 
as a discrete all-or-nothing adoption decision 
of a single practice. From a policy perspec-
tive, such studies do not supply information 
on how multiple practices can fit together 
into an overall conservation package. 
Adopting multiple soil conservation practices 
is common in Ethiopia because topography 
and soils frequently vary substantially within 
farms and because farmers usually diversify 
crop and livestock production. For a given 
plot of land, a farmer is assumed to have 
preferences over a discrete set of alternative 
soil conservation systems—a choice problem 
that requires application of multinomial dis-
crete choice models.
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A multinomial logit model of a qualita-
tive response variable characterizes a choice 
from discrete (nominal) alternatives by a 
decisionmaker as a function of attributes 
associated with each alternative, as well as the 
characteristics of the individual. Because of 
its analytical and computational tractability, 
this model has been applied extensively to 
discrete choice processes in economics with 
great success (Manski and McFadden 1981; 
Train 2003). A certain soil conservation sys-
tem is chosen for a given plot, if and only if 
the expected utility from the selected option 
is greater than the utility obtainable from 
other available alternatives.
Consider the utility of farmer n adopting 
soil conservation practice choice j on the 
plot Unj. The systematic component of the 
utility of alternative j is specified as a func-
tion of an array of household (H), farm (F), 
and regional (R) characteristics. Hence,
Unj = αjHn + ΦjFn + ϕ jRn + εnj (5)
where αj is the parameters for household 
variables in the jth soil conservation alterna-
tives, Φj is parameters for farm variables in 
the jth soil conservation alternatives, and ϕj 
is parameters for regional variables in the jth 
soil conservation alternatives.
Assuming the errors εnj are indepen-
dently and identically distributed with an 
extreme value distribution, the probability 
that alternative j is chosen from J alternative 
sets can be represented by the multinomial 
logit model function (McFadden 1974; Train 
2003). The general form of the multinomial 
logit model is
Prob (choice = j | J )=               =
j
j
J
eβj,Znj
eβj,Znj∑
∑
exp(αjHn + ΦjFn + ϕjRn)
exp(αjHn + ΦjFn + ϕjRn)
, (6)
where jJ is the alternative j from the J alter-
native set, βj is set of parameters for the jth 
alternative, Znj is the variables for the nth 
observation at the jth alternative, n = 1…N 
indexes the observation, and j = 1…J indexes 
the choices.
The dependent variable is Y, coded as 0, 1, 
2 (alternative soil conservation systems); Zn 
is the explanatory vector (representing age, 
sex, education, extension contact, availability 
of family labor, risk attitude, time preference, 
plot size, soil type, slope, wealth and credit, 
etc). In order to identify unique coefficients 
for the alternatives, one of the outcomes in 
the multinomial logit model must be nor-
malized to zero.
Even if the coefficient estimates have 
different interpretations depending on the 
omitted category, the probabilities remain 
the same. Alternatively, the coefficients can 
be used to calculate the partial changes in 
probabilities (marginal effect). The marginal 
effects measure the expected change in 
probability of the choice being made with 
respect to a unit change in an explanatory 
variable (Greene 2008). When there are J = 
3 number of soil conservation choices, the 
marginal change in probability of a given 
soil conservation system, given the change in 
continuous variable Zn, is the partial deriva-
tive of Prob (Y = j) with respect to Zn:
= Pj
J - 1
j = 1
∂Prob(Y = j )
∂Zn
βnj - ∑ Pjβnj
 
, (7)
where Pj is the probability of selecting alter-
native j, and βnj is the parameter estimate of 
the of the variable for the nth farmers at the 
jth alternative.
The marginal effect of a dummy vari-
able on the event probability can always be 
accurately derived by taking the difference 
between the predicted probability when the 
variable is equal to 1 and when it is equal 
to zero:
Prob(Y = j )  = Prob(Y = jZ, Zk = Z1) –
   Prob(Y = jZ, Zk = Z0) , (8)
where Z is the set of explanatory variables, 
Zk is the dummy variable, Z1 represents 
when the dummy variable is one, (Zk = Z1), 
and Z0 represents when the dummy variable 
is zero, (Zk = Z0).
Summing the marginal probabilities across 
the three soil conservation alternatives for a 
unit change of a given explanatory variable 
gives zero sums, implying that an increase in 
the adoption rate of the given choice due 
to a change in a particular characteristics’ 
variable is compensated by a decrease in the 
adoption rate of other choices in the set.
Experimental Design: Risk Preference. 
The expected utility theory, developed by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M) in 
1944, is of central importance in describ-
ing decisionmaking under risk. Decision 
under uncertainty, as described by the N-M 
model, defines the utility to be maximized 
as the expectation of the utilities of the ran-
dom alternatives. The concept of lottery as 
a formal device to represent risky alterna-
tives is the basic building block for the N-M 
expected utility theory. A simple lottery is a 
list, L = (P1,…, PN); PN ≥ 0 for all n; and Σn 
Pn  = 1, where P1 is the probability of the 
event occurring on the first outcome, PN is 
the probability of the event occurring on 
the last outcome, and Pn is the probability of 
outcome n occurring. The concept of “risk 
aversion” intuitively implies that, when fac-
ing choices with comparable returns, agents 
tend to choose the less risky alternative—a 
construction we owe largely to Friedman 
and Savage (1948). To put it differently, an 
agent is risk averse if replacing an uncertain 
final wealth by its expected value makes the 
agent better off. 
In our study, which follows Binswanger’s 
(1980) framework, the experimental method 
through predetermined choices approach 
was employed to elicit farmers’ risk prefer-
ences by observing the reactions of farmers 
to a set of actual gambles in one period. In 
a real context, respondents were presented 
with certain realistic lotteries of the form 
(qmax, qmin, P), promising a monetary prize 
for qmax (maximum payoff) with probability 
P, or qmin (minimum payoff) with probability 
(1 – P). The lotteries represent different real 
farming conditions and were designed with 
six different payoff levels, given a 50% prob-
ability of bad or good harvesting conditions 
(table 1). Following the von N-M expected 
utility approach, an important ingredient is 
the specification of the utility function. The 
most popular parameter specification is the 
constant partial risk-aversion function, where 
the utility function is characterized by the 
risk-aversion parameter, θ. Thus, a constant 
partial risk-aversion function as an approxi-
mation of (U = [1 - θ]M 1 - θ) is used in order 
to measure and obtain a unique risk-aversion 
coefficient, where U is the utility function, 
θ is the coefficient of risk aversion and M 
is the certainty equivalent of the prospect. 
The upper and lower limits of θ are given 
in table 1.
The participants in the household survey 
were confronted with two experiments: one 
involved hypothetical trade-offs and the 
other the possibility of real payoffs. In the 
real payment experiment, the average pay-
offs for the household in the experiment was 
Ethiopian birr (ETB) 25 ($1 [US] = 11.00 
ETB in 2008), which was approximately five 
times the daily wage level of the unskilled 
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Table 1
Pay-offs and classifications of risk aversion associated with each option a farmer could choose.
	 Payoffs	(ETB)*
	 	 	 	 Standard	 	 Approximate
	 Bad	 Good	 Expected	 deviation	 Trade	offs	 risk	aversion	 Risk-aversion
Choice	 harvest	 harvest	 gain	(E)	 (SD)	 (Z)†	 coefficients	(θ)	 category
6	 10.00	 10.00	 10.00	 0.00	 0.78	to	1.00	 ∞	to	7.47	 Extreme
5	 9.00	 18.00	 13.50	 4.50	 0.71	to	0.78	 7.47	to	1.74	 Severe
4	 8.00	 24.00	 16.00	 8.00	 0.50	to	0.71	 1.74	to	0.81	 Intermediate
3	 6.00	 30.00	 18.00	 12.00	 0.33	to	0.50	 0.81	to	0.32	 Moderate
2	 2.00	 38.00	 20.00	 18.00	 0.00	to	0.33	 0.32	to	0.00	 Slight
1	 0.00	 40.00	 20.00	 20.00	 –∞	to	0.00	 0.00	to	–∞	 Neutral
*	ETB	=	Ethiopian	birr.	$1	(US)	=	11.00	ETB	(2008).
† Z	is	the	tradeoff	between	expected	gains	and	standard	deviations	of	two	games	(Z	= dE/dSD).
laborers in the study area. Table 1 explains 
the basic structure of the experiment. The 
sample farmers were presented with a choice 
of six alternatives. Once the farmers selected 
one of the alternatives, they had a 50% prob-
ability of getting either the bad harvest or 
good harvest payoffs. The experiment con-
sisted of offering farmers a set of alternatives 
where higher expected gain could only be 
obtained at the cost of higher variance—thus 
a decline in risk aversion.
Basically, individuals were assumed to be 
risk averse in cases where a certain outcome 
with a lower payoff was preferred over an 
uncertain outcome with a higher expected 
payoff. In contrast, risk-seeking behavior 
occurs when individuals consistently choose 
a gamble over a certain payoff with a higher 
payoff value. For instance, choice 1 is a safe 
alternative where subjects could earn ETB 10, 
with either a bad or good outcome. In alter-
native 5, a coin was tossed, and the subject 
received ETB 2 if the coin showed heads and 
ETB 38 if the coin showed tails. Compared 
to choice 1, the individual’s expected gain 
now increased by ETB 10, but if heads (bad 
outcome) turned up, it would reduce the 
return by ETB 8. In the meantime, the stan-
dard deviation in gain increased from ETB 0 
to ETB 18. Hence, with such uncertainty in 
gains, choice 5 involves more risk than the 
previous choices (choices 1 to 4).
Study Areas and Data. The data in this 
study were derived from a formal survey 
of a random sample of farm households, 
December 2003 to January 2004. The areas 
selected for this study, Ankober and Basona-
Werena districts, are located within the 
North Shewa zone, in the Amhara Regional 
State of Ethiopia. North Shewa is a major 
agricultural region in the central highlands 
of Ethiopia, with a rugged, mountainous 
terrain where altitudes range from 1,600 to 
3,500 m (5,249 to 11,483 ft) above sea level. 
The area has two periods of rainfall, aver-
aging 900 to 1,740 mm (35 to 68 in); the 
main rainy season (Meher) runs from July to 
September, and the short rainy season (Belg) 
is from January to April. The concentration 
of rain in heavy showers, coupled with an 
undulating landscape, causes significant ero-
sion throughout the area.
A two-stage cluster sampling technique 
was employed to randomly select one vil-
lage from each district and households from 
each village. The list of 29 villages in the 
Basona-Werena district and 18 villages in 
the Ankober district served as the sampling 
frame for the choice of the two villages, 
while households within each village were 
the sampling units. The sample households 
were randomly selected from the villages 
using lists that exhaustively record all mem-
bers of the two villages.
A structured questionnaire was prepared, 
and the sampled respondents were inter-
viewed. Initial presurvey tests were made 
in the selected villages to verify the feasibil-
ity of the study and allow redesign of the 
questionnaire if needed. In the randomly 
selected farm households, the head of the 
household was surveyed personally by expe-
rienced interviewers under close supervision 
by one of the authors. The enumerators 
also had special training to make sure they 
understood each question and the reason for 
the information captured in the survey. The 
respondents were interviewed in their local 
language, Amharic. As a result of the care-
ful preparations, there were no rejections of 
the central questions in the survey by the 
respondents, and we are confident that the 
data is of unusually high quality. Information 
was also gathered in discussions with other 
key actors (e.g., field extension agents and 
soil conservation experts).
The survey included a total of 143 
farm households, with 597 farming plots, 
and gathered information on the farmers’ 
socioeconomic characteristics (such as age, 
household size, educational level, land-hold-
ing status, extension contact, availability of 
credit, availability of modern farm inputs, 
community participation, social organiza-
tion, transportation cost, etc.) and farm 
characteristics (plot size, number of plots, 
soil fertility, slope of each plot, soil type, 
distance of plot from the house, cultivation 
arrangements, etc.). For identification pur-
poses, the interviewers sketched all the plots 
farmed by the respondent and then collected 
detailed information for each plot, referring 
to the sketch as needed. The survey also 
elicited information from farmers regarding 
their risk preferences using the experiment 
mentioned above.
Results and Discussion
We found that indigenous soil conserva-
tion techniques were considered part of the 
farming system in the study areas. Indeed, in 
both areas, most farmers were familiar with 
traditional land improvement-conservation 
techniques, such as stone terraces and soil 
bunds. These are embankments of stone or 
soil constructed along the contour of the land 
to control the surface water runoff down the 
slope. The two soil conservation structures 
require different investments in amount of 
time and labor and have different effective-
ness against erosion (Gebremedhin and Scott 
2003). In the Basona-Werena and Ankober 
districts, about 27% and 38% of the plots, 
respectively, have stone terraces. However, 
no more than 16% to 18% of the plots in 
both areas use soil bunds. In Ankober, soil 
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conservation structures have traditionally 
been constructed by the farmers themselves. 
A majority of the farmers in Ankober are 
aware of the need for a continuing incre-
ment of soil conservation practices and have 
perceived a subsequent decline in soil ero-
sion. However, in Basona-Werena, the 
government has instead implemented a huge 
food-for-work program since the 1980s spe-
cifically to build soil conservation structures 
throughout the district.
Farmers’ Risk Preference. The farmers’ 
responses regarding risk preferences cor-
responding to the real and hypothetical 
experiments are presented in table 2. The 
results revealed that, in both the hypothetical 
and the real payoff experiments, a majority 
of farmers fell in the intermediate, severe, 
and extreme risk-aversion categories. In 
both experiments, 73% to 75% of the farm-
ers in Basona-Werena and 60% to 63% of 
farmers in Ankober preferred the alternatives 
representing intermediate to extreme risk-
aversion. This result is slightly higher than 
Yesuf and Bluffstone (2009), who found 
that about 50% of farm households in the 
Ethiopian highlands chose the intermediate 
to extreme risk-aversion alternatives. The 
distribution of risk preferences in other simi-
lar studies in developing countries, such as 
Binswanger (1980) in India and Wik et al. 
(2004) in Zambia, is quite different than our 
result. About 83% of farmers in India and 
52% of farmers in Zambia fell into the inter-
mediate-to-moderate risk category, while 
only 32% of farmers in our study were in 
this group.
Table 2
Frequencies of farmers’ responses to risk preferences corresponding to real and hypothetical experiements.
	 Basona-Werena	 	 Ankober	 	 All	samples
Risk-aversion	 	 Cumulative	 	 Cumulative	 	 Cumulative
category	 Farmers	(%)	 farmers	(%)	 Farmers	(%)	 farmers	(%)	 Farmers	(%)	 farmers	(%)
Risk	preferences	in	hypothetical	experiment
Extreme	 29.6	 29.6	 35.7	 35.7	 32.6	 32.6
Severe	 19.7	 49.3	 17.1	 52.8	 18.4	 51.0
Intermediate	 25.4	 74.7	 7.1	 59.9	 16.3	 67.3
Moderate	 9.9	 84.6	 21.4	 81.3	 15.6	 82.9
Slight	 8.5	 93.1	 7.1	 88.4	 7.8	 90.7
Neutral	 7.0	 100.0	 11.4	 100.0	 9.2	 100.0
Risk	preferences	in	real	experiment
Extreme	 31.0	 31.0	 32.9	 32.9	 31.9	 31.9
Severe	 21.1	 52.1	 21.4	 54.3	 21.3	 53.2
Intermediate	 21.1	 73.2	 8.6	 63.1	 14.9	 68.1
Moderate	 12.7	 85.9	 21.4	 84.5	 17.0	 85.1
Slight	 2.8	 88.7	 5.7	 90.2	 4.3	 89.4
Neutral	 11.3	 100.0	 10.0	 100.0	 10.6	 100.0
It is generally acknowledged that experi-
ments conducted without real payment 
options may suffer from hypothetical bias. 
In order to avoid such a problem and pro-
vide enough incentive for the farmers to 
reveal their true preferences, our experiment 
included a real payoff. Comparison of the 
responses of the hypothetical and real experi-
ments indicated that most of the respondents 
consistently maintained similar responses in 
both parts of the experiment. However, we 
saw a positive and significant correlation of 
responses in the risk aversion elicited with 
both hypothetical and real payoffs, contrary 
to what Wik et al. (2004) found.
Soil Conservation Decision. The major 
observed soil-conservation practices were 
stone terraces and soil bunds constructed by 
the farmers themselves. The decision to build 
soil conservation structures depends upon a 
wide variety of factors, many of which are 
specific to a particular area, household, or 
plot characteristic. The explanatory variables 
for this decision, included in our analysis 
are based on the theory discussed above and 
the literature on conservation investment. 
Expected effects of household, plot, and 
regional characteristics on choice of soil con-
servation practices are included in table 3.
Attitude towards risk is a variable that mea-
sures farmers’ willingness to take risks and is 
a potentially important determinant on the 
decision to use soil conservation practices. 
Risk aversion can have important implica-
tions for the adoption of technologies and 
the farmers’ production-consumption plans. 
Various studies have shown that farmers plan 
their investment under risk (Binswanger 
1980; Yesuf and Bluffstone 2009). The use 
of soil conservation, on the other hand, 
entails subjective risk (uncertainty of yield), 
particularly in the short term. In the longer 
term, the determining factor is whether soil 
conservation itself increased or reduced pro-
duction risk.
Time preference is a variable that mea-
sures the extent to which a household is 
likely to postpone current consumption for 
future income or the extent to which house-
holds discount future benefits for current 
consumption. High subjective discount rates 
may be associated with extreme poverty, 
when immediate subsistence is uncertain. 
More fundamentally, a high discount rate 
decreases the net present value of future ben-
efits from soil conservation. Thus, there is an 
expected inverse relationship between farm-
ers’ discount rate and a decision to invest in 
soil conservation.
An expected change of land holdings is 
used as proxy for land tenure insecurity. It 
represents a variable that indexes a household’s 
attitude toward change in land size. Farmers 
may be insecure (perception of insecurity) 
about their current farms due to frequent 
redistribution of lands (Admassie 2000). 
Studies have also shown that tenure security 
is essential for adoption of soil conservation 
practices (Gebremedehin and Scott 2003). It 
is, therefore, expected that tenure insecurity 
(expected decline of land holdings) is nega-
tively related to soil conservation adoption.
As information and communication 
mechanisms, contact with various sources of 
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for the multinomial logit model variables.
	 	 	 Standard	 	 	 Expected
Variable	 Variable	definition	 Mean	 deviation	 Minimum	 Maximum	 effects
Dependent	variables
Stone	terrace	 Has	stone	terracing	(1	=	yes)	 0.25	 —	 0.00	 1.00
Soil	bund	 Has	soil	bunds	(1	=	yes)	 0.13	 —	 0.00	 1.00
Household	characteristics
Sex	 Sex	of	household	head	(1	=	male)	 0.91	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +/–
Age	 Age	of	household	head	(in	years)	 45.76	 13.10	 19.00	 84.00	 +
Literacy	 Education	of	household	head	(1	=	able	to	read	and	write)	 0.56	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Labor	 Labor	force	(man-equivalent)	 2.65	 1.16	 0.50	 6.90	 +
Extension	 Contact	extension	agent	(1	=	yes)	 0.46	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Radio	 Has	a	radio	(1	=	yes)	 0.10	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Off-farm	 Off-farm	work	(1	=	yes)	 0.39	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +/–
Oxen	ownership	 Household	owns	oxen	(1	=	more	than	one	ox)	 0.69	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Income	 Net	income	(in	ETB)	 71.50	 657.76	 1,933.0	 2,989.0	 +
Land-holding	trends	 Decline/increase	in	land	holdings	(1	=	decline)	 0.90	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 –
Risk	preference	 Risk-aversion	coefficient	 3.14	 2.89	 0.00	 7.50	 –
Time	preference	 Farmers’	discount	rate	 89.61	 36.39	 12.91	 186.04	 –
Plot	characteristics
Parcel	 Number	of	plots	 5.40	 2.73	 1.00	 15.00	 –
Plot	size	 Plot	size,	timad*	per	plot	 1.00	 0.62	 0.13	 4.00	 –
Tenure	 Tenure	arrangements	(1	=	owner	operated)	 0.93	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Highly	fertile	soil	 Fertility	of	soil	(1	=	high	fertile)	 0.23	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Medium	fertile	soil	 Fertility	of	soil	(1	=	medium	fertile)	 0.33	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Soil	type	 Soil	type	(1	=	vertisol)	 0.50	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Gentle	slope	 Plot	has	gentle	slope	(1	=	gentle	slope)	 0.27	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Steep	slope	 Plot	has	steep	slope	(1	=	steep	slope)	 0.39	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Plot	distance	 Distance	of	plot	from	home	(in	minutes	walking)	 18.01	 17.11	 1.00	 90.00	 –
Plot	use	 Plot	use	(1	=	crop)	 0.53	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Regional	characteristics
District	 District	(1	=	Basona-Werena)	 0.50	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +/–
Road	distance	 Distance	from	household	to	nearest	road	 38.81	 39.43	 1.00	 180.00	 –
	 			(in	minutes	walking)
Community	 Community	participation	(1	=	yes)	 0.94	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Idir Idir	membership	(1	=	yes)	 0.10	 —	 0.00	 1.00	 +
Notes:	ETB	=	Ethiopian	birr.	$1	(US)	=	ETB	11.00	(2008).
* 1 timad	≈	0.25	ha.	
information, advice from extension agents, 
and use of radio, are expected to positively 
influence adoption of soil conservation 
practices. Use of radio and extension activi-
ties may help farmers better understand the 
potential effects of soil erosion and benefits 
of soil conservation, as well as enhance their 
technical capacity to apply soil conserva-
tion technologies. The influence of off-farm 
work is indeterminate a priori. Income gen-
erated from off-farm work is expected to 
have a positive influence if it helps buffer the 
short-term variations in output due to soil 
conservation practices. In this case, the impli-
cation is that farmers with off-farm incomes 
are better risk takers, vis-à-vis using soil-
conservation practices, than those without 
off-farm income. On the other hand, off-
farm income may have a negative influence, if 
a farmer’s off-farm employment opportuni-
ties cause labor shortages (from competition 
between agriculture and off-farm activities) 
that restrict the farmer’s ability to build soil 
conservation structures.
The regional characteristics that we 
focused on were market access and social 
interactions in the community. Distance 
from the home to the nearest all-weather 
road was a proxy for market access (transport 
cost). Nearest roads were associated with 
low farm-input costs and high farm-output 
prices, as well as greater opportunities for 
income-earning activities, primarily sale of 
farm produce. Market access offers incen-
tives for farmers to improve or maintain 
their land quality, and thus a positive effect 
is expected. Farmers who have the advantage 
of good market access (including demand 
for high-value crops) may find adopting soil 
conservation practices very attractive eco-
nomically. Existence of good road networks 
also facilitates the availability of and exposure 
to information and communication, leading 
to a positive influence on adoption of soil 
conservation practices. We included a district 
dummy (one for Basona-Werena and zero for 
Ankober) in the model to control for village 
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differences in knowledge, farming traditions, 
and physical characteristics, for example.
Social capital is characterized by norms, 
interactions, and reciprocity, leading to 
cooperation and information flows. It con-
sists of discrete platforms organized and run 
by members of communities or groups for 
various purposes, notably to enhance con-
fidence, pool resources, encourage savings, 
and extend credit. In addition to specialized 
functions, these networks act as forums for 
the exchange of experience and informa-
tion about market behavior, the movement 
of goods and prices, development needs and 
priorities, among others. Hence, they can be 
used to promote development endeavors.
Two variables are proxies for social capital 
in this study. One, community participation, 
means the household is engaged in soil con-
servation activities organized by the farmers’ 
association. In most cases, the farmers’ asso-
ciation organized campaigns to reclaim and 
preserve the communal lands in the area. It 
is thus expected that the spillover effect of 
this variable on household adoption of soil 
conservation will be positive. Studies have 
indicated that, where public soil conservation 
activities take place in the same community, 
but not on the household’s own land, farmers 
will be more likely to adopt soil conservation 
due to the experience effect of reducing real 
conservation investment costs and aware-
ness of the effectiveness of conservation 
(Gebremedhin and Scott 2003).
The second variable for social capital uses 
membership in idir, the traditional form of 
social organization. In small holder agriculture, 
the problem of labor shortage might be solved, 
for example, through idir—a form of mutual 
cooperation imbued with a team spirit. In 
idir, information flows among members, and 
they have labor-sharing arrangements. The 
effect of idir on adoption of soil conserva-
tion is indeterminate a priori. If the members 
enter an agreement to share labor for conser-
vation activities, idir will positively affect the 
decision to use soil conservation; otherwise, 
other social activities will deter adoption of 
soil conservation practice.
Regression Results. The chi-square test 
statistic for the estimated multinomial logit 
model is 276.95, with 52 degrees of freedom. 
The null hypothesis that the nonintercept 
coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at the 
0.01 probability level. This means that the 
empirical multinomial logit model is highly 
significant in explaining the choice of soil 
conservation practice by farmers. We used 
the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator of 
variances, instead of the conventional maxi-
mum likelihood variance estimator, in order 
to avoid the problem of heteroscedasticity. 
In the analysis of plot-level data, correlated 
observations may occur due to repeated mea-
surements of the same subjects. Clustering 
the data allows repeated observations, which 
are not independent within groups, although 
they must be independent across groups so 
that standard errors can be adjusted for clus-
tering within farm households to allow for 
correlation within the group. The predictive 
power of the model is quite appealing. The 
choice of none, stone terraces, or soil bunds is 
correctly predicted for 81%, 60%, and 53% of 
the sample, respectively. These results are also 
an indication that we have made a correct 
classification of soil conservation technolo-
gies for our analysis. Although there is some 
variation in the labor input and efficacy of 
other technologies applied, overall they are 
more similar to the “no” category than the 
soil and stone bunds.
As we hypothesized, the farmer’s decision 
to build stone terraces is significantly affected 
by extension services, sex of the household 
head, expected declines in land holdings, risk 
aversion, discount rate, number of plots, ten-
ure arrangement (if owner operated), slope 
of the plot (medium steepness), use of the 
plot (for cropping), community participation, 
and the district dummy. On the other hand, 
choosing soil bunds significantly depends on 
the sex of the household head, age of the 
household head, family labor force, participa-
tion in off-farm work, trend of land holdings 
(expected declines in land holdings), plot 
size, tenure arrangement (if plot is operated 
by the owner), soil type, steepness of the plot, 
use of the plot (for cropping), and the district 
dummy. Estimated changes in probabilities 
for the variables used in the regression are 
presented in table 4.
The farmer’s attitude towards risk has a 
negative effect on the choice of stone terraces 
or soil bunds. Because conservation practices 
are affected by several random variables that 
result in uncertainty in yields, planning for 
soil conservation involves decision making 
under risk. The farmer’s risk preference is 
thus related to such decision-making sce-
narios. The highly significant marginal effect 
coefficient on “none” indicates that the 
farmer’s risk aversion increases the likelihood 
of nonadoption of soil conservation practices. 
The risk-averse farmers who do not invest 
in soil conservation may assume uncertain 
yield variations, increasing the probability of 
no soil conservation by about three percent-
age points. The result of the marginal effect 
again implies that a 1% increase in farmers’ 
risk aversion would significantly (p < 0.05) 
decrease the probability of choosing stone 
terraces by three percentage points.
Farmers’ risk-aversion behavior has the 
same negative effect on choice of soil bunds, 
but is statistically nonsignificant. One reason 
for the significant negative effect of farmers’ 
risk preference for stone terraces over soil 
bunds may be that construction of stone ter-
races requires more labor and a longer time 
to produce the expected higher return in 
yield than soil bunds. As a result, the more 
risk-averse farmers may be less interested in 
investing in stone terraces than soil bunds. 
Figure 1 depicts the change in predicted 
probabilities of household decisions about 
soil conservation (none, stone terraces, or 
soil bunds) due to changes in risk-aversion 
behavior. The figure clearly shows that as risk 
aversion increases, the probability of adop-
tion of stone terraces continuously declines, 
no conservation increases, and use of soil 
bunds remains unchanged.
As expected, the farmers’ time preference 
influences patterns of resource use in the 
current and future period. Farmers who have 
a higher discount rate are less inclined to 
long-term investments, giving more weight 
to the current, rather than the future, period. 
Our result confirmed the hypothesized rela-
tionship: the farmers’ intertemporal discount 
rate negatively affected the decision to adopt 
soil conservation practices. A higher rate of 
time preference leads to the significantly 
higher (p < 0.05) likelihood of nonadop-
tion of soil conservation. The marginal effect 
of nonadoption of soil conservation, due 
to a unit percentage change in the farm-
ers’ intertemporal discount rate, is about 0.2 
percentage points. Even though the farmers’ 
time preference negatively affects the use of 
both stone terraces and soil bunds, its effect is 
statistically different from zero (p < 0.05) on 
likelihood of adoption of stone terraces only. 
The result of the marginal effect indicates 
that a unit percentage increase in the farm-
ers’ intertemporal discount rate will decrease 
the probability of choosing stone terrace by 
about 0.2 percentage points. The two choices 
have different effects probably because (com-
pared to soil bunds) farmers consider stone 
terraces to be more labor intensive. Their 
longer investment (time and labor) discour-
ages the farmers’ willingness to delay current 
consumption for future income.
The farmers’ expectation that they will 
lose some of their land holdings significantly 
reduces the likelihood of choosing either 
stone terraces and soil bunds to a 10% and 
5% significance level, respectively. Farmers 
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may be very cautious, given their tenure 
insecurity arising from land redistribution 
that may occur in response to growing popu-
lation size and new membership in farmers’ 
associations. The result of the marginal effect 
indicates that tenure insecurity significantly 
increases the likelihood of nonadoption of 
soil conservation by about 18 percentage 
points. Alternatively stated, this result implies 
that when farmers’ security of land is not 
guaranteed (when farmers expect their land 
holdings to decline), the probability of using 
stone terraces or soil bunds is significantly 
reduced by 12 and 6 percentage points, 
respectively. This suggests that securing the 
tenure of a household’s holding(s) should be 
an alternative policy option to encourage 
investments in soil conservation.
Access to extension services is another 
important variable, indicating that farmers 
can get information about better farming 
practices and enhance their understanding 
and technical capability for soil-conservation 
practices. The result of the marginal effect 
analysis indicates that access to extension 
services increases the probability of adopt-
ing stone terraces by about eight percentage 
points. The effect of this variable on the 
choice of soil bunds is negative, although sta-
tistically insignificant. It also suggests that the 
marginal effect of age on the likelihood of 
choosing soil bunds is negative and statisti-
cally different from zero at the 5% significance 
level. The probability of adopting soil bunds 
increases more for young farmers than old 
ones. The implication is that older house-
hold heads probably have shorter planning 
horizons and are physically weaker, more 
resistant to change, and hence less interested 
in adopting soil conservation practices that 
have long-term effects. Thus, targeting young 
farmers for soil conservation intervention is 
probably an advisable strategy because they 
tend to be quicker and more flexible in 
deciding to adopt new ideas and technolo-
gies. With a longer life span—because these 
farmers are younger—they would anticipate 
a longer payout period for their investment.
Families are an important source of labor 
for farm operations and construction of soil 
conservation structures. This variable has a 
positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05) 
effect on the likelihood of adoption of soil 
bunds. The result of the marginal effect sug-
gests that a unit increase in family labor size 
positively changes the adoption of soil bunds 
by about one percentage point. Its effect 
on the choice of stone terraces is negative 
and statistically insignificant. The marginal 
effect of off-farm work on the adoption of 
soil bunds is positive and statistically differ-
ent from zero at the 10% significance level, 
implying that the income obtained from off-
farm work relaxes the liquidity constraints 
in conservation adoption. Participation in 
off-farm work increases the likelihood of 
adoption as evidenced by the negative and 
statistically significant marginal effect on the 
nonuse of conservation practices.
As hypothesized, the number of plots 
(fragmentation of farms) has a negative effect 
on adoption of soil conservation, indicated 
by the highly significant marginal effect on 
“none.” One possible explanation is that with 
more plots, farmers may face increased trans-
action costs in constructing the conservation 
structures. Stone terraces, particularly, require 
the cumbersome activity of transporting 
stones to the different plots. This may signifi-
cantly deter the adoption of stone terraces. 
However, the effect of the number of plots 
on the choice of soil bunds is positive but 
insignificant. The size of the fragmented plot 
area also positively influences the adoption 
of soil conservation practices. The signifi-
cant marginal effect on “none” indicates that 
decreasing plot area increases the probability 
of nonadoption of soil conservation practices 
on a plot. This is probably because farmers 
may be constrained in building conservation 
structures because stone terraces and soil 
bunds are not suitable or convenient for a 
small plot. In addition, farmers assume that 
Table 4
Marginal effects on probability of choice of soil conservation (stone terracing or soild bunds)  
or none.
Variables	 None	 Stone	terracing	 Soil	bunds
Household	characteristics
Sex	 –0.116	(0.051)**	 0.084	(0.049)*	 0.032	(0.011)
Age	 0.007	(0.000)	 0.002	(0.009)	 –0.008	(0.003)**
Age-squared	 –0.0001	(0.0001)	 0.0001	(0.0001)	 0.0001	(0.0001)
Literacy		 –0.022	(0.047)	 0.013	(0.042)	 0.009	(0.014)
Labor	force	 0.011	(0.019)	 –0.025	(0.017)	 0.013	(0.007)**
Extension	 –0.062	(0.054)	 0.079	(0.049)**	 –0.018	(0.016)
Radio	 –0.024	(0.076)	 –0.014	(0.058)	 0.037	(0.041)
Off-farm	 –0.105	(0.064)*	 0.069	(0.055)*	 0.035	(0.021)**
Oxen	ownership		 –0.039	(0.052)	 0.048	(0.042)**	 –0.009	(0.016)
Income	 0.0001	(0.0001)	 –0.0001	(0.0001)	 –0.0001	(0.0001)
Land	holding	trends	 0.179	(0.080)**	 –0.118	(0.070)**	 –0.062	(0.032)**
Risk	preference	 0.029	(0.017)*	 –0.029	(0.015)**	 –0.0001	(0.004)
Time	preference	 0.002	(0.001)**	 –0.002	(0.001)**	 –0.0002	(0.0003)
Plot	characteristics
Parcel	 0.019	(0.011)**	 –0.023	(0.010)***	 0.003	(0.003)
Plot	size	 –0.049	(0.027)*	 0.031	(0.024)	 0.019	(0.009)*
Tenure	 –0.120	(0.040)***	 0.092	(0.038)*	 0.028	(0.012)**
Highly	fertile	soil	 –0.047	(0.061)	 0.021	(0.053)	 0.024	(0.018)
Medium	fertile	soil	 –0.009	(0.042)	 –0.013	(0.037)	 0.024	(0.018)
Soil	type	 –0.002	(0.038)	 0.040	(0.032)	 –0.038	(0.015)***
Gentle	slope	 –0.178	(0.064)***	 0.163	(0.061)***	 0.016	(0.018)
Steep	slope	 –0.208	(0.060)***	 0.164	(0.056)***	 0.044	(0.020)**
Plot	distance	 0.001	(0.001)	 –0.001	(0.001)	 –0.001	(0.001)
Plot	use	 –0.286	(0.044)***	 0.241	(0.038)***	 0.045	(0.016)***
Regional	characteristics
Road	distance	 –0.007	(0.017)	 0.013	(0.016)	 –0.007	(0.005)
Community	 –0.163	(0.037)**	 0.152	(0.029)**	 0.011	(0.020)
Idir	 –0.056	(0.105)	 0.056	(0.095)	 0.001	(0.032)
District	 0.369	(0.086)***	 –0.201	(0.069)***	 –0.168	(0.056)***
Note:	Numbers	in	parenthesis	are	standard	error.
*p < .1 **p < .05 ***p < .01
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conservation structures take up space on a 
small plot and reduce the net cropping area. 
Unwillingness to invest on small plots could 
also be considered as an issue of economies 
of scale.
There is a significant difference between 
the two districts in terms of adopting soil 
conservation practices. Compared to Basona-
Werena, farmers in Ankober have an increased 
likelihood of constructing stone terraces and 
soil bunds by about 20 and 10 percentage 
points, respectively. The adoption rate of soil 
conservation practice in Ankober is relatively 
higher (53%) than in Basona-Werena (44%). 
In Ankober, soil conservation and soil fertil-
ity maintenance dates back more than half a 
century. Personal communication and discus-
sions with elderly people and experts from 
the local agricultural office revealed that 
construction of soil conservation structures is 
indigenous to the area with no government 
intervention so far. However, soil conserva-
tion in Basona-Werena only appeared some 
thirty years ago with massive government 
intervention. The longer and indigenous tra-
dition of soil conservation in Ankober may 
be one reason for the relatively higher rate 
of adoption there. In addition, the topogra-
phy of Ankober may also help promote soil 
conservation in the area. According to infor-
mation from the district office of agriculture, 
the topography of both districts is mountain-
ous, rugged, and plain landscape, respectively, 
covering 75%, 15%, and 10% of Ankober and 
50%, 27%, and 23% of Basona-Werena.
Summary and Conclusions
This study uses survey data of smallholder 
farmers in the central highlands of Ethiopia 
to analyze the determinants of their choice 
of soil conservation practices. The study 
also endeavors to elicit farmers’ attitudes 
toward risk preference using an experimen-
tal method. A link between risk aversion 
and resource protection in the form of soil 
conservation practice was found in this study. 
Results from the experimental method indi-
cate that the estimated risk aversion is high, 
and the majority of the farmers were found 
to have intermediate, severe, or extreme risk 
aversion. Empirical results from the multino-
mial logit analysis demonstrate that a high 
degree of risk aversion has a negative effect 
on adoption of labor-intensive soil conserva-
tion practices. Farmer’s risk aversion increases 
the likelihood of nonadoption of stone ter-
races and soil bund practices.
One implication of this work is that it is 
important to target the underlying reasons 
for nonadoption, such as high degrees of 
risk aversion and high subjective discount 
rates. Promotion of a longer-term and more 
effective soil conservation system (e.g., stone 
terraces) can not only be done through 
extension and programs targeting physical 
interventions, as indicated by the results from 
Basona-Werena where such activities have 
been common. Farmers in the study areas 
are poor with high estimated discount rates 
and levels of risk aversion. Because they are 
trapped in poverty, their high discount rates 
and risk preferences mean that they are still 
inclined to use erosion-prone practices to 
meet their present, urgent needs. The results 
imply that, to promote soil conservation, 
policies that reduce farmers’ risk behavior 
should have priority, especially those that 
address land tenure security and rights, access 
to better education and extension services, 
and development of income-generating off-
farm activities.
The results of this study are limited to the 
soil-conservation adoption decision. Because 
the observation is only whether a farmer 
uses a given practice or not, the study can 
only predict the effect of farmers’ risk pref-
erences and other factors on the probability 
that they will adopt a particular soil-conser-
vation practice. The use of most of these soil 
conservation practices is considered to be a 
continuous investment, however. Moreover, 
the conservation effects of using soil-con-
serving practices are likely to vary according 
to the intensity to which they are used. 
Hence, it would also be important to study 
the extent to which such practices are used 
and what factors might influence the inten-
sity of soil conservation practices. 
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Appendix:  Supplementary material 
Parameter estimates of the multinomial logit model 
are presented in Table A1. It is likely that risk 
aversion is an endogenous variable that farmers can 
change through adoption decisions. Although most 
variables explaining risk aversion is included in the 
model, there might be unobservable effects (for 
example missing market, motivation) influencing 
farmers’ risk aversion behavior, which also 
influence the decision to adopt soil conservation 
structures, which manifests itself through the risk 
aversion variable which does not represent a pure 
farmers’ risk aversion behavior effect. 
To address this issue and check the robustness of 
our results, we also implement a two-stage 
instrumental variable multinomial logit model, with 
identifying instruments to deal with the potential 
endogenity of farmers’ risk aversion to the choice 
of soil and water conservation practices. The use of 
instrumental variables with in a multinomial logit 
model has been previously used by Deolalikar 
(1998)1. We do so using an instrument participation 
in farmers’ socialization group (locally known as 
Mahber) and rotating saving and credit club 
(locally known as Iqub). These groups allowing 
                                                 
1 Deolalikar AB. The demand for health services in 
a developing country: the role of prices, service 
quality, and reporting of illness. In Handbook of 
Applied Economic Statistics, Ullah A, Giles DEA 
(eds). Marcel Dekker Inc.: New York, 1998; 93–
117. 
 
individuals to spread their risks over a diversified 
portfolio of friends and allow information to flow 
among participants there by reducing information 
asymmetries and affect individuals risk preference. 
It is thus suspected that participation in such groups 
will affect the adoption of soil conservation through 
their effect on farmers’ risk preference.  
Results with instrumented risk aversion are 
presented in table A2. Standard errors are corrected 
to account for the presence of a predicted regressor. 
The instruments are jointly strongly significant with 
a statistics of 28.89 (p-value = 0.000) in the first 
stage reduced model. On the other hand, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis (p-value = 0.446) that the 
instrumental variables have no impact on the 
adoption of soil conservation. This generates a test 
of exogenity, which suggests unobservable effects 
are not correlated with adoption decision. However, 
in our case there is no appreciable difference 
between those estimates treating farmers’ risk 
preference as exogenous, and those treating as 
endogenous variable. The negative and significant 
effect of risk aversion on adoption of soil 
conservation still remains2. 
  
                                                 
2 We also experimented with random effects probit 
regression. Results are very similar to those 
reported in table A2 and are omitted here for the 
sake of space. 
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Table A1. Parameter estimates of the multinomial 
logit estimates of the probability of adoption of stone 
terracing and soil bunds 
Variables 
Stone terracing Soil bunds 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Household 
characterstics     
Sex 0.855 0.599 1.562* 0.847 
Age 0.002 0.073 -0.214** 0.094 
Age-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.001 
Literacy 0.113 0.331 0.284 0.419 
Labor -0.177 0.132 0.365* 0.195 
Extension 0.578 0.355 -0.420 0.413 
Radio -0.065 0.495 0.761 0.652 
Off-farm 0.566 0.405 0.986** 0.501 
Oxen 
ownership 0.381 0.379 -0.181 0.456 
Income (10-3) -0.298 0.214 -0.196 0.236 
Land holding 
trends -0.847** 0.410 -1.308*** 0.424 
Risk 
preference -0.225* 0.115 -0.036 0.138 
Time 
preference -0.013** 0.007 -0.007 0.008 
Plot 
characerstics     
Parcel -0.173** 0.083 0.061 0.085 
Plot size 0.263 0.186 0.567** 0.287 
Tenure 0.977* 0.531 1.382 0.847 
High fertile 
soil 0.189 0.391 0.669 0.504 
Medium 
fertile soil -0.081 0.292 0.596 0.392 
Soil type 0.267 0.263 -0.994*** 0.313 
Gentle slope 1.095*** 0.376 0.631 0.473 
Steep slope 1.227*** 0.399 1.322*** 0.482 
Plot distance -0.004 0.010 -0.007 0.014 
Plot use 1.968*** 0.305 1.646*** 0.403 
Regional 
characterstics     
Road distance 0.102 0.125 -0.182 0.143 
Community 2.444** 1.055 0.534 0.763 
Idir 0.390 0.608 0.094 0.934 
District -1.682*** 0.464 -3.148*** 0.631 
Constant -4.471* 2.339 0.559 2.143 
Log-likelihood ratio:            -339.44  
Wald χ2(54)                     301.79*** 
Number of observations:        597   
Note: none is the reference category; *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance difference at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table A2. Two stage instrumental variable 
multinomial logit estimates of the probability of adoption 
of stone terracing and soil bunds 
Variables 
Stone terracing Soil bunds 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Household 
characterstics     
Sex 0.516 4.429 1.265 7.221 
Age -0.013 0.124 -0.222 0.175 
Age-squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Literacy 0.226 0.372 0.311 0.739 
Labor -0.201 0.187 0.305 0.355 
Extension 0.592 0.481 -0.358 0.766 
Radio -0.077 0.625 0.682 0.723 
Off-farm 0.554 0.594 1.090 0.779 
Oxen 
ownership 0.711 0.520 0.156 0.806 
Income (10-3) -0.300 0.317 -0.255 0.449 
Land holding 
trends -0.921* 0.470 -1.425*** 0.550 
Risk 
preference -1.617* 0.931 -1.723 1.609 
Time 
preference -0.016* 0.009 -0.020 0.014 
Plot 
characterstics     
Parcel -0.227** 0.115 0.057 0.159 
Plot size 0.339 0.246 0.651 0.425 
Tenure 0.894 0.876 1.351 4.376 
High fertile 
soil 0.186 0.476 0.684 0.691 
Medium 
fertile soil -0.061 0.390 0.626 0.552 
Soil type 0.283 0.307 -0.946** 0.471 
Gentle slope 1.050** 0.482 0.678 0.564 
Steep slope 1.176** 0.483 1.326* 0.714 
Plot distance -0.001 0.012 -0.004 0.018 
Plot use 1.937*** 0.369 1.593** 0.646 
Regional 
characterstics     
Road distance 0.088 0.163 -0.183 0.240 
Community 2.318 7.025 0.330 6.921 
Idir 0.899 0.689 0.563 2.927 
District -1.661** 0.695 -3.226*** 1.220 
Constant -3.248 9.236 2.644 12.086 
Log-likelihood ratio                      -340.22  
Wald χ2(54) 255.16***  
Number of observations:                 597  
Joint significance of instruments: 
First stage: χ2(2):                            28.89***  
Second stage: χ2(2):                          3.71  
Note: none is the reference category; *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance difference at 10%, 5% and 
1% level, respectively. 
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